Subject: RE: MB: Concepts
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 1999 17:58:00 +0000



 I think that there must be some truth about Leslie saying that if one is   
anti-hegelian one is hegelian, as in the case of Deleuze.  And yet at the   
same time, I want to say that this truth itself is Hegelian - that is to   
say it thinks difference as opposition.

Stawla
 -----Original Message-----
From: leslie hill [SMTP:leslie.hill-AT-warwick.ac.uk]
Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 1999 1:13 PM
To: blanchot
Subject: RE: MB: Concepts

At 18:00 17/03/99 +0000, you wrote:
>
>But to we have to think about concepts in the Hegelian manner.  That
>would make every philosopher who was not Hegelian a non-philosopher.  I   
    

>know that in Derrida we have to be careful of the presuppositions that   
    

>words already contain.  But such a carefulness has always been part of   
    

>philosophy.  What about a philosopher like Deleuze who is quite happy to   
    

>use words like essence concept being and so on.  Would we accuse him, if   
    

>accuse is the right word, of Hegelianism?
>
>Stawla
>

This is a valid point.  But is it possible after Hegel not to subscribe   
to
Hegel's concept of the concept?  Was the encounter with Hegel in   
Blanchot's
case, prompted as it was by Jean Hyppolite and Bataille, a necessary or a
contingent move?  And does it skew Blanchot's thinking in any way?

True enough, Deleuze was happy to describe himself as a systematic
philosopher and often seems to use concepts accordingly.  But much could   
be
said about the discursive tactics adopted by Deleuze in his writing and
thinking, which problematise this image rather a lot.  And we should
remember Deleuze's comments on Nietzsche's attitude to Hegel which figure
in the opening pages of 'Nietzsche and philosophy'.  If Hegel was   
important
to Nietzsche (and Deleuze), we are told, it was because Hegel was the
enemy.  Which is another way of being, if not a Hegelian, at least one of
Hegel's heirs.

Leslie