From: "J Laari" <jlaari-AT-cc.jyu.fi> Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 10:03:59 +0200 Subject: Re: a little more on habitus Greetings Carsten Sestoft wrote: " how can one say that what relates to persons is intrinsically philosophical, whereas habitus as a statistical (or rather relational) concept is a sociological, i.e. non-philosophical, concept? " I don't believe Brandon Claycomb meant exactly that. He wrote: >Could it be that habitus is simply not an appropriate concept for dealing >with arguably intrinsically philosophical issues such as the nature of >personhood and the relationship between self-consciousness and action? That >is, perhaps "habitus" (as a theoretical concept) finds its home only in the >sphere of sociological theorizing on the mass scale that statistical >analysis facilitates, and is not suited for investigations the proceed on a >personal level (...) Philosophical questions dealing with an individual Claycomb mentioned are of different kind than sociological ones. I don't think Claycomb will accept this but here's one way of saying it: phil. concepts are meant universal ones - phil. concept of subject is supposed to have its determinations whether you're using it as a starting point for sociological theory of agent (or actor) or for psychological theory of personality (that is, expand it into sociological or psychological use). Concepts of empirical sciences are supposed to be "valid" in their proper context - you don't use psychological concept in sociological theory, it would be sort of categorial error. You continued: > Habitus is a concept which explains behaviour in terms of dispositions > (contrary to explanations of behaviour in terms of either the finality of > rational calculation or in terms of mechanic determinism), and this type of > explanation is no less philosophical (even if more vague) than the other > two, as far as I know. Yes, habitus can be also philosophical. But then it must be have certain universality (it must be applicable not only to other empirical sciences but to every instance when there is a reference to individual, though this applicability isn't a proof of its phil. nature). Also, and above all, it must answer the phil. questions concerning an individual. This PB's concept don't do. He obviously has certain phil. insight but I don't know whether he has ever stated it systematically. For example, it's hard to tell what would be his view on the problem of "intersubjectivity". Here's an example from your neighborhood: Jürgen Habermas vs. Dieter Henrich & Manfed Frank; is subject reducible to social relations or does it have certain subjective capability/-ies of its own? PB's answer might even depend on how you pose the question to him. Yours, Jukka L ********************************************************************** Contributions: bourdieu-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Commands: majordomo-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Requests: bourdieu-approval-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
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