From: "Chris Andersen" <cta1-AT-ualberta.ca> Subject: RE: [BOU:] Fields can't be erased, only deserted Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2004 08:53:59 -0500 Hi Cam, It's an interesting point that you make. I think the issue is that I am stuck on the fact that the juridical field (Bourdieu's words) as practiced (in) today by lawyers, judges, expert witnesses, etc. is a far cry from what might have passed for an analogous field in an indigenous context say, three hundred years ago. In other words, the types of embodied understandings / practices engaged in by indigenous lawyers in the Canadian courts today doesn't in any sense qualify them to practice in 'indigenous law', nor would the 'universalizing attitude' and a belief in truth and justice (a hallmark of legal actors today) have fit into an indigenous context. Moreover, what counts as juridical capital (i.e. the actual substance of law) and symbolic capital (i.e. the idea that law is arrived at through reason and logic rather than the power relations between actors) is precisely what is supposed to set codified law apart from indigenous 'customs'. So, in arguing that the courts lack jurisdiction in a particular area is in fact to reject the juridical field's legitimacy (or perhaps, as you've put it, Cam, reject it as practiced in its present form by the Canadian state). But ultimately, if fields are analytical spaces rather than 'real' ones, and are predicated on logics and procedures irreducible to those of other fields, at what point do we begin to argue that a field loses its force and effect? That is to say, if fields are ontological guesses on our part and not 'really real', at what point do the differences between 'western' and 'non-western' (pardon the simplification) notions of the juridical simply cease permitting comparison? If you can imagine, three hundred years ago, what counted as rules, authority, reason, rights, responsibility, etc., would have differed radically between an indigenous nation and, say, Britain or France (two use to examples of legal regimes used in Canada). That is to say, the stakes, the illusio, the rules, the boundaries, etc.; all of these differed radically and were perceived as such by their actors. As researchers we might see analogous similarities in suggesting that they all appealed to rules, authority, etc., but surely those operating within them would not confuse one for the other. And if the stakes, the illusio of the participants, what counts as playing the game, etc. are so radically different, if the history accumulated in them so different, why link them together under the same field? My discussion is somewhat meandering, here, but I find that each time I write it out it gets clearer in my head (if not in the text ;) ) Chris -----Original Message----- From: owner-bourdieu-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU [mailto:owner-bourdieu-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU] On Behalf Of Cameron Mann (by way of Cameron Mann <csmann-AT-bigpond.com>) Sent: February 19, 2004 4:24 AM To: bourdieu-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU Subject: [BOU:] Fields can't be erased, only deserted (reposted... it hasn't appeared after 24+ hours... apologies if it comes twice) Chris wrote/asked: "What i'm having a little trouble with is this: if participation in a field requires buying into its legitimacy (i.e. the basis for producing symbolic capital), how does one enter into a field and yet not take on it's doxa? Wait, let me rephrase: i think it's possible to use a field and be in a field without buying into its legitimacy (i.e. indigenous lawyers do it all the time), but i can't tell if Bourdieu fails to deal with this issue and thus is a weakness of his theory, or if I've just missed or misinterpreted where he deals with it. Ultimately i guess, my question is this: can the struggle over capital ever involve attempting to overthrow the entire field rather than (say) radically change it?" Chris, I have to guess the indigenous lawyers (allegedly) participate in the (Canadian?) legal system "without buying into it's legitimacy" by arguing that the established courts/laws do not have the jurisdiction, or rights or authority to exert their influence on certain people or places. But saying the courts and laws are not legitimate is a long way from rejecting the legitimacy of the legal field. To prescribe and proscribe practices from certain people, times or places is to take a stance on the rule of law, and to thus be a part of a legal field. It is not saying that there are not and can not be rules (with sanctions). Indeed, since each agent needs to answer 'What should I do now?', ethics goes wherever people go, and I find it difficult to imagine how every move to the 'communal ethics' of laws and rules could be resisted. If that were achieved, then this state of lawlessness would still be a stance in the legal field (perhaps, that only the conscience or after-world has the authority to determine proper behaviours that have at other times been determined by rules/laws [ie, the law of lawlessness]). I can see the indigenes to the left of me, and the courts/lawyers/universities to the right, both groups screaming "You're not legitimate" at each other. I can't imagine them trying to prove their cases in any other way that with appeals to reason, rights, authority, repsonibilities, truth and justice, and can't imagine these arguments being anything other than part of a legal field. A legitimate part of the legal field could only be delegitimised from a position (however novel or unconsecrated) within the legal field. I think that it is NOT possible to use a field and be in it without buying into its legitimacy. And thus, it is not possible for indigenous lawyers to do it all the time. Par was making the point that the 'capital' about which a field is established is an object of struggle. Exactly what it is, exactly what its for, exactly who's got it, exactly who needs it, etc all subject to struggles within the field. To overthrow the entire field is to say that the capital is nothing, has no function or purpose, is possessed by no one, is not needed etc. You can't just "pop" a field out of existence by arguing that it isn't there - that very discussion would keep it there. The nearest a field would get to being overthrown is to have everybody leave it, and thus prove (in practice) that the field is pointless. Even this would rarely (never?) be a complete success however. There's still likely to be someone somewhere with a conscious interest in the field. The field itself would have left its marks on the world in some way (institutionalised history: a book, a procedure, some words etc) and on some agents (embodied history: some questions, some perceptions etc). Where did all the fields and their capital go during the Dark Ages when everything was forgotten? Where did they all come back from when reborn in the Renaissance? (apologies for my Eurocentric indoctrination). Cam -------------------- csmann-AT-bigpond.com "what you do for now, will it do for now?" - SFK ********************************************************************** Contributions: bourdieu-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Commands: majordomo-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Requests: bourdieu-approval-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ********************************************************************** Contributions: bourdieu-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Commands: majordomo-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Requests: bourdieu-approval-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
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