From: "Jamie Morgan" <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: values and social science
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2002 13:16:21 +0100


hi Mervyn, fromthe last section of Refelctions on Meta-Reality I'd say it's
possible to articulate indecision in a determinable way i.e. Bhaskar clearly
holds here that an enchanted world is one that contains paranormal phenomena
and a form of spirituality that he himself would interpret (whilst accepting
that others may not) as indicative of God -  whether an immanent God can be
sustained when meta-reality with characteristics from which we emerge is
articulated in quite the way he does becomes another issue.

Jamie

----- Original Message -----
From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 12:51 PM
Subject: Re: BHA: values and social science


> Hi Jamie,
>
> I think it's 'all faiths and no faith'. I would argue that atheism is no
> more or less a faith than theism, so in that sense it's covered by the
> formula. But you're right, atheists are not gonna like a theistic
> definition of spirituality. As an agnostic, I would appeal to them not
> to be deterred by the terminology but to engage with the arguments.
> Also, I'm not sure Bhaskar's position *is* a theism. I haven't read the
> first meta-Reality book yet, but since FEW he seems to have dropped much
> of the discourse about 'God' or 'god' and when he does deploy it he
> arguably uses it as a metaphor for the intrinsic structure of
> possibility of the world (without which human spirituality as defined by
> Carrol couldn't exist), just as Hegel arguably used 'God' to refer to
> the logical structure of the world. In the interview in JCR 5:1 he seems
> to be saying that he doesn't really know about god in a theistic sense:
>
> "So where does god fit into all this? The thing is, if someone wants to
> say god is the cosmic envelope, that's fine. If someone wants to say,
> OK, I agree with everything you've said, and I can find this also in my
> religion, but there's something beyond the cosmic envelope which is the
> cause or creator of the cosmic envelope, that too is absolutely fine
> with me. There may well be a cause, and there may not be a cause, the
> point is really, if you like, this is a minimal program, a program on
> which all people who want to see a eudaimonistic society, or achieve any
> objective in life, or ensure the survival of the planet, can all agree."
>
> [snip]
>
> "So if someone asks me, well, is god up there or not, surely you can
> tell us, I say really I don't know."
>
> I've got to bow out of this now, but do comment.
>
> Mervyn
>
> Jamie Morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
> >Hi Mervyn, perhaps since the problem is one of connotation - spirituality
to
> >spirit - forms of theism - problems of theistic interpretations of
> >consciousness, human purpose and anthropmorphic characteristics of all
> >reality - it would be more appropriate to use some other new term to
define
> >an all encompassing movement that is compatible with 'one god or no god'
> >rather than opposing alienation by alienating the atheistists by a
> >terminology that deters them from reading the substance of the argument.
> >Terms only stretch so far without snapping - when Derrida redefines
there's
> >nothing outside the text by later stating that the text includes,
practice,
> >and virtually all aspects that we might understand as social reality, one
> >wonders why he doesn't simply say the original terminology was
> >inappropriate.
> >
> >Jamie
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
> >Sent: Monday, October 21, 2002 7:01 PM
> >Subject: Re: BHA: values and social science
> >
> >
> >> Hi Carrol, all,
> >>
> >> >Incidentally, it seems to me that this critique of "values" applies
also
> >> >to the concept of "spirituality." I have never been able to understand
> >> >why materialists (and in particular _historical_ materialists) are so
> >> >anxious to cling on to claims to spirituality, which seems to me to be
a
> >> >pale substitute for human solidarity in a social order which
> >> >systematically negates solidarity.
> >>
> >> I'm too snowed under to come in on this interesting discussion, but on
> >> spirituality I can match quote for quote. Here, just to go on with, is
> >> Bhaskar's latest definition in an interview I did with him, forthcoming
> >> in JCR 1:1 (new series):
> >>
> >> ************
> >> Spirituality is total, consummate love - adoration - for everything
that
> >> exists and has value in its own right. A love which carries with it
> >> boundless energy and respect for all forms of being. And that's the
> >> ultimate cohesive force in social and natural life, and it must be
> >> creative, on the move. This brings me nicely to the issue you raised
> >> about creativity ex nihilo. We're continually evolving new
> >> possibilities, that's the extraordinary thing. Anything new - all
right,
> >> there's a material cause: there's something there already - but
anything
> >> new also involves an element of ex nihilo; if there wasn't this 'out of
> >> nothing' there could be no de novo (the emergence of the new from
> >> something). Ultimately every change embodies an element of complete
> >> novelty. If you could reduce change to pre-existing elements - if there
> >> was no ex nihilo element - there wouldn't be any change, you'd be
living
> >> in a totally static world. And ultimately the extraordinary thing about
> >> our world is that, when we reach particularly the levels of
> >> consciousness, we can create new possibilities, we can change things.
> >> And through the power of our love - our creativity - we can change
> >> ourselves and change the world. That's my definition of spirituality.
> >> Spirituality is not something static: it is growing, continual, love
for
> >> creation. An infinite and inexhaustible love for being and for life. A
> >> yearning to see everything unfold.
> >> **********
> >>
> >> Mervyn
> >>
> >>
> >> Carrol Cox <cbcox-AT-ilstu.edu> writes
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >rgroff-AT-yorku.ca wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> Hi all,
> >> >>
> >> >> Jamie asked, "Is a value best thought of as grounding  a belief and
how
> >does
> >> >> this accord with the openness of systems and the fallibility of
> >knowledge?
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >It seems to me, again kibbitzing from the sidelines, that this is an
> >> >impossible question to ask, fro reasons Bertell Ollman gives in
Chapter
> >> >4 of his _Alienation_. Here are a few paragraphs from that text:
> >> >
> >> >******
> >> >
> >> >        There is still another objection to ascribing an ethic to Marx
> >> >on the basis of his commitment to human fulfillment or any of the
other
> >> >goals listed.  This as that it is easily mistaken for a description of
> >> >what Marx actually and daily does, rather than a way of viewing his
> >> >work. Neither Taylor nor Maxmilien Rubel, who takes a similar
position,
> >> >sees Marx measuring each new question as it comes up alongside an
> >> >absolute standard and deciding which position to take accordingly.
Yet,
> >> >both men have been misunderstood in this way. <p. 44> This
> >> >misunderstanding arises because what is called "ethics" is generally
> >> >taken to involve a conscious choice; to act on the basis of a
principle,
> >> >under any guise, is to decide to do so.  An ethic assumes that for
each
> >> >question studied there was a period before the standard was applied
when
> >> >one's attitude was neutral, or at least less certain than afterwards;
> >> >and also that there is a possibility that one could have chosen
> >> >otherwise.
> >> >
> >> >        Robert Tucker rightly remarks that ethical inquiry (and hence
> >> >ethics)is only possible on the basis of a suspended commitment.  But
> >> >Marx never suspends his commitments; nor does he ever consciously
choose
> >> >to approve or disapprove; nor does it make any sense to say of the
> >> >matters he studied that he might have judged otherwise.  Tucker's
> >> >conclusion is that Marx is not an ethical, but a religious thinker
with
> >> >a "vision of the world as an arena of conflict between good and evil
> >> >forces." However, if expressing approval and serving certain goals are
> >> >insufficient grounds for ascribing an ethics to Marx, his conception
of
> >> >class struggle coupled with his vision of the future society are
hardly
> >> >enough to burden him with a religion.  But if Tucker is unlucky in the
> >> >alternative he offers, his criticism of attempts to treat Marxism as
an
> >> >ethical theory or as a product of an ethical theory remains valid.
> >> >
> >> >        The foregoing remarks may be summarized as follows: all
ethical
> >> >systems, that is all those ways of thinking which are generally
accepted
> >> >as such, have a basis for judgement which lies outside that which is
to
> >> >be judged.  This results in a suspended commitment until the "facts"
> >> >have been gathered and their relation to the standard for judgment
> >> >clarified.  The evaluation, when it comes, is a matter of conscious
> >> >choice.  Our problem then reduces itself to this: do we want to say of
> >> >Marxism, where none of these things apply, that it either is or
contains
> >> >an ethical theory?  One might, but then the limited sense in which
claim
> >> >is meant would have to be made explicit.
> >> >
> >> >                                        II
> >> >
> >> >I prefer to say that Marx did not have an ethical theory.  But how
then
> >> >to explain the approval and disapproval which he expresses in his
works,
> >> >the fact that he sided with the proletariat and incited them to
> >> >overthrow the system?  How, too, it may be asked, do <p. 45>I account
> >> >for his attachment to the cause of humanity and to the ideas of
> >> >communism and human fulfillment?  In asking such questions, however,
one
> >> >must be careful not to assume at the outset the form the answer must
> >> >take.  For this is what happens if one is saying, "Here are two
worlds,
> >> >facts and values; how do you link them?" But to accept that reality is
> >> >halved in this way is to admit failure from the start.  On the
contrary,
> >> >the relational conception which was discussed in the last two chapters
> >> >required that Marx consider what was known, advocated, condemned or
done
> >> >by everyone, himself included, as internally related.  Every facet of
> >> >the real world, and people's actions and thoughts as elements in it,
are
> >> >mutually dependent on each other for what they are, and must be
> >> >understood accordingly.
> >> >
> >> >        The logical distinction which is said to exist between facts
and
> >> >values is founded on the belief that it is possible to conceive of one
> >> >without the other.  Given a particular fact, the argument runs, one
may
> >> >without contradiction attach any value to it.  The fact itself does
not
> >> >entail a specific value.  Historically the view that moral beliefs are
> >> >contingent has tended  to go along with the view that they are also
> >> >arbitrary.  On this model, all judgment depends in the last instance
on
> >> >the independent set of values which each individual, for reasons best
> >> >known to himself, brings to the situation.  The ethical premiss is not
> >> >only a final arbiter but a mysterious one, defying sociological and
even
> >> >psychological analysis.  Though some recent defenders of orthodoxy
have
> >> >sought to muddle the distinction between fact and value with talk of
its
> >> >"context," "function,"  "real reference," "predisposition," etc., the
> >> >logical line drawn in conception remains.  Yet, if one cannot conceive
> >> >of anything one chooses to call a fact (because it is an open ended
> >> >relation) without bringing in evaluative elements (and vice versa),
the
> >> >very problem orthodox thinkers have set out to answer cannot be
> >> >posed.******
> >> >
> >> >Incidentally, it seems to me that this critique of "values" applies
also
> >> >to the concept of "spirituality." I have never been able to understand
> >> >why materialists (and in particular _historical_ materialists) are so
> >> >anxious to cling on to claims to spirituality, which seems to me to be
a
> >> >pale substitute for human solidarity in a social order which
> >> >systematically negates solidarity.
> >> >
> >> >Carrol Cox
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
> --
> This e-mail is intended for the named recipient only and may be privileged
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> immediately.
>
> Mervyn Hartwig
> 13 Spenser Road
> Herne Hill
> London SE24 ONS
> United Kingdom
> Tel: 020 7 737 2892
> Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>
> There is another world, but it is in this one.
> Paul Eluard
>
>
>
>
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>
>




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