From: "Howard Engelskirchen" <howarde-AT-twcny.rr.com>
Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism,
Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2003 08:38:47 -0500


Hi James,

Thanks very much for your comments.  I'd like to ask you to clarify, and
clarify something myself.

In writing my last sentence, the one you quote, I left out a significant
word:

IT SHOULD NOT READ:

>"The question is not whether we've given a photo-literal depiction,
> but whether allow us to accommodate our practices to the world's
> causal structures."

BUT INSTEAD SHOULD READ:

"The question is not whether we've given a photo-literal depiction, but
whether *our representations* allow us to accommodate our practices to the
world's causal structures."

That emphasizes the distinction between the transitive and the intransitive
that you underscore.

Given that precision, can I ask you to clarify the reference of "This" in
your immediately following sentence, "This however accepts the metaphor
"literal" . . . .

Also, are you saying that the objective and subjective are not two realms,
but transitive and intransitive are?  Without doubt the subject is an
object, but Bhaskar's concept of ontological stratification makes
distinctions of 'realms,' doesn't it?

Howard






----- Original Message ----- 
From: "James Daly" <james.irldaly-AT-ntlworld.com>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2003 7:28 AM
Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism,


> Dear Steve and Howard
>
> Thank you for your informative and stimulating discussion about
> realism, which I hope you will continue.
>
> Steve wrote:
>
> "the issue of what it is to hold that science is a realism does raise
> the question of what it is to accept that a theory is literally a true
> representation of reality - even when it is plain that it is not and
> that what is being proposed is a theoretical construct that derives
> it's truth from a given social system."
>
>
>
> I agree with Howard who replied:
>
>
>
> "Literally" is the word that makes your ideological point but is not
> essential to realism's argument or even fully coherent in context. We
> know our senses don't exhaust the range of sensible phenomena. We're
> not even sure that extension plus time exhaust the world's
> dimensions."
>
> But Howard goes on to say:
>
>
>
> "The question is not whether we've given a photo-literal depiction,
> but whether allow us to accommodate our practices to the world's
> causal structures."
>
> This however accepts the metaphor of "literal", which I think needs
> unpacking. What it seems to mean is that realism claims that with our
> senses and our theories we see the word as it is *without* our senses
> or our theories. As Howard says present day realism (I am thinking of
> Bhaskar) doesn't claim that. Isn't this where the distinction of
> transitive and intransitive comes in? The intransitive world can only
> be known through our sense-knowledge, transitive interpretations,
> categories and theories, but that does not mean we only know *them*. I
> think there was a relevant scholastic distinction between "id quod"
> (that which... e.g. is known) and "modus quo" (that by which..., or
> the way in which... e.g. X is known). Any particular *way* in which we
> know can become an object of knowledge in its turn, because it is in
> the same causal world as the things we know in that *way*.
>
> There seems to be a similarity between this debate and Hegel's reply
> to Kant: the real is precisely what we know (and correct our knowledge
> of) through our senses and theories -- and our practices. The
> objective and the subjective are not two realms.
>
> Does that make any sense?
>
> James
>
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Howard Engelskirchen" <howarde-AT-twcny.rr.com>
> To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
> Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 7:27 PM
> Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism,
>
>
> > OK, Steve.  Thanks for the exchange.
> >
> > howard
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message ----- 
> > From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
> > To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
> > Cc: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
> > Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2003 3:54 AM
> > Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism,
> >
> >
> > > Howard/all
> > > I'm short of time so cannot respond in detail to this interesting
> email
> > > which has given much interesting food for thought. I would assume
> that
> > > you are a 'philosophical realist' as well as a 'scientific
> realist'.
> > >
> > > I had considered that I'd responded to the question 'What
> constitutes
> > > empirical adequacy ?' earlier but i'll repeat myself - a theory
> can be
> > > said to be empirically adequate if what it states about the
> observable
> > > entities and events in the world/local universe is true. In other
> words
> > > the phenomena it describes fit within the model  presented. To
> clarify
> > > further this must include all the phenomena including those
> observed and
> > > those that have not yet been observed which should fit within the
> > > theoretical structure.
> > >
> > > With regard to your two possibilities - given that science is in
> my view
> > > primarily an ideologically bound activity, that is it deals with a
> > > 'reality' which is always already ideological and that as a
> consequence
> > > I see very little scientific activity which can be said to be
> addressing
> > > the 'real'. Which then means that I am not sure where I fit within
> the
> > > two possibilities, because obviously I am not denying that the
> 'real'
> > > exists but rather that i'm not convinced that we can state that
> science
> > > is an activity which can  state that it is investigating the
> 'real'
> > > rather than constructing and defining an ideologically bound
> 'reality'.
> > > Reality is precisely ideological in the sense that even in the
> royal
> > > sciences of physcis and mathmatics it is impossible to get through
> the
> > > social construction , the ideological to the 'Real'. Consequently
> then
> > > we are working with different notions of reality and probably it
> would
> > > make sense for us to recognise this now.
> > >
> > > If science had never invented any 'causal structures and
> relations'  I'd
> > > accept paragraph four but it has...
> > >
> > > (I do not believe this email was distributed last night if it was
> > > apologies -)
> > >
> > > regards
> > > steve
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Howard Engelskirchen wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Hi Steve,
> > > >>
> > > >> Let me say again that I have only dropped in on a conversation
> and
> > > >> therefore
> > > >> don't really follow a number of things you have said and may
> well
> > > >> misunderstand.
> > > >>
> > > >> I'll move backwards through your argument because if I
> understand
> > > >> correctly,
> > > >> your real concern is with science as a "construct."  I assume
> "social
> > > >> construct" is meant here.
> > > >>
> > > >> 1)    There are two possibilities:  (i) you believe that what
> counts
> > > >> as real
> > > >> is socially constructed in the sense that the world is what we
> make
> > > >> it by
> > > >> how we think of it or agree it should be -- what counts as real
> is a
> > > >> matter
> > > >> of philosophical or linguistic or social convention;
> alternatively
> > > >> you mean
> > > >> (ii) that science is a historically situated activity that is
> > > >> socially and
> > > >> politically determined in what it is, what it does and what it
> > achieves.
> > > >>
> > > >> If you mean the first, then your position is inconsistent with
> > > >> scientific
> > > >> realism and we have a disagreement.  We do not make causal
> structures
> > > >> and
> > > >> relations (except insofar as we function as causal phenomena
> > > >> ourselves, and
> > > >> then only to the extent that we do -- we make a dam; we do not
> make the
> > > >> force that pulls water over it).
> > > >>
> > > >> If you mean that the way we understand the world is a product
> of
> > social,
> > > >> ideological and political structures, then this is fully
> consistent
> > with
> > > >> scientific realism today.  There is nothing in the realist
> argument
> > that
> > > >> would bar the proposition that a historically specific mode of
> > > >> production
> > > >> sets limits to what science can know.   Aristotle, for example,
> could
> > > >> not
> > > >> know the equality of social labor produced by exchange because
> of
> > > >> slavery
> > > >> and it seems quite likely that there will be no flowering of
> the social
> > > >> sciences comparable to what has happened to the natural
> sciences over
> > > >> the
> > > >> last three or four hundred years as long as social life is
> dominated by
> > > >> capitalist relations of exploitation.
> > > >>
> > > >> But there are two separate issues here.  Assuming social
> structures
> > > >> block or
> > > >> facilitate what may be known, still within those limits
> investigators
> > > >> may
> > > >> identify causal structures of nature or society that actually
> operate
> > > >> and
> > > >> they may do so accurately enough so that we can learn to
> accommodate
> > our
> > > >> conceptual, disciplinary and everyday practices to them.
> > > >>
> > > >> 2)    You argue that any philosophy of science asserts  that
> what best
> > > >> explains the empirical success of science is that the relevant
> > > >> theories are
> > > >> approximately true.
> > > >>
> > > >> This is not true.  Logical empiricism denied the truth of
> > unobservables.
> > > >> Forms of instrumentalism are agnostic about truth.  Hermeneutic
> > > >> approaches
> > > >> look for the most meaningful interpretations, not those that
> are
> > > >> true, and
> > > >> so on.
> > > >>
> > > >> 3)    You argue that your own best understanding of science is
> that
> > > >> "science
> > > >> aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, and
> > > >> acceptance of a
> > > >> scientific theory is merely that it is empirically adequate."
> > > >>
> > > >> But as I said in my last post, this just re-asks the question
> most of
> > us
> > > >> would like answered:  what is it about empirically adequate
> theories
> > > >> that
> > > >> accounts for their success?
> > > >>
> > > >> 4)  Notice that "the realist argument that science must be
> engaged in
> > > >> identifying what is 'real' because it works and is
> approximately true"
> > > >> sounds more like a pragmatist's argument than a realist one.
> > > >>
> > > >> The realist argument is abductive:  We have the fact that when
> we did
> > > >> a, b
> > > >> and c, result R was produced.  How is this to be best
> explained?
> > > >> Well, if
> > > >> theory T correctly identified how causal process X behaves,
> according
> > > >> to T
> > > >> when we do a, b and c, R is produced.  It must be the case,
> > > >> therefore, that
> > > >> T correctly identified causal process X and how it behaves.
> But the
> > > >> abduction is a result of the global success of science, of
> course,
> > > >> not this
> > > >> or that isolated example.
> > > >>
> > > >> 5)    You say that accepting a scientific theory means
> believing in its
> > > >> truth.  If you mean believing in the whole truth of it, then
> this is
> > not
> > > >> entailed by realism -- the point of the example I gave in my
> last post
> > > >> regarding the luminiferous ether was to show that scientists
> can be
> > > >> quite
> > > >> skeptical about a whole bunch of the substance of their
> theories.  A
> > > >> scientist could believe that she had correctly represented the
> > > >> propagation
> > > >> of light by a wave equation without believing that the carrier
> medium
> > > >> was an
> > > >> elastic solid, even though this idea figured in the way she
> worked
> > > >> out the
> > > >> equation.
> > > >>
> > > >> 6)    Finally, your introductory paragraph subtly shifts from
> the
> > > >> position
> > > >> that realists think they do accurately represent the way the
> world is
> > > >> to the
> > > >> quite different position that realism claims to present a
> "literally"
> > > >> true
> > > >> story of what the world is like.  "Literally" is the word that
> makes
> > > >> your
> > > >> ideological point but is not essenhtial to realism's argument
> or even
> > > >> fully
> > > >> coherent in context.  We know our senses don't exhaust the
> range of
> > > >> sensible
> > > >> phenomena.  We're not even sure that extension plus time
> exhaust the
> > > >> world's
> > > >> dimensions.  The question is not whether we've given a
> photo-literal
> > > >> depiction, but whether allow us to accommodate our practices to
> the
> > > >> world's
> > > >> causal structures.
> > > >>
> > > >> best,
> > > >>
> > > >> Howard
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >
> >
> >
> >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
>
>
>
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