Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 01:21:14 +0800 (CST) From: Liano Sharon <lsharon-AT-ms2.hinet.net> Subject: Some questions on your Bakhtin peice On Sun, 29 Dec 1996, Vadim Linetski wrote: <snip> > throughout my work i argue there there is no need for this > "melancholy" and "pessimism", humbly, i suggest that you skim through my > "Nabokov and Swift, Achilles and the Tortoise: the sublime innocence, or > the uncanny return of the referent in poststructuralist theory along the > lines of Zeno's paradox" and "Bakhtin's words 'There is no alibi for > being': Why Freud was not a creative writer?" - two chapters from > _BAKHTIN LAID BARE..._ > http://www.mcs.net/~zupko/bakhtin/tabcon.htm > - and share with me your critical remarks Ok, on further reading of the chapter dealing with Zeno's paradox I must confess that I've now read the first third or so of the paper several times and though I catch glimpses of things whiich I understand, the whole of your argument escapes me. Some points I'd liek clearification on are the following: 1) what, preciesly, do you mean when you use the word "paradox"? I have the feeling that you may be using it rather unclearly. As a particular example of where I see a lack of clearity, you seem to misunderstand the structure of the Achilles and the Tortoise ""paradox" and the Liar paradox. I put quotations aroound the word when refering to A&T because there is an important sense in which A&T is in fact not a paradox in the same way that the Liar is a paradox. Namely (and this is a version of my quick post on this subject earlier), A&T is or is not a paradox depending totally on where the race is run and totally independent of who participates, while the Liar paradox is a paradox regardless of location and dependent only on the nature of the Liar him or herself. The Liar is self referential (arguably the strongest kind of paradox) while A&T requiers consistent reference to an external referent to be a paradox at all, refer to the wrong race track or use the wrong method of measuring (referencing) it and Achilles wins hands down, no fancy foot work necessary--to prove this all you need to do is go find yourself a tortoise to race (or take an intro to calculus class). In any case, I must strongly dissagree with your assertion that "the Cretan lier [sic] . . . itself is a version of . . . the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise". The structure of the two is completely different, and the difference lies preciesly in what referents each uses and how these referents are used. Since referents seem to be main players in your argument I suggest considering the nature of the two paradoxes (" ") carefully. Put a different way, A&T was a paradox for 2000 years or so because our undestanding of how measurement worked seemed to disagree with observable reality. When the idea of a continuum came along and it became possible to measure the infinitely small (or more importantly, to add the infinitely small together), it was discovered that A&T was not infact a paradox in our physical universe. The Liar is a much more complicated paradox. First of all there are several versions: 1) A Cretan states "all Cretans are liars". This is not a particularly strong paradox, as is illustrated If we consider 2) A Cretan states: "All Cretans always lie" In (1) ther may infact be no paradox since there is no guarranty that he or she is lying at the given moment. "he's a liar" doesn't mean he always lies, it only means he lies sometimes, or possibly even "he's lying right now" with no supposition that he does this habitually. The point I'm getting at is that for the Liar to really clearly be a paradox it must reference itself through all time or state speciifically the temporal limits of its existance as in "_This_ sentence is not true" or "I'm lying _now_". Such temporally constrained paradoxes are pointers to much more interesting paradoxes. For example, note that "all cretans always lie," while it is not constrained temporally, is constrained spacially--to Cretans. Consider a stronger (?? well, lets see if its stroner??) version: "everyone always lies". In fact this is no stronger than (2) because the paradox descends on the individual uttering thi statement and not at all on anyone else in the set used to identify the speaker as one who always lies. Thus a Cretan saying "all cretans always lie" and anyone saying "everyone always lies" and me saying "I always lie" produce exactly the same paradox--this demonstrates that the Liar paradox is in no way spacially constrained (unlike A&T) to some external location. Further, the need to specify a specific (thoough possibly universilly quantified) time frame, together with the centrality of the self-referencing individual, suggests that this paradox represents a way of Being one's self which is qualitatively different from the experience of self we experience now--this suggestion arises from the necessity to distinguish time-in-paradox from time-out-of-paradox while spacial location seems irrelevent. 2) That is, secound point of clearification. You often seem to equate deconstruction with poststructuralism, or with poststructuralism's method of deploying itself. I don't see this connection at all. I see deconstructionism as sort of the inverse operation of logocentrism--logocentrism constructs itself and deconstruction pulls it apart. Locked in battle neiither seems to deploy any kind of life energy. Deconstruction seems to be in constant need of something to deconstruct, if logocentrism went out the windo, deconstructioin (it seems to me) would eiither soon follow or take up its old enemie's place, in essence resurrecting it. I have the impression that you are aguing against this interpretation of deconstructionism. Can you elaborate on this and the relationship yoou see between poststructuralism and deconstruction? well, thats it for now. I'll try to read and understand more of your writting later in the week (I thought I wouldn't be able to get to any of it before the weekend, but I had a lucky break or two :). Your Friend, Liano
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