From: "Jamie Morgan" <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk>
Subject: BHA: Re: Ontological and epistemological materialism
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2003 10:13:50 +0100


Phil, the agreement is not with Bhaskar, the agreement is the receievd
meaning of the term epistemology in philosophical discourse. The distinction
between epistemology and the ordinary us eof the term knolwedge is one
between systemic inquiry and given content. This grounds what seems to be a
confusion for you - Empiricism is specifically defined as an epistemology
within philosophy of science because its question is what is scientific
knowledge and how is it justified? It has an implicit ontology and a flawed
one but is not about ontology - that is part of its error. Its paradox is
that it both theorises an immediately apprehended world but also denies any
articulation of it and then focusses on an object language atomism in its
regard (its approach to criteteria of justified beleif). To see how this
develops one can read Frege, Russell and early Wittgenstein, as well as the
Vienna stuff.

jamie

----- Original Message -----
From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Sunday, June 08, 2003 11:26 PM
Subject: BHA: Ontological and epistemological materialism


> Hi all,
>
> I will start with a quote from Bhaskar's 1975 article:
>
> "Bachelard is right to stress that realism is a function but fails to
> conceive the possibility, implied by the progressive character of science,
> of a realism which does not identify the real with the field of
experience.
> He is thus forced to fight on the ontological ground of the enemy.  There
is
> no concept in his *epistemology* [my emphasis - PW] of *depth* [Bhaskar's
> emphasis - PW] - of the multi-tiered stratification of reality and the
> consequent stratification this imposes on scientific knowledge."
> ['Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies of Science' in NEW LEFT
REVIEW
> number 94, Nov-Dec 1975].
>
> Now I have highlighted the word *epistemology* here because I do not see
> this as an error in Bachelard's epistemology, but rather in his ontology.
> The fact that Bhaskar can only see empiricism as an epistemology here is a
> problem.  [Lack of ontological materialism].  However, in other places
> Bhaskar sees empiricism as an ontology - for example in his critique of
> David-Hillel Ruben.  In his work on Ruben, Bhaskar sees stratification as
> the answer to empiricism, because stratification is supposed to supply all
> the ontological richness required for conceptualizing the object.  My
> problem with that is: in this closed schema that Bhaskar has set up, where
> is the reflection on this stratification?  [Lack of epistemological
> materialism].
>
> This should explain why I use the term *materialism* and also should
explain
> why my use of the terms *ontology* and *epistemology* are different from
> their use by other listers who seem to me to essentially have Bhaskar's
> position on all these matters.
>
> Phil Walden
>
>
>
>
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