From: "Friedman, Howard J." <hfn-AT-sdpfr.powersoft.com>
Subject: partes extra partes
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 96 10:52:00 PDT



>the visual field has the same qualities as the organism and brain
>i.e. they are subjectivities in autosurvol. Perception of externality   
comes
>after the brain as a subjectivity.
>"Leibniz calls this primitive relation, which folds the absolute   
interiority
>onto the total exteriority, the vinculum..." (Alain Badiou)...

>the brain's a subjectless sensation, that is to say, a
>*metaphysical non-dimensional surface*  (when not 'viewed' as an object)   

>and the visual field has the same quality of being as a non-dimensional
>space. i.e. it's not partes extra partes. it's not divisible.

Paul,

What we 'view' as an 'object' in ordinary life is just about everyold   
*thing*, including the brain. But is the substance of the *thing* the   
object that we 'view', or is it indivisible?

(The visual field, at least the way you define it, cannot be 'viewed' as   
an object. It is never partes extra partes, as you say.)

When the 'brain' (or the 'head' or the organism or, in fact, any *thing*)   
is NOT 'viewed' as an object and thus becomes a metaphysical   
non-dimensional surface (Isn't this the nature of Substance?), it has the   
"same qualities" as the visual field. Is there any reason to suggest that   
just because it sometimes has the same qualities (i.e., only when the   
*thing* is not 'viewed' as an object), it is the same *stuff* or of the   
same nature?

Of course, if we admit different *stuffs*, we would seemingly fall into   
the "Cartesian impasse," the old mind-brain problem, i.e., how can we   
account for chains of causality that seem to implicate different   
*stuffs*. So we do everything we can to bring it all back to the One   
(God, egg, matter, what have you), even if the different aspects of the   
one *stuff* are seemingly incompatible.  (By the way, Descartes had his   
"pineal gland" which - forgive my ignorance - doesn't seem much different   
from Liebniz' "vinculum").

But causality is not at issue in the visual field, at least not the way   
you define it. Nor is it at issue in substance that is not 'viewed' as an   
object. Causality is only at issue where there is differenc/tiation.

If instead of bringing everything back to one *stuff* or substance,   
suppose we brought it back to one *field*: the *field* where substance   
becomes 'objects' or where the visual field acquires intensity and   
interest; the *field* where differenc/tiation takes place (the   
'vinculum', the 'brain', or maybe even the 'Convivial'. Or perhaps, like   
Ed, you don't even want to give it a name?).

Howie



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