From: "Ziggy Rivkin-Fish" <ziggy-AT-princeton.edu>
Subject: Re: [BOU:] Subfields and other sundry items
Date: Thu, 15 May 2003 13:11:36 -0400


I thought I'd put my two-cents in on a variety of topics discussed here:

1. Fields and subfields. I agree that the concept of extends as far as its
logic in Bourdieu's framework. But that is exactly the point: a field is
defined partially by the logic that spans it (or the struggle over the
'illusio' the specific form of capital that defines the 'game' and players
of the field). This means that you can have a subfield within the field of
cultural production (where the 'illusio' is artistic recognition as a
specific form of cultural capital). This subfield could be that of
"avant-garde painters in France"). It is a subfield because it is internal
to the logic of the entire field of cultural production while at the same
time having its own specific cultural capital defines boundaries of that
subfield as well as recognized participants in the struggle for capital. A
field in this sense therefore (and here comes the second part of the
definition of the field in a Bourdieuan sense) also depends on recognized
players in the game, i.e. a social network (as in modern social network
analysis) all recognizing their mutual participation in the game. What all
this means, is that a Bourdieuan field is not the same as a social
institution. I'd be very interested to hear how Deborah was able to use B's
concept of field as applying to prisons (what is the game and specific
capital and who are the recognized actors spanning the entire field?). The
new institutionalism in sociology uses 'field' in a manner much closer to
that which the term 'prison system' implies in my humble view.

As for intersection of fields, this becomes a bit murky, because it can be
understood both from a macro and micro perspective. From the (macro) vantage
point of fields themselves, intersections and/or embeddings of fields within
each other are a question of the degree to which the logics governing the
different fields are insulated from each other, to what degree (through
social taboos, professional sanctions etc), and to what extent the various
forms of capital are convertible to each other (and in which directions),
and the ensuing 'ranking' of the forms of capital. When Bourdieu argues that
the economic field is the dominant one in contemporary Capitalist societies,
he means that economic capital is most readily convertible to other forms of
capital, thus giving the possessors of an abundance of that capital much
more strategic maneuverability - (if I have money I can buy art patronize
art events, sit on museum boards, and perhaps even free up time to learn
about art, but if I am an artist it is much harder to ensure that I can
generate economic capital). From the micro-perspective of the individual
player, a player is almost always embedded in multiple fields. Almost all
strategies play to multiple audiences, and certainly have effects on ones
accumulation of capital in all fields. Deciding to pursue an Arts History
Degree, an MBA, or pursuing Law certainly will have effects in many fields,
and the decision itself is subject to constraints and life-chances structure
by ones 'portfolio' of capitals.

2. Misrecognition. This is a useful term indeed, but is not the same as the
one used by Lacanian inspired social theorists. B' uses the term quite
specifically to denote a misrecognition of the source of power and
authority. No form of capital - whether in Kabyle or in France - is ever
raw. Political capital, for example, is never presented in a raw exercise of
power, but always has a symbolic (or as B in a brilliant twist on Weber put
it, 'charismatic') aspect to it which shields it from its nakedness and puts
a socially acceptable and legitimate form to it that misrecognized the power
behind it (police, state, influence with powerful allies) into 'charisma',
'astute leader', 'great communicator' etc.

3. Objectivity. Pam accuses B of being an objectivist. This would surely
come as a surprise to B who built his entire analytical framework as a
rebellion against and response to objectivist social science (particularly
Structuralism). B never lays claim to the Truth, but does advocate a
reflexive methodology that takes account of the social scientist's own
position within various fields of struggle (in order to articulate truths
about social and political structures). And by 'reflexive' he does not mean
postmodern approaches to reflexivity (which he considered 'navel gazing'),
but instead an assessment of the social scientist's own position that may
push her to adopt various assumptions, and the disciplined estrangement of
the scientist from this baggage (and he had a whole bunch of methodological
suggestions for strategies that would help one accomplish this). This does
not mean that Pam is necessarily wrong in her claim, but one would need to
articulate an argument that B ends up being an objectivist much more
carefully by showing (with examples) how his own analysis produces
misleading objectifications and reifications that are produced exactly by
his methodologies and assumptions.

4. Struggle over 'epithets'. The closest B comes to studying discursive
strategies such as 'epithets' are probably in his "Language and Symbolic
Power', but Pam's claim that
"For Bourdieu, epithets are used in struggles for power to gain legitimacy
for a point of view. The less legitimacy a person has, the more they are
motivated to struggle for legitimacy of their perspective in the field"
is misleading. It is not 'perspective' that the struggle is over. It is a
struggle for recognition of ones capital on the one hand and also a struggle
over the rules of the game to better suit ones access to sources of
accumulation and production (for example a successful struggle to define a
particular form of artistic production as 'true avant-garde' can translate
into an immense increase in capital as well as access to future accumulation
and production).
Moreover, the claim that it those with least legitimacy who will have most
at stake in participating in the struggle inverts B's argument completely. B
actually argued that those with the least legitimacy are the most
disenfranchised exactly because they are not even recognized as players who
have authority to contribute. They are therefore 'censored' from engaging
the battle of the elites over the definition of the game. B therefore had
little patience with the Birmingham School's cultural sociology program that
tended to celebrate the 'resistance' of the marginalized. B pointed out that
such resistance never leads to change, but is instead an implicit
recognition (and acceptance) of the powerlessness of these actors. A
legitimate critique of B can be leveled at his inability to see how social
movements can change those rules by either constructing alternative
autonomous fields, or using leverage from other fields (political pressure,
strikes etc) to demand institutionalized recognition of these actors or
changes in rules. It is a pity, since B was very committed to an
emancipatory politics and was very politically active, speaking for those he
considered oppressed and silenced. Yet his blindness to strategies of social
movements led him - I think - to adopt the view of the vanguard intellectual
(only those with the tools and skills to see the true material reality can
help those oppressed see the true nature of their oppression and speak on
their behalf). I'd be happy to be corrected on this point, if any one has an
alternative conception of B on this. I do think, however, that one can use
his own framework to study social movements in a very productive way.

Cheers,

Ziggy Rivkin-Fish

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