Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2003 17:50:14 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Identity - another thought....


Hi Andy,

It's not a question of not wanting to, but of limited time. Also, this 
thread has gone on for a bit, and I don't want to drive anybody round 
the twist (I probably have already).

Mervyn

In message <3EF2E772.9404.358EF0-AT-localhost>, Andrew Brown 
<Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> writes
>Hi Mervyn,
>
>What a shame you don't want to continue this thread because you
>have, I am happy to say, introduced a discussion of my own work
>into it, for which I am very grateful!
>
>You state:
>
>>
>> Yes, identity involves a relation of sameness.
>
>My previous email was simply responding to your earlier email
>where you said that that such a statement resonates with analytic
>philosophy, with 'either-or' thinking. Clearly, you had in mind my
>chapter, not just my one line statement. Anyway you go on to say:
>
>
>But as you say here
>> 'two things can be both identical and non-identical simultaneously'.
>> Yet your argument has been that a) mind and object are non-identical;
>> b) therefore mind cannot achieve identity consciousness with object.
>> It doesn't follow, because it ignores (on your own showing) what mind
>> and object may have in common, as well as the specific powers and
>> means mind has and may come to have. This does seem to me an example
>> of either/or and fixist thinking.
>
>You miss a step in my argument, and a facet in my general
>position on contradictions. Contradictions are admissable and
>indeed vital, one can have identity and non-identity simulatneously,
>yes. But they require explanation and argument, they spur us on to
>develop our theories further. Without any argument, theory
>dvelopment, justification and explanation of a stated contradiction
>then a theory must be consdiered incomplete; if one can show that
>no possible argument exists to justifiy the contradiction then one
>has to conclude that the theory in question is flawed, one has to
>try to develop a theory which overcomes (sublates) the
>contradiction, explains it, and take it from there. My problem has
>been that I have not seen the requisite explanation of the
>contradiction to which I have been pointing, that's all. I accept that
>it may be very difficult to explain such an argument in an email
>exchange.
>
>
> In 'Developing realist philosophy'
>
>Realist'ic' philosophy (my chapter in the 'Critical realism and
>Marxism' book). I think realisitic philosophy is materialist and
>dialectical philosophy.
>
>> you pay obeisance to identity relations and necessary connection
>> between emergent strata, only to ignore them in your main argument --
>> on the grounds that there is a 'sense' in which strata are externally
>> related, which turns out to depend on human conceptions of them. You
>> hang your whole argument on this 'sense'.
>
>I happen to think it is an important, indeed vital sense, fundamental
>to realism and to philosophy: we are talking about the relationship
>between thought and being here, as well as the relatioship between
>all other strata. Some senses are more important than others!
>
> Only thus can you
>> 'demonstrate' that 'critical realist articulation of stratification
>> and emergence collapses into (essentially Humean) scepticism' -- with
>> the aid of a Humean 'time bomb' that might go off in the future and
>> 'cause present scientific "laws" to *cease to exist*'  (CR and
>> Marxism, pp. 168, 176). So the Humean construal of laws and the
>> problem of induction live on too.
>
>Specifically, I argue that, given CR and DCR premises, one cannot
>rule out, or even deem improbable, the emergence or discovery of a
>structure or force that is about to cause currently 'known' laws to
>cease to exist. Actually, I think this is a really quite common
>sense proposition. Who would be so arrogant as to deny it,
>wouldn't such a denial be stepping out of bounds of what human
>cognition can truly be said to know? Wouldn't it be an epistemic or
>ontic fallacy? In the chapter I suggest only an 'idle philosopher
>would have the effrontary to deny it'! However, I go on to try to show
>that if one thinks through the implications of the proposition then
>one ends up having to reject it, and, moreover, I try to show how
>one *can* reject it without thereby claiming too much for human
>cognative capacities. This does mean transcending SEPM and CR
>and DCR, in my view. I draw on Spinoza, and Ilyenkov, for this,
>pointing out that Marx and Engels develop Spinoza's position
>fundamentally. Nick H. misses this last aspect in his review. Nick
>criticises the apparent stasis in my exposition, without noticing
>that I concur with this criticism of Spinoza, a criticism which is an
>aspect of Marx and Engel's critique of all hitherto existing
>materialism, and which I raise towards the end of the chapter.
>Spinoza's conception of the thought-being relation is not abolished
>by the criticism rather it is correctly developed by it, and Spinoza's
>view forms the abstract basis of materialist dialectics, on my
>argument.
>
>Many thanks,
>
>Andy
>
>
>>
>> This definitely has to be my last in this thread!
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>> In message <3EF1A44D.7607.37B3C4-AT-localhost>, Andrew Brown
>> <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> writes
>> >Hi Mervyn,
>> >
>> >Have been thinking further about the following:
>> >
>> >> >No. What I have in mind is a very basic and fundametal notion of
>> >> >identity: two things are identitical if they are the same.
>> >>
>> >> What do you mean, No? - - This notion of identity is at the heart
>> >> of the analytical problematic (formal logic, identity-thinking) --
>> >> 'an ideology of an admittedly very nice set of formal logical
>> >> techniques' (RMR 90).
>> >>
>> >
>> >I note also that you repeat this view regarding the 'analytical
>> >problematic' to Ruth.
>> >
>> >Basically, I wonder if you might reconsider what you are saying
>> >here? On reflection I really don't think there is a meaning of
>> >'identity', relevant to our discussion (where we are talking about an
>> >identity relationship), which does not include, one way or another,
>> >the relation of sameness. I certainly deny that this has anything to
>> >do with a favouring of the analytical philosophy problematic (however
>> >we might define that problematic). Rather, it is part of the
>> >dictionary definition, a part of our common discourse. Consider, for
>> >example, your discussion of 'constellational identity'. Here you say
>> >that we have a 'basic fine structure common to all being'. This is an
>> >identity (commonality) of fine structure: all beings share, in some
>> >sense, the *same* fine structure.
>> >
>> >Dialectics cuts agains our common sense discourse, not by
>> >simply denying all meanings of words (which would make
>> >dialectics nonsense). Rather, dialectics insists two things can be
>> >both identitical and non-identical simultaneously. Both the same and
>> >different. It denies the 'law of the excluded middle'. We can have an
>> >identity of opposites, and identity-in-difference. But these phrases
>> >would be deprived of all meaning if you are to insist that an
>> >'identity' relationship does *not* carry a connotation of sameness.
>> >There are many ways in which we can interpret the identity relation
>> >but they all share this connotation one way or another. So I don't
>> >see it as a dialectical point to say 'identity of things does not
>> >mean they are the same, and anyone who thinks so betrays pseudo-
>> >dialectical tendencies!' Indeed I don't believe the most thorough
>> >reading of RBs latest works (or any other works) are going to
>> >substantiate your point. Rather, I can only think that you are not
>> >expressing what you want to say accurately, here.
>> >
>> >What do you think?
>> >
>> >Best wishes,
>> >
>> >Andy
>> >
>> >
>> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
>
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