From: "Andrew Brown" <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk>
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2003 12:20:34 +0100
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Positivism, Realism, Materialism


Hi Jamie,

> emergence is a form of supervenience argument in philosophy I wouldn't
> therefore say I was eliding emergence

For me at least, emergence is a key concept in *CR* not to be 
confused with, but certainly to be compared with, the more general 
concept of emergence in philosophy. Bhaskar, Collier, A.Sayer, 
Archer, indeed any critical realist (DCRist) are at pains to elaborate 
carefully the CR notion of emergence. And I think this notion is 
really very clear: it involves non-identity, 'emergent powers', non-
identical with the root stratum or other strata, but in some sense 
united with other strata. CR and DCR would amount to nothing 
without it, in my view. Now, 'SEPM' has an 'E' in it. Therefore all 
that CR has to say about emergence applies to SEPM. 

 - I am also not saying that
> thought and objects are not independent - it of course depends on the
> nature of the object (no defintiive separation can be made without
> considering the natur eof the object and its relation to the ontology
> conditions of its production)

I'm not suggesting you are.

 in any case you seem to be thinking of
> identity as the recreatuion of reality in the head where thought is
> that reality - this might imply identity as any range of 
> isomosphrism, codependent or constutive of it subject

Actually, I haven't stated my own position at all. In my previous 
post but one I simply listed a range of possible meanings of 
'identity'. I was really quite surprised that you answered that *all* of 
them were possible, according to SEPM! Hence in my previous 
reply I elaborated on what the implications of one rather obvious 
meaning of identity would actually be. I tried to show it entailed 
'miracle' powers, not 'emergent' powers hence contradicted SEPM. 
Perhaps your previous response was in haste, and you now reject 
the particular notion of identity that I elaborated upon? This would 
still leave the question of what notion of 'identity' you do allow to be 
'possible' and how you sqaure this with a rejection of the obvious 
meaning of 'idenity', and SEPM more generally, and the 
epistemological dialectic [do you agree that the epistemological 
dialecic must at least start with non-identity?], and so on..

 - at the same
> time the thrust of your position is based on the fact that emergence
> implies some sense of independence - of course it does, if only in the
> sense that most of reality is outside the head -

My position has not been part of this particular discussion. Rather I 
am trying to make sense of the assertion that SEPM, and CR 
more generally, leaves open the 'possibility' of 'identity' between 
thought and object. I am yet to see any way except 'constellational 
identity' in which this can be so. I feel that much of CR, DCR, 
indeed any 'realism' depends on this issue, after all 'realism' refers 
to 'mind-independence', so the assertion of 'identity' of mind and 
being is prima facie alarming to any realist.


 but it is not
> necessary to argue for the mind as solipsistically creating reality
> which is then within the head and without it (a pure identity as you
> seem to be costruing it)

As noted above, I simply elaborated upon a notion of identity which 
you had earlier said was 'possible' given SEPM. I don't think my 
elaboration has anything to do with solipsism. The latter notion 
would surely rule out identity of thought and being, unless for each 
person there was a *different* being with which their thought was 
identitcal.

 the point I want to make would be that the
> fallibility of mind does not discount the fact that one might be right
> about a reality that is mainly outside the head and thus have produced
> an isomorphism between knowledge and its object (however construed)

Now we have another term, 'isomporhism' and you are endorsing it. 
This directly contraduicts RBs statements denying isomporhism in 
SRHE, doesn't it? You leave the crucial aspect wide open by the 
phrase ' however construed'. Given SEPM it seems to me very 
difficult to construe at all. However, you do provide some 
elaboration below...


> this does not require one to contravene emergence, contingency,
> fallibility etc. it simply implies that it isnot inconceivable that
> mind in body can know mind outside body with increasuibng degrees of
> confidence that at some point may be descriobed as for all intents and
> purposes as an identity (in some time and place of some particular
> phenomenon even if it cannot then be asserted that the two are
> absolute equivelants since this would contravene fallibility). 

How and in what sense can it be an identity. Is it a material 
identity? If all it is is 'truth', a difficult enough term in itself, then 
why open yet another can of worms by also using the term 
'identity'? Is it an apparent contradiction to say that two things are 
'identical' yet not 'absolute equivalents' - would this also suggest 
that it is better not to invoke 'identity'?

This is
> a logicla possibility of any posiiton that argues for more adequiate
> knowledge and for progress and development in knowledge - it does not
> imnply a static reality or empiricism  - it does raise the issue of
> both method (dialectical or otherwise) of progress and the capacity of
> mind to think into the world, as well as the degrees of relation
> between mind and the world int he willed and practical constitutuon of
> social reality through projects of emancipation.

I am not clear what 'this' refers to, i.e. what notion of 'identity' you 
are employing.

 On the way you move
> from SEPM to discount arguments for the possibility of identity - what
> powers of human mind can SEPM discount?

SEPM has an 'e' in it which entails an account of powers as such. 
SEPM rules out a reality which does not conform to this account of 
powers. It rules out reductionism and it rules out wholism, doesn't 
it? Specifically it rules out eliminative materialism, 
epiphenomenalism, behvaiourism, central state materialism, 
anomolous monism, Cartesian dualism, Spinozist 'double aspect' 
theory. Is your position that SEPM does none of these things?

 I would suggest none - you
> cannot point to any without first pointing to a scientific finding and
> an empirical claim - these are not aspects of SEPM as an arguemnt in
> philosophy of mind they are precisely aspects of sciences claims on
> the characteristic sof mind, which is the only point I was makign here
> i.e. that emergence arguments do not dictate powers of mind only that
> they relate ins ome way to the biological (don't be so quick to place
> philosophy over neuro-science this is not the under-labourers job).

All I said was that the entirety of philosophy (thought / being 
relationship, i.e 'realism' as such, epistemological dialectic, 
emergence,  etc.) seems to be entirely contingent on future 
findings of neuro science, on your view. For me it isn't. Rather 
philosophy and neuro science need one another; one cannot 
reduce philosophy to neuro science, nor vice versa. This does not 
belittle the importance of neuro science to philosophy but it does 
clearly provide a balanced assessment of the reltionship between 
the two.

 In
> any case we seem to be going in circles here (and not Ruth's circles)
> which is ironic since we both agree that identity is a dubious issue.

I think identity is a vital issue. I am still not sure what you mean by 
it, nor how you can legitimately argue that SEPM has nothing to 
say about it. SEPM says nothing at all if it does not say anything 
about it, and this must be faced up to if DCR and TDCR are to be 
adequately grasped.  (For myself I think the notion of 'identity' of 
thought and being has been adequately addressed by Spinoza, in 
its most abstract aspects, and then developed fundamentally by 
Marx and Engels but that is another story).

Are we still dancing around in circles? I hope not!

Many thanks,

Andy


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