File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2003/bhaskar.0312, message 56


Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2003 22:08:40 +0000
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Re: capitalist social structures are false, Ruth


Try Capital Vol. 1, appendix 'Results of the immediate process of 
production', s. III, where he refers to it as 'the illusory reflection 
of the capitalist relations underlying it' and 'this deceptive 
appearance of capitalist relations'. I take it you'll agree that 
illusions and deceptions are false, albeit of course real.

Mervyn

<steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk> writes
>Mervyn
>
>Where does Marx say the Wage form is false ? Are you referencing the 
>Grundisse ? or Vol 1 of Capital - he does say "... the object of his 
>exchange is a direct object of need, not exchange value as such..." 
>(Grundisse)  which i would not have read as saying the relationship or 
>the wage form is false but rather that the antagonism between workers 
>and capital in  is mature form is a class antagonism.  But false is an 
>odd word to use.
>
>steve
>
>Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
>
>> If Marx is being invoked, he surely ungainsayably held that the wage 
>>form is false and that the wage form is not the same as (not exhausted 
>>by) beliefs about it. I.e. the source of beliefs, not just beliefs, is 
>>false.
>>
>> In more fundamental support of Phil's position, cf the Marxist Chris 
>>Arthur, _The New Dialectics and Marx's *Capital*_, p. 165:
>>
>> ~~~~~~~
>> His [Hegel's] concern is with truth (the usual philosophical topic) 
>>and since truth is the whole, only the whole truth retrospectively 
>>explains the transition [from Being to Becoming]. But if we 
>>deconstruct Hegel's dialectic, a certain 'prejudice-for-truth' is 
>>revealed. Occluded is another possibility: a world of falsity, where 
>>everything is inverted. This would be a 'downward' spiral, the 
>>concretisation of nothingness, the apotheosis of the false, insofar as 
>>'Being' is denied, and demoted to the other of 'Nothing'. No doubt 
>>such a hellish dialectic, in which, contrary to the vision of 'the 
>>whole as the true', the whole is the false, could not occur to Hegel. 
>>But it is precisely the case in capitalism, we argue. Living as we do 
>>in the belly of the 'rough beast' born in Manchester, this possibility 
>>must be taken seriously.
>> ~~~~~~~
>>
>> Cf Bhaskar's concept of the 'demi-real'.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>> jamie morgan <jamie-AT-morganj58.fsnet.co.uk> writes
>>
>>> I'm slightly amazed Phil has brought this up since Marxists and most CR
>>> would argue the useful distinction is between belief and what beleif
>>> reproduces:
>>>
>>> 1) Capitalism is real
>>> 2) Beleifs about capitalism are causally efficacious
>>> 3) CapitLISM is itself causally efficacious in socialisibng beleif
>>> 4) Beliefs may be false
>>> 5) It may be true that capitalism is real and that the beleifs by 
>>>which it
>>> is reproduced are false therefore it is is possible to make true
>>> determinations about false beleifs in capitalism and also true
>>> determinations baout those aspects of captialism that are also held 
>>>truly in
>>> beleif (since one cannot assume that all aspects of society are false
>>> beleif - contingent but not false)
>>> 6) The link in terms of critique and investigation is explanatotyr 
>>>critique
>>> from beleifs but bnot restricted tot hem
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: "Howard Engelskirchen" <howarde-AT-twcny.rr.com>
>>> To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2003 7:37 AM
>>> Subject: BHA: Re: capitalist social structures are false, Ruth
>>>
>>>
>>>> Phil,
>>>>
>>>> How am I supposed to read the statement that capitalist social 
>>>>structures
>>>> are false?   It reads to me like saying 'the oak tree in my front 
>>>>yard is
>>>> false.'  It doesn't make any sense.  Unless there isn't an oak tree 
>>>>my
>>>> front yard -- but that is definitely not the case with capitalist 
>>>>social
>>>> structures.  Or it can mean something like saying "my uncle Ben is 
>>>>false,"
>>>> ie he's a hypocritical old son of a gun.  But then you're not really
>>>
>>> engaged
>>>
>>>> in a discussion about realist ontologies.  That's Ruth's point.  Or you
>>>> could say "my uncle Jim is false," and it would be false because 
>>>>you don't
>>>> have an uncle Jim,  etc.
>>>>
>>>> Let me put it in directly materialist terms.  Charles Bettelheim 
>>>>describes
>>>> the central characteristic of the capitalist mode of production as a
>>>
>>> "double
>>>
>>>> separation" -- the separation of the direct producers from the means of
>>>> production and the separation of productive enterprises from one 
>>>>another.
>>>> You can't meaningfully say these capitalist social structures are 
>>>>false.
>>>> They describe, in a straightforward way, twin material social 
>>>>relations of
>>>> producers to nature and to each other.  That is, I can make an
>>>
>>> ontologically
>>>
>>>> realist statement -- identifying the separation of workers from the 
>>>>means
>>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>> production describes a real state of affairs; it describes how the 
>>>>world
>>>
>>> is.
>>>
>>>> The same with the separation of productive enterprises from one 
>>>>another.
>>>> These statements describe fundamentally important causal 
>>>>structures,  and
>>>
>>> we
>>>
>>>> need representations that with approximate accuracy describe such
>>>> structures.  By saying something true about what capitalist social
>>>
>>> relations
>>>
>>>> are and how they behave, we can guide our practice to overcome them.
>>>> Moreover we know that without overcoming these twin separations we 
>>>>can't
>>>
>>> get
>>>
>>>> beyond capitalist social relations.
>>>>
>>>> It is possible to say the wage form is false.  But while the 
>>>>separations I
>>>> just referred to can be described pretty much the way an oak tree 
>>>>can be
>>>> described, the wage form is false because of the meanings embedded 
>>>>in it.
>>>> The wage form presents itself as a form of equivalence, as a fair day's
>>>
>>> work
>>>
>>>> for a fair day's wage, but it isn't that at all.  In fact, the 
>>>>exchange of
>>>> labor power for a wage initiates the act of the appropriation of 
>>>>surplus
>>>> labor without the exchange of any equivalent.  So insofar as it 
>>>>presents
>>>> itself as an equivalent exchange -- which because it actually is a
>>>
>>> commodity
>>>
>>>> exchange it actually is -- then it is hypocritical and false. 
>>>>Better to
>>>
>>> say
>>>
>>>> this:  it actually is an equivalent exchange and it actually isn't. 
>>>>Both
>>>> descriptions work because the exchange of labor power for a wage is 
>>>>really
>>>> two different material social relations at once, and both are true.  On
>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> one hand it is an exchange of commodities, on the other hand it is an
>>>> integral part of the social relation of capital.  It exists at an
>>>> intersection of contradiction; in the wage relation the commodity 
>>>>relation
>>>> and the capital relation contradict each other so each makes the other
>>>> false.  Hence capitalist relations are through and through, to their
>>>
>>> deepest
>>>
>>>> recesses, hypocritical, and that is true -- they cannot be made not
>>>> hypocritical.  But now I know I am talking in the way I would talk 
>>>>about
>>>
>>> my
>>>
>>>> uncle Ben.
>>>>
>>>> You can say that measured against some projection of what human nature
>>>
>>> must
>>>
>>>> become teleologically, capitalist social relations are false, but 
>>>>then we
>>>> risk straying from the path of materialism.  Or, better, we could 
>>>>say it
>>>> this way:  we know actually existing capitalism is destructive to most
>>>> living and especially human things, so in that sense capitalist social
>>>> relations are false, and some such statement can be understood without
>>>> teleology in a fully materialist fashion.  But however we present the
>>>> matter, to transform capitalism you have to know what its social 
>>>>relations
>>>> actually are and know pretty accurately how they behave.  You need
>>>> approximately true representations of what they actually are to guide
>>>> practice.
>>>>
>>>> (Also, it's false to say there are no other historical materialists 
>>>>the
>>>> list.  You can say there are no good ones, but that is another issue.
>>>
>>> Suppo
>>>
>>>> se you say, no, I mean there are no other ones in the sense that 
>>>>there can
>>>> only be good historical materialists; bad ones are not historical
>>>> materialists at all.  But now you are locked again into a funny 
>>>>ontology.)
>>>>
>>>> Howard
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> From: "Phil Walden" <phil-AT-pwalden.fsnet.co.uk>
>>>> To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
>>>> Sent: Monday, December 01, 2003 1:42 PM
>>>> Subject: BHA: capitalist social structures are false, Ruth
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > Hi Ruth, Tobin,
>>>> >
>>>> > Ruth, I did not - repeat not - say that social structures are
>>>> > truth-bearers.  I said that *capitalist* social structures and
>>>> relations
>>>> > are false.
>>>> >
>>>> > Tobin, materialism does not - repeat not - *have* to be what Charles
>>>> > Sanders Peirce says it is.
>>>> >
>>>> > Lots of love to the anglo-american analytical/pragmatic philosophical
>>>> > community in the US of A, who are doing sooo much good work. :)
>>>> >
>>>> > Phil
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > Hi guys,
>>>> >
>>>> > I'm surprised that my post has generated so much response.
>>>> >
>>>> > Steve, you ask how my position can be thought of as a realism.
>>>> I'm not
>>>> > perfectly sure what you mean by "my position," but I'll address
>>>> the two
>>>> > things that I said.
>>>> >
>>>> > The first thing I said was that I understand realism to be an
>>>> > ontological position, adopted relative to specified objects.  I
>>>> > contrasted this with the correspondence theory of truth, which I
>>>> take to
>>>> > be a definition of the concept of truth.  How is what I say here 
>>>> >
>>>> form
>>>> > of realism?  Well, it isn't.  It's a meta-theoretical distinction
>>>> > between realism about entities and correspondence as one of a
>>>> number of
>>>> > different competing definitions of the concept of truth (which,
>>>> just to
>>>> > remind everyone, I distinguished analytically from criteria for
>>>> > justification).
>>>> >
>>>> > The second thing I said (hi Phil) is that I don't think that social
>>>> > structures are truth-bearers -- not technically.  I don't think
>>>> that I'm
>>>> > convincable otherwise on this one.  Though as I said I'm willing
>>>> to talk
>>>> > that way amongst friends, for rhetorical purposes.   And I would
>>>> stand
>>>> > by the rhetorically pathetic but in my view technically correct claim
>>>> > that at the level of appearance capitalism corresponds (as best 
>>>> >
>>>> can
>>>> > tell) to PROPOSITIONS that are false, such as "The wage is a
>>>> > relationship of equivalence."  How is the denial that structures are
>>>> > truth-bearers a form of realism?  Well, it isn't.  It is a claim
>>>> about
>>>> > what sorts of things in principle can be true or false, not about
>>>> what
>>>> > sorts of things exist, and in what sense.
>>>> >
>>>> > I think of myself as a realist because I think that causality is an
>>>> > expression of the intrinsic properties that things have.  This
>>>> commits
>>>> > me ontologically to the real existence of causal bearers and of their
>>>> > powers.
>>>> >
>>>> > The way that correspondence as a definition of the concept of
>>>> truth gets
>>>> > conflated with ontological realism in the literature, so far as I can
>>>> > tell, is that people say something like "Well, the correspondence
>>>> theory
>>>> > of truth implies that there is something real for statements to
>>>> > correspond *to*, i.e. correspondence implies realism about what are
>>>> > called truth-MAKERS."
>>>> >
>>>> > I think two things about this move.  First, even if the
>>>> implication is
>>>> > correct, what is really the case is that a correspondence theory of
>>>> > truth is internally related to ontological realism, not that they are
>>>> > different names for the same thing.  This is important because the
>>>> > implication does not, in fact, go in the other direction.
>>>> Ontological
>>>> > realism might be especially compatible with the correspondence
>>>> theory of
>>>> > truth, but it certainly doesn't imply it.  One can be a realist and
>>>> > still think that the concept of truth doesn't add anything to
>>>> > substantive claims about the world (this is what is called a
>>>> > "deflationist" position), or think that what we mean by "true" is
>>>> > "justified," according to either philosophical or scientific criteria
>>>> > (Bhaskar held the latte position in RTS, for example), or think that
>>>> > what we mean by "true" is "coheres well, or best, with our other
>>>> views."
>>>> > Etc.  Realism about entities and/or about causality itself does not
>>>> > imply the correspondence theory of truth.
>>>> >
>>>> > Second, it is important to note that while the correspondence
>>>> theory of
>>>> > truth is internally related to (but not the same name for)
>>>> ontological
>>>> > realism, the realism to which it is related does not have to be a
>>>> > materialism.  William Alston makes this point really nicely in 
>>>> >
>>>> book
>>>> > a few years back on truth.  Objective idealism will do.  Just so
>>>> long as
>>>> > the truth-makers have SOME sort of ontological solidity,
>>>> correspondence
>>>> > as a definition of truth will work.
>>>> >
>>>> > I think of myself as being a realist ontologically (for the reasons I
>>>> > said above) and as subscribing to a minimalist version of
>>>> correspondence
>>>> > as a definition of truth (because I think that the *idea* of
>>>> > correspondence, even if we cannot know whether or not it has been
>>>> > achieved, is a condition of possibility for thought itself).  And
>>>> then
>>>> > as holding to something like a hermeneutic/coherence theory of
>>>> > justification.
>>>> >
>>>> > What about others?
>>>> >
>>>> > Ruth
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > --- StripMime Warning --  MIME attachments removed ---
>>>> > This message may have contained attachments which were removed.
>>>> >
>>>> > Sorry, we do not allow attachments on this list.
>>>> >
>>>> > --- StripMime Report -- processed MIME parts ---
>>>> > multipart/mixed
>>>> >   text/plain (text body -- kept)
>>>> >   application/ms-tnef
>>>> > ---
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>>
>
>
>
>    --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---




     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005