File spoon-archives/bourdieu.archive/bourdieu_1996/96-01-02.102, message 263


Date: Wed, 27 Dec 1995 11:49:25 +1100
From: dvine-AT-melbpc.org.au (Daniel Vine)
Subject: Re: Clarification of fuzzy logic



>To the best of my ability of knowledge, "dialectical
>logic" is more of an attitude towards reasoning
>rather than a specific, concrete set of technical
>ideas. [May I add that in "Language and Problems
>of Knowledge", Chomsky admits that he does not
>understand "dialectics", so I don't feel
>bad if I don't either.] One definition of dialectics
>is simply that one takes opposing views or ideas and
>trie to synthesize them - as opposed to axiomatic reasoning
>in a Cartesian fasion. Another has to do with
>the idea that when analyzing social systems (or 
>perhaps any situation) that it should be understood
>in terms of opposites and the resolutions
>of the conflict present when a system and that
>which is antagonistic to it coexist. 
>
>Given the above, I think it is possible that
>"dialectical reasoning" can be fully consistent
>with standard Aristotelian logic. [Example:
>"Capitalist countries have internal conflicts"
>and "The US is a capitlaist country" both imply
>"The Us has internal conflicts" - each of the
>premises can be argued for "dialectically"
>but the conclusion uses standard Aristotelian
>syllogism.] Furthermore, fuzzy loogic,
>as a natural generalization of Aristotelian
>logic can also be consistent with "dialectical
>logic". 
>
>I hope this clears up some issues about classical,
>fuzzy and "dialectial" logic.
>
>Fabio rojas
>
>
Thank you for this explanation. I must say that I share some of Fabio's
unclarity about "dialectical logic". At first, it just sounds like something
suitably warm and fuzzy to oppose to binary logic. However there are those
who work to extract a system of logic from the work of Hegel. One of them
was my first year logic lecturer. Sadly I never really understood what he
was doing so I can't pass it on.

On the relation between Aristotlean logic and dialectics, they can't be
completely opposed as Arsitotle admits a role for dialectical reasoning. It
is ages since I read this stuff and I am not sure how closely it relates to
B but a brief comment may be in order. I hate the words "Aristotleian",
"Cartesian", etc being used as swear words!

For Aristotle, _demonstration_ (what modern logicians tend to call proof) is
only suitable for certain subject matters - mathematics obviously. As
Aristotle says early in the Nicomachean Ethics_ (a very useful book for
those who would understand the scholastic and even the Bourdieuian _habitus_), 

   It is the mark of the trained mind never to expect more precise in the
treatement of    a subject than the nature of that subject permits. (Book 2,
chapter iii - Penguin       translation).

Other philosophical fields must procede dialectically. That is, the various
opinions on the matter must be marshalled and shifted. This is how A.
proceeds in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as those books dealing with what
we would call the "natural sciences" - e.g., his _De Anima_ and _Physics_.

This is less to do with logic as a way of testing the formal validity of
arguments and more to do with logic as heuristics - what is the best way of
proceeding in a given field. These two are readily confused. Various
Cartesians, notably Spinoza, rather cloud the issue by presenting their
results in a way that suggests that they were reached via axiomatic methods.

Well that's my two cents worth. I hope its not too far off topic.


Dan Vine
dvine-AT-melbpc.org.au
Philosophy Department
phi246b-AT-silas.cc.monash.edu.au
Monash University
http://www.monash.edu.au/cc/student/phi/phi246b/WWW/
Clayton, Victoria 3184, Australia



   

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