From: "Jamie Morgan" <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> Subject: Re: BHA: moral world Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2003 09:44:44 +0100 Hi what are examples of intransitive moral positions - what is the difference between a transitively held beleif and its instantiationin an also transitive moral practice - how are they grounded in the intransitive? what is it about humans that is both a capacity for the moral and a source of the moral to which all moral systems then are situated in some sense? Jamie ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jan Straathof" <janstr-AT-chan.nl> To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu> Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2003 11:57 PM Subject: RE: BHA: moral world > Hi Jeff, you wrote: > > >your comments have cleared up the moralISED aspect, whcih seems similar to > >Colliers idea of a transitve moral realm [in Being & Worth]. This would be > >the particular moraities [or amoralities] of current societies, but what > >of the intransitive morality? are we not also born into or with such a > >foundation? > > Yes, this is an intriguing question. As true CR's we are all in someway > committed to some vision of moral realism: i.e. one that implies we're > not only born in societies of actually and empirically existing moralities, > but that we're also and maybe first of all, born and living in a world with > an intransitive moral dimension. Yet what can we say and know about > this intransitive moral dimension ? > > On the ontological side, avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, Bhaskar defends > the view that, although society evoluted out of nature, human society as an > emergent structure [cf.PE:73] possesses a set of unique structures, powers > and possibilities of its own and one of them is: morality (ethics/deontology). > > It makes little sense imo to talk about a morality of rocks, gasses or sub- > atomic particles. In RMR [p.58] the question arises if there is morality in > animals. I don't think so, animals are neither moral nor a-moral, yet they > are not non-moral but, i would say, proto-moral. > > "What must the world be like for birth to be possible ?" > > I was wondering about this strange question, it's a transcendental question. > Aren't the phenomena of 'giving birth' and 'being born' the most basic and > fundamently human acts and modes of morality ? For us CR, given the case > that our world is (a)moralISED in the TD, as you say, this world must first > be real 'moralizeable' in the ID. In a similair vein Levinas argues that moral > responsibility does not arise out of obligation or submission to some episteme > (law, code) but from the ontological encounter with the reality of the Other. > > In his latest works Bhaskar goes quite far imo, when he claims that we can > come in contact and get direct access to 'ontologically deeper' realms of e.g. > the intransitive moral dimension, namely in and via moments of awareness > of our 'ground-state', in 'non-dual being', in 'transcendental > consciousness', as > 'enfolded co-presence' nad so on. Yet these experiences -as Bhaskar stresses- > have nothing to do with escapism or mysticism, but they are all an essential > and constitutive part of our everyday loves and lifes. > > yours in a mellow summer-evening mood, > Jan > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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