Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2003 23:06:22 +0100 From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere.demon.co.uk> Subject: Re: BHA: Identity - another thought.... For what it's worth, in DPF it seems logic = formal logic and dialectic = rather a species of (transcendental) *argument* (when it doesn't have the wider meaning of the overall process of reason or rational directionality or the pulse of freedom in human history). Formal logic has, but has only, a vital role to play in dialectic as argument, and doubtless in the overall process too. There's no 'dialectical logic' as such. Mervyn Jamie Morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes >Isn't this precisely the problem you were attributing to using identity and >truth? Is logic without formal rules still logic or is itsomething else >marching udner the wrong semantic flag? > >----- Original Message ----- >From: "Andrew Brown" <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> >To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu> >Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2003 12:29 PM >Subject: Re: BHA: Identity - another thought.... > > >> Hi Jamie, >> >> > Thanks, interesting, I would suggest however that as described it is >> > not a dialectical logic but a logic of dialectic since you don't seem >> > to be providing any rules of coherent argument that would be definable >> > as a dialectical logic >> >> Such formal rules would give us a formal not a dialectical logic. One >aspect of >> dialectical logic is to take us away from the view that 'logic' always >equals *formal* >> logic, that to count as 'logic' is to have a list of formally defined >rules. One can list >> general 'laws' (Engels does, for example), and one must provide general >arguments, >> but they are always preliminary, in need of concretion, of content, of >more and more >> specifc grounds, much as you suggest below. >> >> you seem to be arguing that whilst formal logic >> > has its uses it also has its limits and one of these is that it cannot >> > incorproate all aspects of dialectical thinkingbut is still useful - >> >> This is Hegel's, and all other dialecticians', argument, as I understand >it. >> >> > I'm still not sure about the law of excluded middle though - its a >> > dangerous move to omit this without careful clarification of the >> > grounds under which it is done in given cases. >> >> My near totally ignorant impresson is that, within the domain of the >contemporary >> philosophy discipline, there are a number of caes of logical systems which >deny this >> law. Intuitionist logic is explicit about this (none other than Dummet has >extensively >> explored this logic). There is also many-valued logic. Also fuzzy logic. >Alas I do not >> know any details, accept that they all, of course, have various >justifications for their >> stance. >> >> I suppose both specifc grounds and general grounds of posibility must be >put >> forward. A general argument one often sees is the suggestion that stasis >is the >> outcome of strict universal adherence to the law of the excluded middle, >and non- >> contradiction. I mention this because of the interesting comparision with >DPF but I >> have never thought through the general arguments. Rather, as I said, I >have worked >> on what I interpret as two specifc and interesting real contradictions, >only. >> >> Perhaps the best grounds are those offered by Lewontin and Levins in their >> 'Dialectical Biologist' book, and elsewhere (also the work of Stephen >Rose). Sean >> Creaven provides a good introductory discussion of their work. They are >revered >> scientists within their fields, with a facility for clear expression to >any interested >> reader. >> >> Another excellent discussion is to be found In Tony Smith's article in >'Historical >> Materialism', issue 4, which Mervyn mentioned some time ago. From here you >could >> go to the broader literature on 'systematic dialectics'. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Andy >> >> >> > Jamie >> > ----- Original Message ----- >> > From: "Andrew Brown" <Andrew-AT-lubs.leeds.ac.uk> >> > To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu> >> > Sent: Tuesday, June 24, 2003 5:04 PM >> > Subject: Re: BHA: Identity - another thought.... >> > >> > >> > > Hello Jamie, >> > > >> > > > Andrew, hi could you just go through what you mean by dialectical >> > > > logic and particularly refuting the law of exlcuded middle? >> > > >> > > I take dialectical logic to be a science of thinking, a theory of >> > > knowledge, and, in a materialist version, this is also a science of >> > > the most abstract objective, material laws (since true thinking >> > > reflects these laws). The content of dialectical logic, the >> > > development or substantiation of the abstract definition I just >> > > gave, cannot therefore be summed up by reference to some or other >> > > formal system. It cannot be summed up in a few words or paragraphs >> > > since its scope is to say the least ambitious! It includes much of >> > > what might be termed 'epistemology' yet it also includes ontology >> > > for reasons I have mentioned. So the main thing to get over is this >> > > vast change in scope relative to a more typical definition of logic. >> > > Still, Engels did a job of summarising some key propositions with >> > > his 'laws of the dialectic' (taken from Hegel, obviously the main >> > > guy when it comes to dialectical logic) but these are easily taken >> > > to be sterile, formal propositions which is the last thing they are. >> > > Sean Creaven discusses Engels very well though I doubt Sean would >> > > agree with the definition of dialectical logic I have suggested >> > > above. >> > > >> > > Amongst the relevant aspects to the discussion we have had is the >> > > point that the law of the excluded middle, loosely the law that a >> > > statement is either true or false but not both, is 'denied' by >> > > dialectical logic. I put 'denied' in scare quotes because it is of >> > > course true that this law is useful and common sense, within many >> > > domains of application, but it does have limits outside of which the >> > > law is not true. Better to say 'sublated' I suppose. >> > > >> > > More generally I take dialectical logic to stress that >> > > contradictions play an important role in real, material development >> > > and in theory development. Such oppositions as thought and being, >> > > universal and particular, identity and difference, their mutual >> > > interpenetration, their very identity and difference spur on the >> > > dialectic. >> > > >> > > But these are all wooly phrases without detailed explication. In my >> > > CR and Marxism chapter I briefly hint at an explanation of the >> > > 'identity-in-opposition' between thought and being developed by >> > > Spinoza (at least given Ilyenkov's admittedly idiosyncratic >> > > interpretation of Spinoza). I set this out in a proper length in my >> > > PhD. Also in the PhD I interpret the so-called 'transformation >> > > problem' within Marxist ecnoomics as the development of the >> > > contradiction between value and use value (hence not a problem at >> > > all). >> > > >> > > So thought / being and value / use value are the two contradictions >> > > I have actually done any work on. >> > > >> > > Ilyenkov's 1977 'Dialectical Logic: Essays in its Theory and >> > > History', Progress, is the major influence on me regarding >> > > dialectical logic. Though I would not profess to fully grasp what >> > > Ilyenkov is on about.... >> > > >> > > Best wishes, >> > > >> > > Andy >> > > >> > > >> > > > >> > > > Best, Jamie >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- >> >> >> >> >> --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- >> >> > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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