Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2003 17:31:54 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: RE: BHA: moral world



From: "Goatcher, Jeffrey" <jeffrey.goatcher-AT-ntu.ac.uk>

Thans very much Mervyn, Jan this has been vey helpful and stimulationg
[thus the delay in replying]

Mervyn, you say:

When we are 'thrown' into the world, it is always already moralized in
the ID; we reproduce or change this in our (transitive) activities.

I am interested in the way in which we reproduce or change the world, or
rather what we use to imform the direction of our [re]production or
change. Much of this will be conditioned by the social mores we find
ourselves lumbered with - but if we are to transform and emanicpte our
selves there must be some other criteria at which we aim our activities.
I am playing with the idea that there might be some eternal moral
stnadard which might guide us. do you think such an idea could hold water?

Jan I have tried to find some relevant Levinas without luck, could you
help out with a reference? I was particularly stirred by:

moral responsibility does not arise out of obligation or submission to
some episteme (law, code) but from the ontological encounter with the
reality of the Other.

as I have been working on a critique of Mouffe's readical democracy, and
her insistance on agonistic relations between persons. She seems only to
characterise our inter-relations sceptically. I believe she is thus
obliged to misread sentiments such as â^À^ØI know you are in painâ^À^Ù, as
statements of knowledge [an idea I have found in Tanesini]. She is unable
to read such statements as expressions of acknowledgement of a common,
human, life; as statements motivated by a connection between the inner
lives of individuals.

Cheers

Jeff


	-----Original Message-----
	From: Mervyn Hartwig [mailto:mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk]
	Sent: Mon 07/07/2003 10:45
	To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
	Cc:
	Subject: Re: BHA: moral world



	"Goatcher, Jeffrey" <jeffrey.goatcher-AT-ntu.ac.uk> writes

	>the moralISED aspect, whcih seems similar to
	>Colliers idea of a transitve moral realm [in Being & Worth]. This would be
	>the particular moraities [or amoralities] of current societies, but what
	>of the intransitive morality? are we not also born into or with such a
	>foundation?

	The crucial thing to grasp I think is that we inhabit a world that is
	both transitive and intransitive (has these as dimensions)--a world of
	systematic bipolarity or duality. In such a world, things are
	existentially interdependent but essentially distinct. We can switch
	from one to the other (see the notion of 'perspectival switch' in DPF)
	or referentially detach our transitive world or activities and view it
	under the aspect of intransitivity, critically thinking about it etc.
	This is what is perhaps above all distinctively human about us as
	compared with other animals.

	The TD after all is or corresponds with epistemology (more broadly all
	our activities), and the ID with ontology. In its intransitive aspect,
	epistemology is 'constellationally contained' within ontology. In its
	transitive aspect it is our attempt to know, criticize and change things
	ontological.The ID contains, but also contrasts with, the TD.

	My communicating with you now is in the TD (within ontology). Included
	within it is a commitment to truth and understanding as goods, so it's
	inter alia an ethical example of something in the TD. By a valid
	perspectival switch or act of referential detachment, however, I can
	also think about it/ study it, etc in the ID, and so can you. When we
	are 'thrown' into the world, it is always already moralized in the ID;
	we reproduce or change this in our (transitive) activities.

	Hope this helps.

	Mervyn



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