From: "Friedman, Howard J." <hfn-AT-sdpfr.powersoft.com> Subject: RE: The Bergsonian submarine. Date: Tue, 02 Apr 96 02:30:00 PST Paul, Many thanks for your clarifications. Definitely trippy. However, it only raises more questions. Like how would you distinguish the 'visual field' from the brain as 'a metaphysical non-dimensional surface'? This would seem to be central to your analysis. And, I'm still wondering if you would describe the difference between the visual field and its(?) objects as an attributive difference? Is it only an attributive difference that demarcates the 'inside' from the 'outside', even though their dimensions are incommensurate? Is the 'visual field' just another word for the virtual? Also, I would think that the brain could be an object of sensation as much as an object of perception or 'a.m.n-d.s.' Isn't there a difference in nature between sensation and perception or do you place them both on the same continuum? 'Still many questions. And I haven't even got to the turtles yet. Howie HF: >>Just curious when the brain ceases to be an object and becomes "a >>metaphysical, non-dimensional surface." Only when it thinks/dreams? PB: >No, the brain _is_ an 'a.m.n-d.s'. It appears as an 'object' in perception. >But it's a 'true form', a subjectivity. HF: >> Do you mean to say that the visual field is never an object, PB: >Yes. HF: >>Doesn't the 'head' do the same as the brain, i.e., become a metaphysical, >>non-dimensional surface? PB: >Yes! HF: >> Are there "two sides" to the brain, but only one >>(and opposite sides?) to the head or the visual field? PB: >There's an object (the head or brain) for the 'observer' (as if seen from >the outside) and an absolute surface on the '=EDnside'. An inside that is only >for the inside. "only one side regardless of the number of its dimensions." >(WIP,p198, french ed.). PB: >Non-semiologically mediated proto-subjectivity all the way down, just like >turtles. ------------------
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