File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2004/bhaskar.0405, message 6


From: "Howard Engelskirchen" <howarde-AT-twcny.rr.com>
Subject: BHA: Re: RE: foundationalism; a priori; PON
Date: Sun, 2 May 2004 14:43:19 -0400


Hi Ruth,

Well if that's dumbass, you've set the bar pretty high for yourself!

1.    I accept your critique of my definition of foundationalism.  You are
certainly right.  It doesn't change anything on the matters at issue,
though, because established foundations still rest in the last analysis on
apriori justification, so we draw a distinction between the a posteriori
methods of realism and the methods of foundationalisms, whether
sophisticated or dogmatic.   That is, if realisms, critical and scientific,
are a posteriori.

2.    You say that philosophy is different from science.  What about the
proposition that it's continuous with science rather than different from it?
Isn't something of this sort implied by Bhaskar's proposition from
Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom (145) that "social theory just is moral
philosophy, but as science."  In what sense could  philosophy be anything
other than continuous with science.

3.    As for your bumper sticker proposal that "philosophers do it a
priori," I think, then, I don't want to be a philosopher.  Wasn't that
Marx's point about interpreting or engaging the world?

4.    With respect to your gloss on Bhaskar on Kant, if for a knowledge
claim the referent has to fall within the realm  of experience, how can we
have knowledge of it except a posteriori?

5.    Here's your restatement of my quote from PON labeled item (5):

<"This is very interesting.  The former -- i.e., the premises of
philosophical arguments -- are social and historically transient.  But not
the latter, i.e., not the conclusions.  The conclusions of philosophy
(presumably only philosophy done correctly) are NOT socially and
historically transient.  The claim here is that transcendental realism
itself - which is a metaphysical position, not a position within natural
science - is on qualitatively different epistemic footing than are the
contingent claims of the particular sciences.">

If this accurately states Bhaskar's position, isn't it just wrong?  Why are
conclusions less socially and historically transient?  They are fallibly and
approximately true, surely, but nonetheless subject to revision in light of
new theories or experience.  Anyway, the premises of philosophical arguments
just are experience and previous conclusions.

6.    And on my item (6) you buy into the idea, I take it, that the way to
understand this is to draw a distinction between philosophy (a priori) and
science (a posteriori).  But if we accept that then doesn't (6) contradict
(1), ie the proposition that philosophy produces knowledge?  It must be a
proposition of critical naturalism, isn't it, that knowledge is necessarily
produced a posteriori.

Congratulations on the book!  Terrific work!!

Howard




----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Groff, Ruth" <ruth.groff-AT-marquette.edu>
To: <bhaskar-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU>
Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 11:10 AM
Subject: BHA: RE: foundationalism; a priori; PON


Hi Howard, all,

We had a Mayday/book party last night (hey everybody, the book's out!  It
only costs a million dollars, but maybe your library would like to order
it!) so I am not yet entirely awake as I write this.  But there are two
things that you say that I think I disagree with.  I'm not sure how crucial
either is to your thinking.

The first is just the definition of "foundationalism."  My understanding is
that those who regard themselves as advancing foundationalist theories of
knowledge (and note that in context what these are are theories about what
distinguishes true beliefs from false beliefs -- i.e., they are always in
some sense theories of justification as well as demarcations thereby of
which beliefs will fall into the "true beliefs" (now re-named "knowledge)
category and which will not.)  -- people who take themselves to be advancing
such a theory do not think that the criteria that they identify are, as you
put it, "just chosen or accepted a priori with no further justification
required."  On the contrary, they think that what they have done is to
*establish* a foundation.  That's why it's called a foundation and not a
dogmatically asserted first principle, or something.  See what I mean?
Everyone always accuses the other guy of just pulling the foundation out of
his (in this case it's all he's) sleeve; but they don't think that about
their own position.

The second point has to do with RB's philosophy of philosophy.  My
understanding of the position in the texts that you are working with is that
while philosophy is an activity (largely cognitive, but presupposing
material engagement with the world) that embodied human beings do (yes,
yes...), and while it is itself part of the on-going social, historical life
of human beings (yes, yes), it is different from science.  Look at the
quotations you've pulled:

(2)  "But it is knowledge of the necessary conditions for the production of
knowledge -- second order knowledge, if you like" (10).

(3)   following the Kantian road, philosophy considers what can be
established about the same world that science studies "by a priori argument,
where it takes as its premises generally recognized activities as
conceptualized in experience" (8).



Okay, so philosophers and scientists both study the general features of the
world, but philosophers do it in an a priori fashion.



4)  "for transcendental realism, what is presupposed in any given
scientific activity is at once a possible object of scientific explanation .
. . ; that is, what is synthetic a priori is also (contingently) knowable a
posteriori" (8).



So, the reverse: the scientists study the world too, but they do it in a a
posteriori fashion.  Scientists and philosophers study the same thing; they
just do it differently.

(NOTE: I don't know if the full logic of the RB's position was even apparent
to him at the time, but the target here is Kant.  Kant makes a division
between metaphysics and science that Bhaskar wants to undo via Kantian-esque
argumentation; even at this stage you can see that the ultimate show-down
will be over Kant's claim that in order for a claim to be a knowledge claim
(and not be a matter of speculation or faith) the referent has to fall, in
principle, within the realm of phenomenal, or empirical, experience.  For
this reason, Kant thinks that we can have knowledge of, e.g., god.



(5)  "on this conception, then, both the premises and conclusions of
philosophical argments remain contingent facts, the former (but not the
latter) being necessarily social, and so historically transient" (7);


This is very interesting.  The former -- i.e., the premises of philosophical
arguments -- are social and historically transient.  But not the latter,
i.e., not the conclusions.  The conclusions of philosophy (presumably only
philosophy done correctly) are NOT socially and historically transient.  The
claim here is that transcendental realism itself - which is a metaphysical
position, not a position within natural science - is on qualitatively
different epistemic footing than are the contingent claims of the particular
sciences.

This is where RB is most vulernable to a charge of scientism, because the
"experience" upon which the deduction rests in these early works is the
highly local one of experimentation.  You can see, though, that already in
PON (because he wants the account of science from RTS to extend to the
social world) he tries to broaden th category of "experience" (upon which a
deduction to transcendental realism as a metaphysics is made) to mean
"living in a society" (and later "using language").   The category is less
local, but the argument that it's condition of possibility is captured
uniquely by transcendental realism is weaker.  This is the exact point at
which the Durkheimian case for the exisitence of social structures is
introduced.  The suggestion is that this is in fact a transcendental
deduction, of the same sort that got us TR from experiments.  I personally
think that it is a mistake to argue it this way.


(6)  a critique of empiricism is achieved by noting that knowledge of real
essences is possible, but a critique of rationalism also is made "by noting
that such knowledge is produced a posteriori -- in the transitive,
irreducibly empirical, process of science."

Yes.  By scientists.

Shoot -- now I have to go, right when I see that you raise half the points
that I've just made.  Man, what a dumbass I am.  NEVER START RESPONDING
BEFORE YOU READ THE WHOLE THING!!!  O well.

r.


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