From: rgroff-AT-yorku.ca Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2003 10:41:09 -0400 Subject: BHA: Identity Hi Jamie, Andrew, all, There are, I think, two different concepts of, or approaches to the concept of, "identity" in circulation here. The one is primarily epistemological -- it is, basically, Aristotle's model of knowledge-production. Aristotle thought that when we have knowledge of a thing what we have done is construct a concept of it that matches its intrinsic/incipient form. It's a bit more dynamic of a process, according to Aristotle, than I've made it sound (our capacity to recognize form comes together with the thing's form in order to produce the fully actualized concept), but that's the gist of it. Jamie, it sounds as though that is what you are talking about. Meanwhile, the other idea, I think, is more ontological (though it is certainly related to the more epistemological thesis above; Adorno, e.g., deals with both). Here "identity" is the idea that matter is, ultimately, an expression of thought or consciousness. This is a view that I take Adorno, for example, to reject, in favor of an alternative in which matter and consciousness are related but in which neither is, in any way, ultimately the other. As an interpretive matter, I have always read the early Bhaskar as agreeing with Adorno, against Hegel, on this point, though once you see the trajectory of his thought (by DPF) it is true that you can find a couple of places in the first two books where he says things that can be rendered consistent with the kind of (ontological) identity thinking that Adorno argues against. My own view is that this tells us only that Bhaskar was not quite as committed to the overt materialist thrust of his early books as he thought he was. (And regardless of what Bhaskar thinks, I'm with Adorno on the primacy of the object.) r. Quoting Jamie Morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk>: > Yes, that's not what I meant though, I meant that emergence does not mean > that the possibility of identity through thought is impossible - this would > depende ont he nature of thought - clearly there is a disjuncture between > thought and its object and also between different strata - the issue of SEPM > thatr I was considering (cross purposes I expect) is whether thought can > bridge the gap (is it possible to have truth of something based on some > emergent quality of mind) this is what is at stake in TDCR and where I think > its weakness seems to be. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Andrew Brown" <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> > To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu> > Sent: Wednesday, June 11, 2003 12:37 PM > Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Positivism, Realism, Materialism > > > > Hi Jamie, > > > > Many thanks for the reply. > > > > > There'snothing about SEPM to > > > indicate that identity is or is not possible - that would be an > > > additional argument (though one I personally tend to think is a > > > probable no). > > > > This cannot be true. 'Emergence' essentially entails 'emergent > > powers', usually underlain by a unique 'real essence', does it not? > > These powers and this structure (real essence) are non-identical to > > others in a sense that is vital to science. That is, non-identity is > > fundamental to emergence as a concept. Different strata are not > > identical, or reducible, to one another. The concept of emergence > > denies reductionism. (On the other hand strata *are* related, so > > there is an aspect of identity or at least unity to different strata) > > > > Given this then the emergent power of thought and hence the realm > > of ideas is non-identical to other 'objects' in a fundemntal sense, > > don't you think? > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > > > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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