File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2003/bhaskar.0312, message 8


Date: Tue, 02 Dec 2003 09:08:17 +0000
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism,


Richard

Actually it was a genunine call for clarification rather than a 
'challenge'  as I  was unsure how for the stated argument could be 
maintained in respect of 'scientific realism'  and I was and am 
specifically interested in  that phrase and not in realism in general. 
My interest is in relation to how a realism would understand 
contemporary science and that seems a lot clearer now...

Where did the use of the religious metaphor come from ?

regards
steve

Moodey, Richard W wrote:

>Hi Ruth and Steve,
>
>Ruth calls herself as a "realist," and Steve challenges her claim.  He writes to Ruth:
> 
>"Perhaps after reading through this and the subsequent half a dozen emails you can clarify how your position can be thought of as a 'realism'."
>
>I read this as a challenge to Ruth's claim to be a "realist," rather than a genuine call for her to clarify her position. She is quite clear about what she means.  She writes:
>
>"I think of myself as a realist because I think that causality is an expression of the intrinsic properties that things have.  This commits me ontologically to the real existence of causal bearers and of their powers."
>
>Earlier she had written:
>
>"Ontological realism.  A claim about the independent existence of specified objects ("scientific realism" being a claim about the independent existence of the objects of scientific theories specifically)."
>
>This seems quite clear.  I read Steve as telling Ruth that she does not fit his criteria for being a realist.  This is curious, however, because Steve claims to be an anti-realist. He writes:
>
>"There are a number of things in relation to the representation of 'scientific realism' that has caused me some amusement and which in some sense could allow me to think of myself as a 'realist' but for consistencies sake let's maintain my normal anti-realist stance."
>
>And in another post:
>
>"From an anti-realist perspective some of the above examples work quite easily because they are either empirically adequate (and consequently true) or not. However more directly these entities are mostly understandable as ideological phantasies which are mere social constructs with no connection to the real at all, even though the scientists are still maintaining that they are operating within the scope of the real."
>
>Steve seems to be like the anti-Catholic who challenges someone who claims to be a Catholic to clarify how it is that what she believes can really be Catholicism.  Why should the anti-Catholic care whether the Catholic is orthodox or not?  Why should the anti-realist Steve care what the self-styled realist Ruth believes?
>
>Perhaps it is because Steve wants to refute realism, but finds that Ruth's insistence upon distinctions made in her four points makes it more difficult?
>
>I really don't see how what Ruth has written is in any way an attempt to "drive a stake through the heart" of an attempt either to arrive at some kind of least common denominator belief among those who call themselves "realists" or "scientific realists," or the the attempt to develop a more elaborated account of what any particular realist holds.  
>
>I think we have to allow realists (and Catholics and Marxists) to disagree and still let them use the names to refer to themselves.
>
>Best regards,
>
>Dick
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: steve.devos [mailto:steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk] 
>Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2003 7:49 AM
>To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU
>Subject: Re: BHA: scientific realism,
>
>
>Ruth/all
>
>Perhaps after reading through this and the subsequent half a dozen 
>emails you can clarify how your position can be thought of as a 
>'realism'.  I would rather that we kept the clarification specific to 
>the discussion around scientific realism as the slippage into discussing 
>whether 'capitalist social relations are a truth' is not particularly 
>interesting,  (it reminds me of the Deleuze statement on heidegger 'Is 
>he a bit of a Nazi (obviously, obviously)').
>
>I originally quoted Putnam rather than my usual sources because I have a 
>sense that this list is happier using anglo-american philosophical 
>sources than my more usual continental ones - this was used as an 
>attempt to arrive at a common understanding of 'scienctific realism', 
>that is a common understanding of the claim usually made by scientists 
>that 'science is a realism' - given that you have attempted to drive a 
>stake through the heart of this I would personally like to understand 
>how you would define this. It is not clear to me how the below four 
>points can be asserted as being a defence of the statement that 'science 
>is a realism', rather they are vague enough to enable a  non-realist to 
>be quite content to accept the general arguments, is this intended.
>
>Note the emphasis on scientists - a scientist, at least one descended 
>from the original agreement/bargin that Max Planck and his descendents 
>agreed with the political establishment(s) that allowed science to be an 
>active participant in the regulation of the social - such a scientist 
>would insist on the necessity of the truth of point 1. Without this the 
>following three points are meaningless explanatory sub-categories. Is 
>then the definition of 'scientific realism' you are proposing acceptable 
>to a Planckian scientist ?
>
>regards
>steve
>
>Groff, Ruth wrote:
>
>  
>
>>Hey guys,
>>
>>Thanks to people who responded to my test message.  It seems that I am 
>>able to post again.
>>
>>I am way behind in everything, and so can't respond to the current 
>>thread in the way that I'd like to at all.  But I wanted to say that 
>>the mainstream move of defining ontological realism in terms of a 
>>theory about what is meant by the concept of truth and/or in terms of 
>>an attendant claim about the truth-value of scientific theory, is a 
>>really unhelpful category error.
>>
>>I like to keep the following issues separate (and for what it's worth 
>>it is consistent with a realist position to do so):
>>
>>1. Ontological realism.  A claim about the independent existence of 
>>specified objects ("scientific realism" being a claim about the independent existence of the objects of scientific theories specifically).
>>
>>2. The correspondence theory of truth.  One account of what the concept 
>>of truth does or must mean.
>>
>>3. Justification criteria.   Epistemic criteria according to which we judge a theory to be true (*however* we happen to define the term "true").  
>>
>>4. The epistemic status of scientific theory.  The ascribed truth-value (however we define the concept of "truth" and whatever we point to as justification criteria) of scientific claims.   
>>
>>r.
>>    
>>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
>  
>


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