From: Mikehpaed-AT-aol.com Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2003 10:16:10 EDT Subject: Re: BHA: transcendental arguments --part1_1e.1489e4fc.2c304eaa_boundary Ruth and Mervyn, Thanks for your responses. And, hi, Ruth! Brief omments on two issues: 1) Transcendental arguments >From Ruth: "I am maybe a little more sympathetic to Callinicos' point about the so-called transcendental argument of RTS. I think that RB responded correctly: that the> > argument there is not a transcendental arguement from a necessary feature=20of > experience (or, as in Kant, the fact of experience), but is instead an > immanent > (sp?) critique of regularitiy theory. > > On the claim that these two are in fact the same, I am not convinced. I > think > that there is a structural similarity, in that the logic of both is "If x=20is > so, > then what must be so in order for x's being so to be the case?" But a > transcendental argument is, by definition, one in which x's being so is > taken to > be beyond dispute by everyone. This is because the whole idea, the whole > plan > behind that kind of move, is to say that what is established by > transcendental > argument is apodictic in epistemic status, absolutely certain. To EVERYONE. > > Not just to people who buy into a set of contingent premises. Immanent > critiques, by contrast, don't (supposedly) convey universal validity simply > in > virtue of their form. > > Now I'm all in favor of someone saying "There's no such thing as a > transcendental argument. (For whatever reasons they want to cite.) Rather, > there are ONLY immanent critiques -- which will never have the epistemic > force > (albeit illusory) that T args are supposed to have." But I wouldn't then > expect > the person to retain the name "transcendental argument" for the immanent > critiques that they offer." =A0 >From Mervyn, responding to Ruth: "What your position seems to forget is that Bhaskar is a fallibilist for whom nothing is indubitable--as he says in the debate, "there's nothing you can take for granted in philosophy except your opponents' premises", and that's why, "*for me* transcendental argument is always immanent critique" (emphasis added). I think we need to distinguish between the form and content of transcendental arguments, and note that it's in virtue of the form, not the content, that a TA is a TA.=A0 If the premises are granted the conclusion does indeed follow with apodictic certainty; but=A0 Bhaskar doesn't claim that his premises are indubitable, just that they are either his opponents' (as in immanent critique--and even such a claim can be fallible, as Callinicos himself demonstrates by getting Bhaskar's premises quite wrong) or currently widely accepted. The form is the same whether the premises are regarded as indubitable or not." Both Ruth and Mervyn make good points. Both agree that Bhaskar is not starting from premises that every one in the world (irrespective of class, gender, race, culture, ideology, religion, etc.) agrees with. The dispute is over what Bhaskar's argument should be called (Is it a transcendental argument?) and, more importantly, what is the "cash value" of the argument (What do you get=20from the argument?). I'm more in agreement with Meryvn here. A transcendental argument, as I understand it, does not have to rely on premises that every one agrees to, but those premises that are accepted in the philosophical context in which the argument is made. In this sense, Bhaskar does make a transcendental argument in RTS, although what is established by his argument is not apodictic in epistemic status. (Aren't absolutely certain statements inconsistent with CR?) Rather, the argument provides a vital starting point and strong foundation for his ontological perspective. 2) Philosophy qua Master Key Mervyn: " I'm not sure exactly what you mean by Master Key; the normal phrase is Master Scientist, which refers to the old scholastic and rationalist foundationalist position which essayed to work out everything on the basis of a few indubitable starting points. Bhaskar is in my view definitely not a Master Scientist in this sense. His premises are historical, his main arguments are immanent critiques and he still holds that in the long run philosophy (which has always had in his view a relative autonomy from science) must be compatible with the findings of science. Sure, some of his later philosophy is more conjectural than the earlier work, but why not, given the compatibility requirement, from a philosopher who's always asked the big questions? His views on a range of key issues in his later philosophy e.g. holistic causality arguably have their origins in modern science, and one could in fact make out a respectable case that he, *unlike most other modern philosophers*, takes the implications of the findings of modern science very seriously--they lead to a radically different understanding of the world than that presupposed by positivist and empiricist philosophy, pointing towards a new paradigm. It's true that the drive in Bhaskar's system is towards, if not a 'complete answer', Totality. But if you want to change the world, you do need to try and understand the whole of which it is a part, do you not? Nor can a general conceptual schema be elaborated on any other basis. The seventeenth century revolution enshrined on its banner, 'Thou shalt not commit ontology'. Bhaskar has committed it from the outset." One of the things that I found most attractive with Bhaskar's writings on science, social science, and human agency is his ability to conjoin a recognition of the inevitably perspectival nature of human knowledge with a robust notion of reality. Anti-foundationalism in epistemology need not lead to a relativism that cripples efforts to understand critically the natural and social worlds, as postmodernist anti-foundationalism does. That's a wonderful insight, and combined with several other of his key concepts, has has a positive effect in a number of fields. While critical realism provides a valuable framework for theory and research, it does not have all the answers nor should it attempt=20to do so. On the other hand, the attempt to find a complete answer and comprehend Totality seems to me to be inconsistent with Bhaskar's initial approach. The belief that one has a "Master Key" that answers all of the questions does not aid efforts to change the world, but is, in fact, more likely to hamper such efforts insofar as one loses sight of the perspectival/limited nature of knowledge. Mike --part1_1e.1489e4fc.2c304eaa_boundary
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argument there is not a transcendental arguement from a necessary feature of
experience (or, as in Kant, the fact of experience), but is instead an immanent
(sp?) critique of regularitiy theory.
On the claim that these two are in fact the same, I am not convinced. I think
that there is a structural similarity, in that the logic of both is "If x is so,
then what must be so in order for x's being so to be the case?" But a
transcendental argument is, by definition, one in which x's being so is taken to
be beyond dispute by everyone. This is because the whole idea, the whole plan
behind that kind of move, is to say that what is established by transcendental
argument is apodictic in epistemic status, absolutely certain. To EVERYONE.
Not just to people who buy into a set of contingent premises. Immanent
critiques, by contrast, don't (supposedly) convey universal validity simply=20in
virtue of their form.
Now I'm all in favor of someone saying "There's no such thing as a
transcendental argument. (For whatever reasons they want to cite.) Rather,
there are ONLY immanent critiques -- which will never have the epistemic force
(albeit illusory) that T args are supposed to have." But I wouldn't then expect
the person to retain the name "transcendental argument" for the immanent
critiques that they offer."
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