From: "James Daly" <james.irldaly-AT-ntlworld.com>
Subject: BHA: Re: Primacy of practice, sophistry, and other fun stuff
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2003 23:34:36 -0000



----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gis.net>
To: "Bhaskar list" <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
Sent: Sunday, November 16, 2003 7:47 PM
Subject: BHA: Primacy of practice, sophistry, and other fun stuff


> Hi Mervyn, James and Phil--
>
> Shoot, you've given me some interesting but hard nuts to crack, and
at the
> moment I have neither time nor tongs nor tongue to open them
further.  But
> I'll give it a valiant effort as briefly as I can (and I promise not
to go
> on another alliterative binge -- fun as it was, it also took lots of
work!).
>
> I think I'll start with Phil's points (hey, Phil, that choice of
"Pragma"
> and "Metaphysic" was a kick!).  I'm afraid I can't give a strong
reply to
> your comments on Hegel, who I haven't read and probably never will,
being
> little more than an educated dog myself (sorry, I'm alluding to a
joke that
> perhaps only Howard will remember, though come to think of it, it
should
> also bring a wry smile to anyone who knows the history of the word
"cynic").
> In any case, I agree that reason is crucial to the improvement of
human
> affairs, although as that annoying Mr Marx once said, thinking about
the
> world is ducky but you also gotta change it.  I'll also agree that
Marx
> sometimes slid toward a pragmatic view of truth.  My point however
lies
> elsewhere: and that is, reason doesn't come out of nowhere, ex
nihilo (but
> Mervyn, I'll get to your question about nihilo vs novo).  Reason
*emerges*
> from practical (bodily) engagements with the world, starting with
our most
> basic interactions like crawling from point A to point B, putting
things
> into boxes and pulling them out again, and playing peek-a-boo.  I
have to
> both agree and disagree with your argument that cooking involves
theories.
> Our embodied interactions with the material world lead us to
*develop*
> categories (cats are distinguishable from mats), which involve
theories
> (cats are more like rats than they are like mats in that they're
both
> *alive*).  However, on the one hand, I don't believe categories
exist
> outside semiosis, or if you like, outside consciousness (that would
be the
> epistemic fallacy -- powers, relationships and events do, but not
> categories).  And on the other hand, beyond categorization I'm
skeptical
> that noticing phenomena (e.g., fermentation or antibiosis) or asking
a
> question ("I wonder what'll happens if I mix an egg into the
flour?")
> demands a theory or even a hypothesis; on the contrary, they both
depend on
> a *lack* of prior knowledge or theory.  So it's from those two
perspectives
> (embodied activity and the absence of knowledge) that I maintain the
primacy
> of practice.  In fact, for embodied activity to yield knowledge it
must
> start from ignorance and error, so ultimately it depends on absences
too.
>
> I hope it's clear that the primacy of practice thesis does not -- or
at
> least need not -- devolve into simple pragmatism.  As for Peirce, he
> objected to William James's verson of pragmatism (and in response
renamed
> his own view the intentionally ugly "pragmaticism").  His eventual
concept
> of truth was a type of consensus theory, but with a crucial
qualification:
> truth is what the community of minds determines it to be over the
entire
> course of history, *including the future*.  In other words, the
> understanding of reality which we've attained in the present is
always
> fallible and subject to later correction.
>
> To respond quickly to Mervyn's inquiry about my view of "de novo" vs
"ex
> nihilo," my answer is "Yes."  Put less flippantly, my understanding
of
> emergence (including intrastructural emergence) is that it depends
upon
> pre-existing materials and conditions, and so in that sense is not
"ex
> nihilo."  However, since the emergent power or relationship is
contingent
> and cannot be directly derived from or reduced to the level from
which it
> arose, it is both new _and_ "from nothing/nowhere."  I think this
view
> coheres with my comment about the dependence of knowledge upon
absences.
> (Re RB, I think *From East to West* is a mess, but I haven't gotten
to any
> subsequent works yet.  I intend to, however.)
>
> Mervyn, I wish I were as confident as you that James's statement was
not
> anthropocentric.  But he can speak for himself.
>
> Be that as it may, I think both you and James oversimplify the
Sophists a
> bit -- there was quite a variety among them, and Plato had an axe to
grind
> when he vilified them in contrast to his hero.  Not all Sophists
were
> market-oriented, and some were politically subversive.  Some were
anthropic,
> but some were naturalistic.  And some were of a scientific bent.
But
> evidently what both of you really have in mind are the rhetoricians.
Let me
> quote James:
>
> > The Sophists [...] did not teach logic or science, but
> > rhetoric, the art of persuasion, i.e. demagoguery and sales
technique,
> > which Gorgias said was superior to science; the physician could
tell
> > you what would cure you, but could not make you take it, whereas
the
> > rhetorician, although ignorant of medicine, could.
>
> I don't identify with or endorse the rhetorician Sophists, but I
don't
> simply condemn them either.  Clearly, if the patient won't take the
> medicine, you'll have one very sick and possibly dead patient.  We'd
be
> fools not to acknowledge that.  But this is not to say that
persuasion is
> "superior" to science, only that it has its role, and an important
one.  I'm
> sure it'll surprise no-one that I'm deeply interested in language
and
> representation (and delight in them as well), and that I'm convinced
of
> their cultural, social and political power.  However, precisely
because
> they're powerful, I see them as having a crucial ethical aspect.
(At the
> risk of re-opening the argument, this is a key reason why I complain
about
> RB's writing: I think there's an ethical dimension to *everyone's*
use of
> language, and that RB undercuts the social power of his ideas by not
> communicating them well.)
>
> But ethics is a complicated matter.  For example, sometimes lying is
the
> right thing to do.  Consider politeness: it is really necessary to
tell
> sweet aged Aunt Betsy that her coffee makes you gag?  So even if we
prize
> truth and truthfulness, here's a situation in which the worser
argument, the
> one for the merits of lying, is (and I think should be) the
stronger.  I
> suspect that some of you are a little shocked by this argument -- 
and by the
> fact that you know it's true!  But lying can be good because it can
sustain
> a deeper truth, one concerning our humanity: sustaining the bonds of
> sociability, friendship and love is generally more vital to us as
people
> than is an absolute allegiance to honesty.  In short, virtually all
of
> civility requires accepting the situational propriety of lying.
(Let me
> emphasize *situational*, since I'm not at all advocating lying as a
> universal good -- far from it.)
>
> The ethics of language is complex in another direction as well.
Here's
> James again:
>
> > Faith for Kierkegaard meant something like "trust" -- Abraham is
his
> > model. Faith is akin to hope, but not hope for something finite.
It is
> > more like what is expressed in the phrase "Everything has a
reason".
> > Reason after all is the highest and defining human faculty.
>
> James plays on words in order to advance his argument: he first uses
the
> term "reason" in the sense of "cause," and then uses it in the sense
of
> "reasoning."  Now, I disagree with him when he connects the two
senses this
> way -- reasons are (or can be) causes, but not all causes come from
> reasoning, unless one presupposes a God directing everything's
existence.
> Nevertheless I don't think playing on words this way is necessarily
> unethical.  On the contrary, it can be vital to the imagination and
creative
> thinking.  Consequently, if we strictly obeyed distinctions in
meaning, we
> would gravely impoverish our ability to wonder about the world; and
that, I
> think, *would* be woefully unethical.
>
> Cripes, I've spent way more time than I meant to, so I'm going to
split.
>
> Thanks,
>
> T.
>
> ---
> Tobin Nellhaus
> nellhaus-AT-mail.com
> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S.
Peirce
>
>
>
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