Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2003 11:00:10 -0400 From: Richard Moodey <moodey001-AT-mail1.gannon.edu> Subject: Re: BHA: [fyi] Interview with Manuel De Landa - part 1 Hi Jan and Mervyn, Thanks for sending this on, Jan. One reading is not enough for me. I am still not sure what the "flat ontology" of individuals means. I'm going to have to think about it some more. Dick At 09:44 PM 07/06/2003 +0100, you wrote: >Hi Jan, all > >I found this very interesting (if somewhat limited as social theory, >underpinned as his position is by 'a flat ontotolgy of individuals'). >Thanks. Do you have the CTHEORY reference for it please? > >"Roy Bhaskar wants it all to be about self-organized criticality (his sand >piles with fractal avalanches)" > >I love this. But is it De Landa's gloss on Bhaskar on contradiction, >emergence, process, rhythmics etc, or does Bhaskar write in these terms >specifically somewhere? > >Re 'self-organized criticality' cf DPF on emergence, p. 49 "There is a >quantum leap, or nodal line, of (one feels like saying) the materialized >imagination - or even, with Hegel, reason - akin to that occurring in the >s or t transforms of the epistemological dialectic. This is matter as >creative, as autopoietic." > >Mervyn > >In message <l03130300bb2cd65ac910-AT-[195.86.123.47]>, Jan Straathof ><janstr-AT-chan.nl> writes >>Dear All, >> >>below an interview with the philosopher Manuel De Landa, >>although his realism seems influenced most by Deleuze's, he >>speaks quite favorably of Bhaskar too. It's kinda longish so >>i send it in three parts. >> >>enjoy, >>Jan >> >>----------------- >>1000 Years of War: >>CTHEORY Interview with Manuel De Landa >> >>Manuel de Landa in conversation with: Don Ihde, Casper Bruun Jensen, Jari >>Friis >>Jorgensen, Srikanth Mallavarapu, Eduardo Mendieta, John Mix, John >>Protevi, and >>Evan Selinger. >> >> >>Manuel De Landa, distinguished philosopher and principal figure in the "new >>materialism" that has been emerging as a result of interest in Deleuze and >>Guattari, currently teaches at Columbia University. Because his research into >>"morphogenesis" -- the production of stable structures out of material >>flows -- >>extends into the domains of architecture, biology, economics, history, >>geology, >>linguistics, physics, and technology, his outlook has been of great >>interest to >>theorists across the disciplines. His latest book on Deleuze's realist >>ontology, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002), comes in the >>wake of >>best-sellers: War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991), where De Landa >>assumes the persona of the "robot historian" to bring the natural and social >>sciences into dialogue vis-a-vis using insights found in nonlinear dynamics >>to analyze the role of information technology in military history, and A >>Thousand Years of Non-Linear History (1997), where he carves out a space for >>geological, organic, and linguistic materials to "have their say" in >>narrating >>the different ways that a single matter-energy undergoes phase transitions of >>various kinds, resulting in the production of the semi-stable structures that >>are constitutive of the natural and social worlds. When Evan Selinger >>gathered >>together the participants for the following interview, his initial intention >>was to create an interdisciplinary dialogue about the latest book. In >>light of >>current world events -- which have brought about a renewed fascination >>with De >>Landa's thoughts on warfare -- and in light of the different participant >>interests, an unintended outcome came about. A synoptic and fruitful >>conversation occurred that traverses aspects of De Landa's oeuvre. >> >> >> >> >>I. War, Markets & Models >>CTHEORY (Mendieta): In these times of "a war against terrorism," and >>preparing >>against "bioterrorism" and "germ warfare," do you not find it interesting, >>telling, and ironic in a dark and cynical way that it is the Western, >>Industrialized nations that are waging a form of biological terrorism, >>sanctioned and masked by legal regulations imposed by the WTO and its legal >>codes, like Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Would you agree that the >>imposition of GMO -- genetically modified organism -- through WTO, NAFTA, and >>IMF, on the so-called developing world is a form of "legalized biotech and >>biological" terrorism? And then, as a corollary, what are the prospects for >>global justice and equity in light precisely of the yawing gap between >>developed and underdeveloped nations that is further deepened by the >>asymmetrical access to technologies like genetic engineering and genomic >>mapping? >> >>Manuel De Landa: Though I understand what you are getting at I do not >>think it >>is very useful to use this label (biological terrorism) for this phenomenon. >>The point, however, is well taken. The way in which corporations are >>encroaching around the most sensitive points of the food chain is dangerous: >>they direct the evolution of new crops from the processing end, disregarding >>nutritional properties if they conflict with industrial ones; the same >>corporations which own oil (and hence fertilizers and herbicides) also >>own seed >>companies and other key inputs to farming; and those same corporations >>are now >>transferring genes from one species to another in perverse ways (genes for >>herbicide resistance transferred from weeds to crops). When one couples these >>kind of facts with the old ones about the link between colonialism and the >>conversion of many world areas into food supply zones for Europe (from the >>creation of sugar plantations to the taking over of the >>photosynthetically most >>active areas of the world by Europe's ex-colonies) we can realize that this >>state of affairs does have consequences for equity and justice. The key point >>is not to oversimplify: the Green Revolution, for example, failed not because >>of the biological aspect, but because of the economic one: the very real >>biological benefits (plants bred to have more edible biomass) could only be >>realized under economies of scale and these have many hidden costs (power >>concentration, deskilling of workforce) which can offset the purely technical >>benefits. >> >>The question of Intellectual Property rights is also complex. We should >>be very >>careful how we deal with this, particularly considering many of us bring old >>moral clichs ("private property is theft") into the debate without being >>aware of it. I believe this issue needs to be handled case by case (to solve >>the inherent conflict between lack of accessibility and incentive to create). >>For example, I am completely opposed to the patenting of genes but not of >>gene >>products, like proteins. >> >>CTHEORY (Mix): In War in the Age of Intelligent Machines you discuss the >>German >>Blitzkrieg of WWII in relation to a synergistic tactic that unified air and >>ground troops. If we return to this time period, it becomes noteworthy to >>highlight that the synergy fell apart when the machinery, specifically the >>ground forces (i.e. tanks, jeeps, personnel transports, etc.) broke down and >>the soldiers manning them could not get them operational, and were forced to >>get mechanics to do the repairs, or else hope that the supply lines were kept >>open to bring in replacement vehicles. By contrast, many of the American >>G.I.s >>were "grease monkeys" and could easily repair their own vehicles. Since >>many of >>the components of the ground vehicles were interchangeable, they could >>scavenge >>usable pieces from damaged equipment, therein being able to fix problems >>on the >>spot and remain operationally mechanized. My question is: Because >>contemporary >>military technology is built on principles that the average G.I. is not >>familiar with (i.e. the compatibility between the standard engine and >>military >>ground vehicles no longer exists), do you think that the benefits of the war >>machine will be outstripped by the lack of serviceability that probably will >>arise in the field under combat conditions? Do you think that we should be >>training our soldiers differently or do you think that we should modify the >>technologies they use? >> >>De Landa: One of the themes of the War book was the tendency of military >>organizations to get "humans out of the loop." Throughout the book (and in my >>only live lecture to the military) I have very strongly criticized this, >>urging >>for the lowering of decision-making thresholds so that soldiers in the field >>with access to real time information have more power to make decisions than >>their superiors at the Pentagon. (This theme, of course, goes beyond the >>military to any kind of centralized decision-making situation, including >>economic planning.) The problem you raise is, I believe, related to this. If >>all technological decisions are made centrally without thinking of issues of >>maintenance in the field, and if there is no incentive for field soldiers to >>become "grease monkeys" or "hackers," the army that results is all the more >>brittle for that. Flexibility implies that knowledge and know-how are not >>monopolized by central planners but exist in a more decentralized form. >> >>CTHEORY (Protevi): War in the Age of Intelligent Machines came out in 1991, >>just at the time of Operation Desert Storm. Do you see any noteworthy >>developments in the integration of information technology and artificial >>intelligence into US security / military operations from the time of Desert >>Storm, through Afghanistan and the Second Gulf War? I have two particular >>areas >>I would ask you to comment on: (1) developments in what you call the >>Panspectron in surveillance; and (2) the use of the robot drone plane to >>kill 6 >>suspected al-Qaida members in Yemen: is this a decisive step forward in your >>history of the development of autonomous killer machines, or is it just >>more of >>the same, that is, AI as an adjunct, without true executive capabilities? >>Finally, do you see any utility to the claim (a variation on the old >>"technological imperative" idea) that, among many other factors in the Bush >>Administration, certain elements of the Pentagon support the war campaign as >>providing a testing ground for their new weapons systems? >> >>De Landa: I do not see the threshold I warned against (the emergence of >>predatory machines) as having been crossed yet. The drone plane was being >>remotely guided, wasn't it? At the level of surveillance I also fail to >>see any >>dramatic development other than a quantitative increase in computing power. >>What has changed is the direction that the migration of "intelligence" into >>weapons has taken, from the creation of very expensive smart bombs to the use >>of GPS-based cheap equipment that can be added to existing dumb bombs. >> >>I am not sure the Pentagon has a hidden agenda for testing their new weapons >>but I do think that it has been itching for a war against Iraq for years >>before >>9-11, in a similar way they were itching for one during the Cuban missile >>crisis in the 60's. It was tough for Kennedy to resist them then, and so Bush >>had very little chance to do it particularly because he has his own family >>scores to settle. >> >>CTHEORY (Mix): Medieval archers occupied the lowest rung of the military >>hierarchy. They were looked down upon and thought of as completely >>expendable, >>not only because the archers were mostly untrained peasants, but also in part >>because the equipment they used was quite ineffectual. At the level of >>military >>ethos, one could say that the archer lacked the romantic stature of the >>knight >>because their style of combat was predicated on spatial distance -- shooting >>from far away seemed cowardly, whereas face-to-face sword combat had an >>aura of >>honor to it. The situation changed for the English, however, due to the >>introduction of the long bow (a development that was materially dependent on >>the availability of the wood in the region, the yew trees). Years of training >>were invested in teaching the English archers to use this weapon with deadly >>effectiveness. Consequently, their stature increased, and for the first time, >>pride could be taken in being an archer. Today, some critics charge that >>using >>unmanned drones is cowardly because it involves striking at a distance. >>We can >>thus see the situation as somewhat analogous to the arrow let loose by the >>Medieval archer. My question is: Will the drones let loose by servicemen ever >>lose their stigma in the same way as the English archers did? Clearly, the >>drones like the English archers proved to be successful in battle. And >>yet, the >>image of the drone controlled by a serviceman does not evoke the same >>humanity >>as the embodied Englishman. >> >>De Landa: I agree that in military history questions of "honor" have always >>influenced decisions to adopt a particular weapon. And distance per se >>was not >>always the main reason: early rifles were not particularly liked due to their >>increased precision, and the practices this led to (the emergence of snipers) >>were seen as dishonorable. Yet, once Napoleon had changed the paradigm from >>battles of attrition to battles of annihilation harassing the enemy via >>snipers >>became quite acceptable. Even more problematic was the effect of the >>rifle and >>the conoidal bullet in changing traditional hierarchies as infantry could now >>defeat artillery, forcing the latter to hide behind defensive positions (a >>hiding which must have carried a bit of stigma at first but that went away >>fast). I think the use of drones will only be seen as problematic from the >>"honor" point of view for a very short time. >> >>CTHEORY (Mallavarapu): In your work you challenge anthropomorphic and >>anthropocentric versions of history. What implications does this have for >>politics in an increasingly militarized world? More specifically, is there a >>danger of the idea of self-organizing systems being used to justify and >>celebrate increasing militarization and the growth of so-called "free market" >>economies? >> >>De Landa: I'll begin with the latter. Theories of self-organization are >>in fact >>being used to explain what Adam Smith left unexplained: how the invisible >>hand >>is supposed to work. From a mere assumption of optimality at equilibrium >>we now >>have a better description of what markets do: they take advantage of >>decentralized dynamics to make use of local information (the information >>possessed by buyers and sellers). These markets are not optimizing since >>self-organizing dynamics may go through cycles of boom and bust. Only >>under the >>assumption of optimality and equilibrium can we say "the State should not >>interfere with the Market." The other assumption (of contingent >>self-organization) has plenty of room for governments to intervene. And more >>importantly, the local information version (due to Hayek and Simon) does not >>apply to large corporations, where strategic thinking (as modeled by game >>theory) is the key. So, far from justifying liberal assumptions the new view >>problematizes markets. (Let's also remember that enemies of markets, such as >>Marx, bought the equilibrium assumption completely: in his book Capital >>he can >>figure out the "socially necessary labor time," and hence calculate the >>rate of >>exploitation, only if profits are at equilibrium). Now, the new view of >>markets >>stresses their decentralization (hence corporations do not belong there), and >>this can hardly justify globalization which is mostly a result of >>corporations. >>And similarly for warfare, the danger begins when the people who do not go to >>war (the central planners) get to make the decisions. The soldiers who do the >>actual killing and dying are never as careless as that. >> >>CTHEORY (Selinger): On a number of occasions, we have discussed different >>aspects of computer modeling. In fact, you just brought up the topic of >>modeling in connection with war-games. I remain unclear on the following. To >>what extent should we use evidence from computer modeling in artificial >>societies to get us to rethink traditional notions about human behavior? For >>example, the standard metaphor that used is to think about mass violence is >>contagion; this is because the violence seems to spread so quickly from >>person >>to person and neighborhood to neighborhood. Yet, Joshua Epstein's >>simulation of >>artificial genocide suggests that the view that a collective mind (or >>some sort >>of infectious hysteria) underlies mass violence is illusory, perhaps even >>folk >>psychological. Specifically, his work suggests that the origin of genocide >>might be a series of individual decisions whereby people turn violent as a >>result of their responses to local conditions. Thoughts? >> >>De Landa: All models, by definition, simplify things. Contagion models can be >>very useful to study certain propagation effects, whether these are fads, >>fashions or ideas. Can they also be useful to study the propagation of >>affect? >>We can't tell in advance. What is important to see is that even if they turn >>out to be useless to study violence that does not affect their usefulness in >>other areas. Also, contagion models differ in the detail with which they >>portray agency, from completely mechanical models with no agency at all (a >>homogeneously socialized population) to models in which some form of virtual >>agent is included. But the key problem is that no one agrees what agency is: >>must it include some form of rational choice, and if so optimizing or >>satisfying rationality? Should all psychological effects be eliminated >>and only >>inter-subjective effects taken into account? How socialized and obedient >>should >>we assume agents to be, and should these qualities be modeled as >>homogeneously >>or heterogeneously distributed? Most of these issues have nothing to do with >>computers and will haunt any modeling effort however informal. >> >>CTHEORY (Selinger): You have often questioned what is at stake, socially, >>politically, and conceptually, when intellectuals engage in criticism. Simply >>put, you are all too aware of the ease by which putatively "Critical >>Theorists" >>are easily swayed by dogmatic convictions and too readily cognitively stymied >>by uncritical presuppositions. One might even say that in so far as you >>characterize yourself as a philosopher -- even if in the qualified sense of a >>"street philosopher" who lacks official credentials -- you believe that it is >>the duty of a philosopher to be critical. By contrast, some of the more >>avant-garde STS theorists seem -- albeit perhaps only polemically and >>rhetorically -- to eschew criticism. For example, Bruno Latour's latest >>writings center on his rejection of criticism as an outdated mode of thought >>that he associates with iconoclasm. He clearly sets the tone for this >>position >>in We Have Never Been Modern in connection with acknowledging his >>intellectual >>debt to Michel Serres, and he emphasizes it in Pandora's Hope, War of the >>Worlds, and Iconoclash. Succinctly put, Latour claims that for six reasons >>ideology critique (which he implicitly associates with normative critique as >>such) is a faulty and patronizing form of analysis: (1) ideology critique >>fails >>to accurately capture how, why, and when power is abused, (2) ideology >>critique >>distorts how authority comes to be overly esteemed, (3) ideology critique >>imputes "extravagant beliefs" onto whatever group is taken to be >>oppressed, (4) >>ideology critique leaves the group that is perceived to be oppressed without >>adequate grounds for liberation, (5) ideology critique distorts the relation >>between critic and the object of criticism, and (6) ideology critique >>accusatively "destroys a way of arguing." What do you think of this position? >> >>De Landa: First of all, I agree that the labels "critical" and "radical" have >>been overused. In the last analysis one should never apply these labels to >>oneself and wait for history to decide just how critical or radical one's >>work >>really was (once its consequences have been played out). Latour's problem >>seems >>to be more with the concept of "ideology" than that of "critique," and in >>that >>I completely agree: to reduce the effects of power to those of creating a >>false >>consciousness is wrong. But here is where the real problem is, since one >>cannot >>just critique the concept of "ideology," the real test of one's radicality is >>what one puts in its place. Or, to put it differently, how one >>re-conceptualizes power. And here one's ontological commitments make all the >>difference in the world. Can a realist like myself trust a theory of power >>proposed by a non-realist, for example? Can a realist ever believe in a >>theory >>of power developed, for example, by an ethnomethodologist, when one is aware >>that for that person everything is reducible to phenomenological experience? >>The same point applies to normativity: if one is a realist defending a >>particular stance will depend on developing a new ethics, not just critiquing >>old moralities. Here a Spinozian ethics of assemblages that may be mutually >>enhancing versus those that are degrading may be the solution, but developing >>this idea will also imply certain ontological commitments (to the >>mind-independent reality of food and poison, for example). >> >>CTHEORY (Jensen): A similar question could be raised in relation to your work >>on markets and anti-markets. In contrast to Empire by Hardt and Negri, which >>explicitly hopes to have a political impact, your position is much less >>straightforwardly normative. If, in a realist vein, you take your analysis to >>be descriptive, how then do you think people might act to reap the >>benefits of >>your description? >> >>De Landa: No, not at all. Remember first of all that a realist never settles >>for a mere description. It is explanation that is the key and the latter >>involves thinking about real mechanisms which may not be directly observable >>(or describable). The disagreement with Empire is over the mechanisms one >>postulates and the details of their workings. I do not accept the Marxist >>version of these mechanisms (neither those through which markets are supposed >>to operate nor those for the State) and believe the Marxist version leads to >>practical dead ends regardless of how ready to be used in social >>interventions >>the analysis seems to be. (To be blunt, any idea for social intervention >>based >>on Marxism will be a failure). I do take normative positions in my books >>(such >>that decentralization is more desirable than centralization for many reasons) >>but I also realize than in an ethics of nourishing versus degrading >>assemblages >>real-life experimentation (not a priori theorization) is the key. To use an >>obvious example from environmental ethics: a little phosphorous feeds the >>soil; >>too much poisons it. Where exactly the threshold is varies with type of >>soil so >>it cannot be known a priori. But the normative statement "do not poison the >>soil" is there nevertheless. Similarly for society: too much centralization >>poisons (by concentrating power and privilege; by allowing corruption; by >>taking away skills from routinized command-followers etc) but exactly how >>much >>is to be decided by social experiments, how else? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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