File spoon-archives/deleuze-guattari.archive/d-g_1995/d-g_Sep.95, message 64


Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 23:47:42 -0500 (CDT)
From: cnd7750-AT-UTARLG.UTA.EDU
Subject: Susan saying more


Tim: "Susan, i'm not going to argue these crazy points with you. Even
if you do know what you are talking about philosophically, it still
has no practical bearing."
Me: "We've have been over the grounds for your belief in the 
real/unreal dualism and eliminated them. Remember? Could you explain
to me how an occurrence could not be real?"
Tim: "Obviously things are real, but thoughts about things are not
necessarily true."
Me: "Aren't thoughts things too?"
Tim: "I guess they are. But they are not always correct."
Me: "You seem to be attempting to straddle the line between thought
being something and being about something. Let me introduce you
to the Socratic dialectic and tell you you had better get off the
line lest your nuts get chopped on the 'in between' stance you
are here attempting. It is obvious that you are still trapped in
the conceptual web of representation. Thought is not about something,
it is something. That is, it is just as physical as your now
castrated testicles. Thought does not represent the world like
a mirror that simply reflect images. Rather, the physical composition
of the human body necessarily affects the presentation of the 
phenomena with which the body comes in contact. What we call
intelligence is the coordination between sensory input and
motor skill activation, i.e., the power to receive external
affects, embody them, and then discharge some amount of force
in a way tht affects other forces in a way that a group of human
bodies uses the phoneme 'good' to describe. Your concern for
practice, being 'practical', verifies that you unknowingly
associate intelligence with the power to turn sensory inputs
into previously established 'good' movements."

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