File spoon-archives/bourdieu.archive/bourdieu_1999/bourdieu.9912, message 118


From: "J Laari" <jlaari-AT-cc.jyu.fi>
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 10:03:59 +0200
Subject: Re: a little more on habitus


Greetings

Carsten Sestoft wrote:

" how can one say that what relates to persons is intrinsically 
philosophical, whereas habitus as a statistical (or rather relational) 
concept is a sociological, i.e. non-philosophical, concept? "

I don't believe Brandon Claycomb meant exactly that. He wrote:

>Could it be that habitus is simply not an appropriate concept for dealing
>with arguably intrinsically philosophical issues such as the nature of
>personhood and the relationship between self-consciousness and action? That
>is, perhaps "habitus" (as a theoretical concept) finds its home only in the
>sphere of sociological theorizing on the mass scale that statistical
>analysis facilitates, and is not suited for investigations the proceed on a
>personal level (...)

Philosophical questions dealing with an individual Claycomb 
mentioned are of different kind than sociological ones. I don't think 
Claycomb will accept this but here's one way of saying it: phil. 
concepts are meant universal ones - phil. concept of subject is 
supposed to have its determinations whether you're using it as a 
starting point for sociological theory of agent (or actor) or for 
psychological theory of personality (that is, expand it into 
sociological or psychological use). Concepts of empirical sciences 
are supposed to be "valid" in their proper context - you don't use 
psychological concept in sociological theory, it would be sort of 
categorial error.

You continued:

> Habitus is a concept which explains behaviour in terms of dispositions
> (contrary to explanations of behaviour in terms of either the finality of
> rational calculation or in terms of mechanic determinism), and this type of
> explanation is no less philosophical (even if more vague) than the other
> two, as far as I know.

Yes, habitus can be also philosophical. But then it must be have 
certain universality (it must be applicable not only to other 
empirical sciences but to every instance when there is a reference 
to individual, though this applicability isn't a proof of its phil. 
nature). Also, and above all, it must answer the phil. questions 
concerning an individual. This PB's concept don't do. He obviously 
has certain phil. insight but I don't know whether he has ever stated 
it systematically. For example, it's hard to tell what would be his 
view on the problem of "intersubjectivity". Here's an example from 
your neighborhood: Jürgen Habermas vs. Dieter Henrich & Manfed 
Frank; is subject reducible to social relations or does it have 
certain subjective capability/-ies of its own? PB's answer might 
even depend on how you pose the question to him.

Yours, Jukka L

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