Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2004 14:48:32 -0400 Subject: Re: MB: passivity/re-sponsibility Thank you very much, for responding. I'm an undergrad, writing a thesis, seeking reassurance (and perhaps distraction or the unexpected)--might as well say so. .click. Thoughts admittedly loose, but their release is something of a relief, hope they can be forgiven. Vaguely wondering if there is a kind of irony in a potential distinction between Blanchot and Derrida on one hand, and Nancy and Agamben on the other. The former seeming more melancholy, the latter less encumbered, and yet the former insisting on a certain refusal perhaps more vehemently, an insistence on the most difficult aporias and affirmation, on difficulty, even. The latter more subsumptive and maybe less interested in dwelling on distinctions, or perhaps on resisting/refusing the heritage of a metaphysics--perhaps also original sin? The former don't dwell on shame, and yet they are more melancholy, a deeper sadness at the core. Blanchot's perhaps: 'Death is God' and Derrida's: The other as God? and then Agamben's: "The self is, at bottom, shame." As a question of style(s)--the former sometimes seem to embrace a different (at once more anonymous and intimate?) reader responsiveness, or dwelling, or patience, cummulative(?) désoeuvrement...anyway a different relation toward a will to disappear, maybe, and also toward the meaning of humility. I am fascinated by passages--such as on "automatic writing"--where Blanchot speaks of a certain "lightness" that is without "the anxiety of a guilty conscience" and yet "not without risks and never in the calm of an indifferent spontaneity" (_Space_, 187). Does this "lightness" pierce through the cracks of the disaster, through intimacy, friend(sh)ip, a certain on-tology of touch ever untouched or unmarked by distaster? (Shaviro) Bataille without the battle? At least without the ceremony of facing lines? Believing only in death as impossible, not in any pure originary Being, how is ligthness possible? Is true lightness always at its core an apocalyptic white heat, white night (white Knight?). The need for two languages/\/\ and yet a need to distinguish also between guilt and responsibility? An ethics without redemption, the madness of decision (the decision of madness?), the inability to ever grasp and extract the sliver, that in-finite less, always less. Gerard Bruns ends his book on a consistent note, if one that seems to use the word, "anarchy" as a mantric spur in ways both productive and ultimately foreclosing (Nancy also wonders at the pin of Hegel's "State"--today the increasingly ironic worship of the image maybe both encourages and frustrates pin-ility in new ways?): "Blanchot's thought seems to be this: there is poetry after Aushwitz, and also philosophy, but it is no longer possible for these things to go on in good conscience. Of course poetry (since Plato's time a discourse of survival) is interminable, incessant; that is, thinking of poetry in terms of its place in the history of philosophy, Blanchot has always understood it (as he has understood everything else, perhaps himself as well) in bad conscience. Bad conscience, just to summarize, is internal to the exigency of writing. The question is whether philosophy could ever respond to this exigency, becoming, in effect, anarchic ("without intentions, without aims, without the protective mask of the character beholding itself in the mirror of the world, reassured and posing. Without name, without situation, without titles"). This question is Blanchot's provocation, or perhaps his gift, to philosophy." (Bruns, 264- 65) Can radical abstraction be so wedded to anarchy or even an-archy? Or to a wiling 'whatever'? What do these pins conceal? (Do they puncture the skin? terrorize the blood?) A look that cannot be exchanged I would prefer not to Il faut (Pas au-dela) Il faut I would prefer not to A look that cannot be exchanged happy in fatigue, Matt Quoting twall-AT-oz.net: > Matt, > > These are not naive questions at all. They are well put. I think about, > obsess about, them myself. I will only say now that I read in Sylvan > Tomkins (sp?) about patients, children, who suffered shame to the extend > of being ashamed of their shame and hiding or repressing it. Shame is at > bottom ashamed of itself. Like Being in Heidegger, and I think Agamben > makes that point. So finally, the question of shame may depend on how one > comes to terms with Heidegger's thought of Being. > > Thomas Wall >
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