File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2004/bhaskar.0404, message 23


Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2004 22:29:21 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: BHa: criteria for ascription of reality


Hi Howard,


>Except for the conflations, I think that's what I was trying to say.


That's well and good, but you've given the impression that that is *not*
what Bhaskar is saying. Seems to me first you put on monovalent and
analytical spectacles to read PN, then you put on polyvalent and
dialectical ones to construct a critique of the resulting straw man.

Mervyn


 Howard Engelskirchen <howarde-AT-twcny.rr.com> writes
>Except for the conflations, I think that's what I was trying to say.
>
>Howard
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "jamie morgan" <zen34405-AT-zen.co.uk>
>To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
>Sent: Friday, April 23, 2004 5:11 AM
>Subject: BHA: BHa: criteria for ascription of reality
>
>
>> Hi Howard, a priori justifications are not the same as the plausibility of
>a priori to knowledge as a necessary stage in comprehending a world that is
>more than that which is percieved - Boyd seems to have conflated this. The
>arguemnts for cause and percepetuion are of course linked in many ways but
>are bnot collapsible one intot he other without serious conceptual
>problems - there seems to be two implicit uses of percieved in your
>thinking - real as percieved and percieved and scientific method - they are
>not the same and arenot argued in the same way (that reality is more than
>percieved though wecannot be definite about it is different than the
>adequacy of diffferent perceptually linked or non percpetually linked (since
>the scope of perception is constantly moved by technology and new cocnepts
>that look in old place sin new ways)causal explanations in science and other
>forms of knowledge - one oproblem comes when we started using rationalist
>philosophy to argue about scienc
>>  e in a way that is not in dialoguie with science or empirical arguments
>of any kind - this can lead to the fairy problem - but it is a problem of
>unengaged philosophy or acritical method or bad argument or the limits
>imposed by a historical period rather than a necessary issue of perception
>and causation as analytically nonequivelant cocnepts). Consider also that
>reliable percepetion is not the same as adequate explanation or genuine
>understanding - see Wiliam Alston The REliabilioty of Sense Perception for
>varietie sopf arguments on all these issues.
>>
>> Jamie
>>



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