File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2002/bhaskar.0210, message 55


Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2002 22:55:31 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: values and social science


But in the long run, if they don't conform with the findings of science,
we give them up. I don't think he's reneged on this (or much else). It
would be an interesting exercise to see what findings of science the
Bhaskarian philosophy has anticipated rather than announced.

The normal is relative to us. If we fully understood totality, nothing
could be paranormal.

Mervyn

Jamie Morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>Hi Mervyn, I'd say it's a bit more than expanding one's viewof the normal,
>this implicitly atributes reality to the paranormal (which is different than
>making a meta-reality for aspects of the possibility of different orders of
>being)This passes them off as emprically or transcendentially established
>aspects of it - neither of which is that certain as things stand.
>
>Jamie
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2002 5:05 PM
>Subject: Re: BHA: values and social science
>
>
>> Hi Jamie,
>>
>> >i.e. Bhaskar clearly
>> >holds here that an enchanted world is one that contains paranormal
>phenomena
>>
>> In a section of the interview that had to be edited out for reasons of
>> space etc, Bhaskar said that he doesn't believe there's anything
>> paranormal or super-normal, just that we have to expand our concept of
>> the normal.
>>
>> Just for the record.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>>
>>
>> Jamie Morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>> >hi Mervyn, fromthe last section of Refelctions on Meta-Reality I'd say
>it's
>> >possible to articulate indecision in a determinable way i.e. Bhaskar
>clearly
>> >holds here that an enchanted world is one that contains paranormal
>phenomena
>> >and a form of spirituality that he himself would interpret (whilst
>accepting
>> >that others may not) as indicative of God -  whether an immanent God can
>be
>> >sustained when meta-reality with characteristics from which we emerge is
>> >articulated in quite the way he does becomes another issue.
>> >
>> >Jamie
>> >
>> >----- Original Message -----
>> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>> >Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 12:51 PM
>> >Subject: Re: BHA: values and social science
>> >
>> >
>> >> Hi Jamie,
>> >>
>> >> I think it's 'all faiths and no faith'. I would argue that atheism is
>no
>> >> more or less a faith than theism, so in that sense it's covered by the
>> >> formula. But you're right, atheists are not gonna like a theistic
>> >> definition of spirituality. As an agnostic, I would appeal to them not
>> >> to be deterred by the terminology but to engage with the arguments.
>> >> Also, I'm not sure Bhaskar's position *is* a theism. I haven't read the
>> >> first meta-Reality book yet, but since FEW he seems to have dropped
>much
>> >> of the discourse about 'God' or 'god' and when he does deploy it he
>> >> arguably uses it as a metaphor for the intrinsic structure of
>> >> possibility of the world (without which human spirituality as defined
>by
>> >> Carrol couldn't exist), just as Hegel arguably used 'God' to refer to
>> >> the logical structure of the world. In the interview in JCR 5:1 he
>seems
>> >> to be saying that he doesn't really know about god in a theistic sense:
>> >>
>> >> "So where does god fit into all this? The thing is, if someone wants to
>> >> say god is the cosmic envelope, that's fine. If someone wants to say,
>> >> OK, I agree with everything you've said, and I can find this also in my
>> >> religion, but there's something beyond the cosmic envelope which is the
>> >> cause or creator of the cosmic envelope, that too is absolutely fine
>> >> with me. There may well be a cause, and there may not be a cause, the
>> >> point is really, if you like, this is a minimal program, a program on
>> >> which all people who want to see a eudaimonistic society, or achieve
>any
>> >> objective in life, or ensure the survival of the planet, can all
>agree."
>> >>
>> >> [snip]
>> >>
>> >> "So if someone asks me, well, is god up there or not, surely you can
>> >> tell us, I say really I don't know."
>> >>
>> >> I've got to bow out of this now, but do comment.
>> >>
>> >> Mervyn
>> >>
>> >> Jamie Morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>> >> >Hi Mervyn, perhaps since the problem is one of connotation -
>spirituality
>> >to
>> >> >spirit - forms of theism - problems of theistic interpretations of
>> >> >consciousness, human purpose and anthropmorphic characteristics of all
>> >> >reality - it would be more appropriate to use some other new term to
>> >define
>> >> >an all encompassing movement that is compatible with 'one god or no
>god'
>> >> >rather than opposing alienation by alienating the atheistists by a
>> >> >terminology that deters them from reading the substance of the
>argument.
>> >> >Terms only stretch so far without snapping - when Derrida redefines
>> >there's
>> >> >nothing outside the text by later stating that the text includes,
>> >practice,
>> >> >and virtually all aspects that we might understand as social reality,
>one
>> >> >wonders why he doesn't simply say the original terminology was
>> >> >inappropriate.
>> >> >
>> >> >Jamie
>> >> >
>> >> >----- Original Message -----
>> >> >From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>> >> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>> >> >Sent: Monday, October 21, 2002 7:01 PM
>> >> >Subject: Re: BHA: values and social science
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >> Hi Carrol, all,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >Incidentally, it seems to me that this critique of "values" applies
>> >also
>> >> >> >to the concept of "spirituality." I have never been able to
>understand
>> >> >> >why materialists (and in particular _historical_ materialists) are
>so
>> >> >> >anxious to cling on to claims to spirituality, which seems to me to
>be
>> >a
>> >> >> >pale substitute for human solidarity in a social order which
>> >> >> >systematically negates solidarity.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I'm too snowed under to come in on this interesting discussion, but
>on
>> >> >> spirituality I can match quote for quote. Here, just to go on with,
>is
>> >> >> Bhaskar's latest definition in an interview I did with him,
>forthcoming
>> >> >> in JCR 1:1 (new series):
>> >> >>
>> >> >> ************
>> >> >> Spirituality is total, consummate love - adoration - for everything
>> >that
>> >> >> exists and has value in its own right. A love which carries with it
>> >> >> boundless energy and respect for all forms of being. And that's the
>> >> >> ultimate cohesive force in social and natural life, and it must be
>> >> >> creative, on the move. This brings me nicely to the issue you raised
>> >> >> about creativity ex nihilo. We're continually evolving new
>> >> >> possibilities, that's the extraordinary thing. Anything new - all
>> >right,
>> >> >> there's a material cause: there's something there already - but
>> >anything
>> >> >> new also involves an element of ex nihilo; if there wasn't this 'out
>of
>> >> >> nothing' there could be no de novo (the emergence of the new from
>> >> >> something). Ultimately every change embodies an element of complete
>> >> >> novelty. If you could reduce change to pre-existing elements - if
>there
>> >> >> was no ex nihilo element - there wouldn't be any change, you'd be
>> >living
>> >> >> in a totally static world. And ultimately the extraordinary thing
>about
>> >> >> our world is that, when we reach particularly the levels of
>> >> >> consciousness, we can create new possibilities, we can change
>things.
>> >> >> And through the power of our love - our creativity - we can change
>> >> >> ourselves and change the world. That's my definition of
>spirituality.
>> >> >> Spirituality is not something static: it is growing, continual, love
>> >for
>> >> >> creation. An infinite and inexhaustible love for being and for life.
>A
>> >> >> yearning to see everything unfold.
>> >> >> **********
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Mervyn
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Carrol Cox <cbcox-AT-ilstu.edu> writes
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >rgroff-AT-yorku.ca wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Hi all,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Jamie asked, "Is a value best thought of as grounding  a belief
>and
>> >how
>> >> >does
>> >> >> >> this accord with the openness of systems and the fallibility of
>> >> >knowledge?
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >It seems to me, again kibbitzing from the sidelines, that this is
>an
>> >> >> >impossible question to ask, fro reasons Bertell Ollman gives in
>> >Chapter
>> >> >> >4 of his _Alienation_. Here are a few paragraphs from that text:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >******
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >        There is still another objection to ascribing an ethic to
>Marx
>> >> >> >on the basis of his commitment to human fulfillment or any of the
>> >other
>> >> >> >goals listed.  This as that it is easily mistaken for a description
>of
>> >> >> >what Marx actually and daily does, rather than a way of viewing his
>> >> >> >work. Neither Taylor nor Maxmilien Rubel, who takes a similar
>> >position,
>> >> >> >sees Marx measuring each new question as it comes up alongside an
>> >> >> >absolute standard and deciding which position to take accordingly.
>> >Yet,
>> >> >> >both men have been misunderstood in this way. <p. 44> This
>> >> >> >misunderstanding arises because what is called "ethics" is
>generally
>> >> >> >taken to involve a conscious choice; to act on the basis of a
>> >principle,
>> >> >> >under any guise, is to decide to do so.  An ethic assumes that for
>> >each
>> >> >> >question studied there was a period before the standard was applied
>> >when
>> >> >> >one's attitude was neutral, or at least less certain than
>afterwards;
>> >> >> >and also that there is a possibility that one could have chosen
>> >> >> >otherwise.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >        Robert Tucker rightly remarks that ethical inquiry (and
>hence
>> >> >> >ethics)is only possible on the basis of a suspended commitment.
>But
>> >> >> >Marx never suspends his commitments; nor does he ever consciously
>> >choose
>> >> >> >to approve or disapprove; nor does it make any sense to say of the
>> >> >> >matters he studied that he might have judged otherwise.  Tucker's
>> >> >> >conclusion is that Marx is not an ethical, but a religious thinker
>> >with
>> >> >> >a "vision of the world as an arena of conflict between good and
>evil
>> >> >> >forces." However, if expressing approval and serving certain goals
>are
>> >> >> >insufficient grounds for ascribing an ethics to Marx, his
>conception
>> >of
>> >> >> >class struggle coupled with his vision of the future society are
>> >hardly
>> >> >> >enough to burden him with a religion.  But if Tucker is unlucky in
>the
>> >> >> >alternative he offers, his criticism of attempts to treat Marxism
>as
>> >an
>> >> >> >ethical theory or as a product of an ethical theory remains valid.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >        The foregoing remarks may be summarized as follows: all
>> >ethical
>> >> >> >systems, that is all those ways of thinking which are generally
>> >accepted
>> >> >> >as such, have a basis for judgement which lies outside that which
>is
>> >to
>> >> >> >be judged.  This results in a suspended commitment until the
>"facts"
>> >> >> >have been gathered and their relation to the standard for judgment
>> >> >> >clarified.  The evaluation, when it comes, is a matter of conscious
>> >> >> >choice.  Our problem then reduces itself to this: do we want to say
>of
>> >> >> >Marxism, where none of these things apply, that it either is or
>> >contains
>> >> >> >an ethical theory?  One might, but then the limited sense in which
>> >claim
>> >> >> >is meant would have to be made explicit.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >                                        II
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >I prefer to say that Marx did not have an ethical theory.  But how
>> >then
>> >> >> >to explain the approval and disapproval which he expresses in his
>> >works,
>> >> >> >the fact that he sided with the proletariat and incited them to
>> >> >> >overthrow the system?  How, too, it may be asked, do <p. 45>I
>account
>> >> >> >for his attachment to the cause of humanity and to the ideas of
>> >> >> >communism and human fulfillment?  In asking such questions,
>however,
>> >one
>> >> >> >must be careful not to assume at the outset the form the answer
>must
>> >> >> >take.  For this is what happens if one is saying, "Here are two
>> >worlds,
>> >> >> >facts and values; how do you link them?" But to accept that reality
>is
>> >> >> >halved in this way is to admit failure from the start.  On the
>> >contrary,
>> >> >> >the relational conception which was discussed in the last two
>chapters
>> >> >> >required that Marx consider what was known, advocated, condemned or
>> >done
>> >> >> >by everyone, himself included, as internally related.  Every facet
>of
>> >> >> >the real world, and people's actions and thoughts as elements in
>it,
>> >are
>> >> >> >mutually dependent on each other for what they are, and must be
>> >> >> >understood accordingly.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >        The logical distinction which is said to exist between
>facts
>> >and
>> >> >> >values is founded on the belief that it is possible to conceive of
>one
>> >> >> >without the other.  Given a particular fact, the argument runs, one
>> >may
>> >> >> >without contradiction attach any value to it.  The fact itself does
>> >not
>> >> >> >entail a specific value.  Historically the view that moral beliefs
>are
>> >> >> >contingent has tended  to go along with the view that they are also
>> >> >> >arbitrary.  On this model, all judgment depends in the last
>instance
>> >on
>> >> >> >the independent set of values which each individual, for reasons
>best
>> >> >> >known to himself, brings to the situation.  The ethical premiss is
>not
>> >> >> >only a final arbiter but a mysterious one, defying sociological and
>> >even
>> >> >> >psychological analysis.  Though some recent defenders of orthodoxy
>> >have
>> >> >> >sought to muddle the distinction between fact and value with talk
>of
>> >its
>> >> >> >"context," "function,"  "real reference," "predisposition," etc.,
>the
>> >> >> >logical line drawn in conception remains.  Yet, if one cannot
>conceive
>> >> >> >of anything one chooses to call a fact (because it is an open ended
>> >> >> >relation) without bringing in evaluative elements (and vice versa),
>> >the
>> >> >> >very problem orthodox thinkers have set out to answer cannot be
>> >> >> >posed.******
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Incidentally, it seems to me that this critique of "values" applies
>> >also
>> >> >> >to the concept of "spirituality." I have never been able to
>understand
>> >> >> >why materialists (and in particular _historical_ materialists) are
>so
>> >> >> >anxious to cling on to claims to spirituality, which seems to me to
>be
>> >a
>> >> >> >pale substitute for human solidarity in a social order which
>> >> >> >systematically negates solidarity.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Carrol Cox
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> This e-mail is intended for the named recipient only and may be
>privileged
>> >> or confidential.  If you are not the intended recipient please notify
>me
>> >> immediately.
>> >>
>> >> Mervyn Hartwig
>> >> 13 Spenser Road
>> >> Herne Hill
>> >> London SE24 ONS
>> >> United Kingdom
>> >> Tel: 020 7 737 2892
>> >> Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>> >>
>> >> There is another world, but it is in this one.
>> >> Paul Eluard
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>> --
>> This e-mail is intended for the named recipient only and may be privileged
>> or confidential.  If you are not the intended recipient please notify me
>> immediately.
>>
>> Mervyn Hartwig
>> 13 Spenser Road
>> Herne Hill
>> London SE24 ONS
>> United Kingdom
>> Tel: 020 7 737 2892
>> Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
>>
>> There is another world, but it is in this one.
>> Paul Eluard
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

-- 
This e-mail is intended for the named recipient only and may be privileged 
or confidential.  If you are not the intended recipient please notify me 
immediately.

Mervyn Hartwig
13 Spenser Road
Herne Hill
London SE24 ONS
United Kingdom
Tel: 020 7 737 2892
Email: <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>

There is another world, but it is in this one.
Paul Eluard




     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

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