Date: Thu, 15 Aug 1996 11:21:47 -0800
From: scooper-AT-best.com (Sean Cooper)
Subject: Re: quantum physics


>But I do have problems getting my head round their philosophy of science,
>although it does have interesting possibilities - and it seems to me to come
>down to this: scientists do not, as a whole, confine their thought to a
>plane of reference constituted by relations between functives and variables.
> Instead, there seems to me to be vast amounts of metaphysics in science
>(and Hawking and others have some very bad theology) which is inseparable
>from it - indeed, it is necessary for applying (or referring) the Maths to
>something.  (Only a devout DandGer could do without it - by relying on
>philosophy.)  And the metaphysics will determine which theory, paradigm, and
>functives dominate - so the phenomenalism of the Copenhagen school is both a
>metaphysical postulate, and therefore subject to philosophical critique, and
>an application of Maths.

funny that this thread should arise just as i'm struggling with the very
epistemological split gp alludes to above. my question, though, is to what
extent that split can be rigorous for very long outside something like the
"milieu of the page" (that is, between the covers of _what is
philosophy?_). to what extent is "evolution" a concept, created by
darwin-becoming-philospher, or the "quark" (or much subatomic theory for
that matter)...? most physicists (atl least, the ones i've read and spoken
with) will concede that what they do is a kind of elaborate soothsaying,
mediated by the laboratory, and as with nietzsche's description of the work
of philosophers--inspiration for which they seek proof only after the
fact--scientists, often it would seem, are engaged in a similar act...art,
science, philosophy...intellectually, i follow dandg's dissection, but once
inside, like that frog in high school, all the parts seem all mixed up
together...

>How well can the divisions between science, philosophy, and art specified in
>WIP be maintained?

this is my question. it seems particularly unlikely for philosophers of the
assemblage to seek its systematic classification. perhaps this is to
counter certain strains of criticism that would seek to reduce their
thought to a kind of relativistic quietude (see kellner)? "...pragmatics as
a residue..." i don't know...

sc