Date: Fri, 02 Aug 1996 19:45:28 +0100 From: "Steve.Devos" <steve.devos-AT-dial.pipex.com> Subject: Re: Machining theo-logics Greg J. Seigworth wrote: > > Hmm ... interesting, Steve: in the post following the post where you > attempt to provide further support for your argument that belief (and > faith) are 'dangerous irrelevances,' you quote from Deleuze's _Empiricism > and Subjectivity_. A book where Deleuze begins, in the preface to the > English-language edition, by listing Hume's most essential and creative > accomplishments: first among them--establishing "the concept of belief and > put[ting] it in the place of knowledge" (p.ix). In fact, _E&S_ (re)writes > a theory of the subject in terms of belief and invention (& anticipation), > putting experience and experiment into a spin-cycle, wondering at what > frequency reason and imagination resonate, etc. Though Deleuze says that > Hume has 'laicized belief,' neither of them is ready to throw out the > divine with the dishwater. In the paragraph following your quote (which > actually isn't all that damning: Deleuze is just, more or less, ruling out > those [established?] religions that reign in all flights of fancy and > leaps of pure imagination), Deleuze--through Hume's essays "On the > Immortality of the Soul" and "The Essay on Miracles"--finds a place for > belief in something divine (narrow though it may be but impossibly wide at > the same time). But I'm not quoting: pp.76-77 for those with the book > handy and are so inclined. Anyway ... I was trying to figure out how you > reconcile your apparent hostility toward the concept of belief with your > reading of _Empiricism and Subjectivity_? > > Thanks. > > Greg > > (who is currently working on a list of post-Enlightenment atrocities to > lend force to whatever argument I'm making. They're seeming so popular > recently; I figure the longest list wins. Damn! Wouldn't you know it? I > cannot find my copy of J.G. Ballard's _Atrocity Exhibition_ when I'd like > to throw a witty quote in somewhere.) Greg: The point at which the conjunction of Hume and Deleuze becomes interesting is in the moment when empiricism appears - `He asked about the conditions which legitimate belief, and on the basis of this investigation sketched out a theory of probabilities....' What interests me is the notion of probabilities and relations. Cause and anti-cause: Hume argued that cause is a constant conjunction. For example to state that X caused Y is not to state that X from some internal state or power brought about the state Y. It is rather to say that events or objects of type X are regularly followed by events or objects of type Y. Humes argument can be found in hundreds of places, but it's better if we read it in some historical context. Hume is not actually responsible for the argument about the constant-conjunction attitude to causation, Newton was almost certainly unintentionally. The most important scientific discovery of Hume's day was Newton's theory of gravitation. Prior to Newton's discovery progressive scientists thought the world should be understood in terms of mechanical forces and causes. But gravity does not fit within this `paradigm' because it operates at a distence. It was because of this that Leibnitz rejected Newton's theory of gravitation; a blatently reactionary response in favour of occultism. But the empirical and positivist perspective became dominant. As a result we learned to think that laws of gravity (nature) are regularities that can be said to describe what happens in the universe. From this it was decided that all causal laws are simply regularities. For empiricists the result of this was that we don't have to look for causes in nature but rather for probablity, regularity etc.... Laws of nature within the empirical frame of mind do not describe what must happen in the universe, but rather what does happen. A scientist (a philosopher ?) as a result tries to find universal statements - theories, laws which cover events and objects as special cases. The description and explanation of an event is something which can be derived from a general regularity - causes don't enter into it of course probabilty does - hence the interest in Deleuze's Hume text. Is that clearer ? Theoretical entities - (beliefs) from black holes to gods..... I believe that an opposition to, (or at least a general intellectual caution around), theoretical entities is synonomous with this perspective. Hume for example does not deny that the world is run by hidden causes, he suggests that they are nothing to do with us. Out of curiousity we may look for fundemental particles but physics will not succeed, for fundemental causes will forever remain cloaked in obscurity.... In contemporary terms he's wrong but still its an interesting perspective.... What Deleuze typically does is to suggest that theories should be taken, almost literally, as experiments (see Dialogues p54 -59 for example). To extend the discussion I'd suggest you need two additional concepts - acceptence and empirical adequacy - science after all aims to give us a literally true version of what the world is like - the acceptence of a scientific theory involves some kind of belief that it is true according to the evidence and that the theories have to be empirically adequate to be accepted as `true'. To explain this with some examples - both Hawking's and Penrose's theories about Black holes appear acceptable and indeed appear to be empirically adequate but as yet we have no evidence that confirms either as being correct - to believe in either of them is consequently ridiculous. Another example - an atomic accelerator 1000 light years long is needed to prove superstring theory, almost impossible to imagine. But there is no need to believe that all good theories are true nor do you have to believe that the entities that are proposed are real - you have to be able to consider that the theories are empirically adequate - in other words what a theory proposes about what is observable is true and makes sense. Theories are events and objects for prediction, research and passion, acceptence proposes a level of commitment and interpretation for example..... I suppose you can argue that Aquinas with his `five ways' attempts to theoretically prove the existence of some god or other but it scarcely stands as a contemporary proof, indeed its less acceptable than the arguments about the base cosmology of the universe - big bang, inflation, steady state etc.... To conclude: An empirical position is i'd suggest anti-metaphysical, in that the proposal of the empricial adequacy of a theory is a good deal less acceptable that the argument for truth and that the acceptence of it, releases us from metaphysics. Pro-observation and anti-causal in that explanation does not necessarily lead to truth - for example Baudrillard's theorisation of the gulf war may be theoretically adequate but it doesn't help the people directly involved much. A scientifc example is of course the old story of Newton being unable to explain gravity - science as a result is not a matter of explanation. this is far too long - sorry - and i hope this is at least mostly coherent.... oh and thanks to Bas Van Fraassen for empirical adequacy.... steve.devos
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