Subject: RE: BHA: scientific realism,
Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2003 11:15:42 -0600
From: "Groff, Ruth" <ruth.groff-AT-marquette.edu>


Hey guys,

Thanks to people who responded to my test message.  It seems that I am able to post again.

I am way behind in everything, and so can't respond to the current thread in the way that I'd like to at all.  But I wanted to say that the mainstream move of defining ontological realism in terms of a theory about what is meant by the concept of truth and/or in terms of an attendant claim about the truth-value of scientific theory, is a really unhelpful category error.

I like to keep the following issues separate (and for what it's worth it is consistent with a realist position to do so):

1. Ontological realism.  A claim about the independent existence of specified objects ("scientific realism" being a claim about the independent existence of the objects of scientific theories specifically).  

2. The correspondence theory of truth.  One account of what the concept of truth does or must mean.

3. Justification criteria.   Epistemic criteria according to which we judge a theory to be true (*however* we happen to define the term "true").  

4. The epistemic status of scientific theory.  The ascribed truth-value (however we define the concept of "truth" and whatever we point to as justification criteria) of scientific claims.   

r.


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