File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2003/bhaskar.0307, message 19


From: "Jamie Morgan" <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: moral world
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2003 09:44:44 +0100


Hi

what are examples of intransitive moral positions - what is the difference
between a transitively held beleif and  its instantiationin an also
transitive moral practice - how are they grounded in the intransitive? what
is it about humans that is both a capacity for the moral and a source of the
moral to which all moral systems then are situated in some sense?

Jamie



----- Original Message -----
From: "Jan Straathof" <janstr-AT-chan.nl>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2003 11:57 PM
Subject: RE: BHA: moral world


> Hi Jeff, you wrote:
>
> >your comments have cleared up the moralISED aspect, whcih seems similar
to
> >Colliers idea of a transitve moral realm [in Being & Worth]. This would
be
> >the particular moraities [or amoralities] of current societies, but what
> >of the intransitive morality? are we not also born into or with such a
> >foundation?
>
> Yes, this is an intriguing question. As true CR's we are all in someway
> committed to some vision of moral realism: i.e. one that implies we're
> not only born in societies of actually and empirically existing
moralities,
> but that we're also and maybe first of all, born and living in a world
with
> an intransitive moral dimension. Yet what can we say and know about
> this intransitive moral dimension ?
>
> On the ontological side, avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, Bhaskar
defends
> the view that, although society evoluted out of nature, human society as
an
> emergent structure [cf.PE:73] possesses a set of unique structures, powers
> and possibilities of its own and one of them is: morality
(ethics/deontology).
>
> It makes little sense imo to talk about a morality of rocks, gasses or
sub-
> atomic particles. In RMR [p.58] the question arises if there is morality
in
> animals. I don't think so, animals are neither moral nor a-moral, yet they
> are not non-moral but, i would say, proto-moral.
>
> "What must the world be like for birth to be possible ?"
>
> I was wondering about this strange question, it's a transcendental
question.
> Aren't the phenomena of 'giving birth' and 'being born' the most basic and
> fundamently human acts and modes of morality ? For us CR, given the case
> that our world is (a)moralISED in the TD, as you say, this world must
first
> be real 'moralizeable' in the ID. In a similair vein Levinas argues that
moral
> responsibility does not arise out of obligation or submission to some
episteme
> (law, code) but from the ontological encounter with the reality of the
Other.
>
> In his latest works Bhaskar goes quite far imo, when he claims that we can
> come in contact and get direct access to 'ontologically deeper' realms of
e.g.
> the intransitive moral dimension, namely in and via moments of awareness
> of our 'ground-state', in 'non-dual being', in 'transcendental
> consciousness', as
> 'enfolded co-presence' nad so on. Yet these experiences -as Bhaskar
stresses-
> have nothing to do with escapism or mysticism, but they are all an
essential
> and constitutive part of our everyday loves and lifes.
>
> yours in a mellow summer-evening mood,
> Jan
>
>
>
>
>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>




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