File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2004/bhaskar.0406, message 44


Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2004 09:17:40 +0100
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh-AT-jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
Subject: BHA: Ways of knowing


Hi Ruth,

I think it would be useful if you cited what people actually said
instead of snipping it off. I said:

"My answer is that *commitment* to science as the pivotal way of knowing
can't be justified philosophically - in the end it just is a commitment
- but it seems foolish to deny the historical importance and results of
science compared with other practices, achieved above all by that which
distinguishes it from other practices: systematic experiment and
comparison in order to ground models of the real."

Allow me to underline *in the end*, *seems* and *historical*, none of
which would appear to be consistent with your analytical either/or
construal of what I said.  *In the end* implies that there are cognitive
grounds, but I don't regard them as conclusive - and no, I never mean
'absolutely' conclusive (or even 'sure exactly'). *Seems* is not the
same as *is*. And the Big Ditch argument is from history, not philosophy
(though it doubtless involves philosophical assumptions). By philosophy
I meant a priori argument.

>I'm not sure exactly what I think about the relative epistemic status of
>science.

This entails that you at any rate don't have a problem about there being
other ways of knowing (the main thing at issue in this thread),
otherwise there would be nothing for science to be relative to.

Mervyn


 "Groff, Ruth" <ruth.groff-AT-marquette.edu> writes
>Hi Mervyn, Tobin, all,
>
>I'm not sure exactly what I think about the relative epistemic status of
>science.
>
>But Mervyn, if you want to say:
>
>"My answer is that *commitment* to science as the pivotal way of
>knowing can't be justified
>philosophically - in the end it just is a commitment"
>
>then it is hard to see what place a term such as "foolishness" has in
>characterizing someone who happens *not* to make such a
>commitment.
>
>"Foolishness" suggests a lack of abiity to judge; it's a kind of cognitive
>shortcoming, among other things.  If the commitment has no cognitive
>grounds, then failing to make it can't really be a matter of foolishness.
>By "justified philosophically" did you really mean something more like
>"demonstrated with absolute certainty, such that it is impossible to
>disagree," or something along those lines?
>
>Ruth




     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005