Date: Sun, 14 Dec 1997 13:04:14 -0500
From: "Charles J. Stivale" <C_Stivale-AT-wayne.edu>
Subject: Sokal/Bricmont


	I=92ve had the Alan Sokal/Jean Bricmont book, _Impostures intellectuelles_
(Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1997), sitting on my desk, then my floor,
then my desk, so in order to get it out of sight, relatively, on my shelf,
here is a brief response to it. I should mention that as much as I=92d like
to do this by means of explicit rapprochement between S/B and Barbara
Herrnstein Smith=92s _Belief and Resistance_, I can=92t do the latter justice,
so any rapprochement will remain implicit since I feel quite comfortable
with her stance and mode of argumentation. In particular, one should look
at ch. 3 "Belief and Resistance: A Symmetrical Account" for an assessment
of the push-pull regarding questions of evidence.

	Sokal/Bricmont have done a slapdash job in preparing this text. To proceed
more rapidly, I repeat (and develop) what I said in an earlier post 2 weeks
ago:
S/B=92s strategy can be summed up as follows: after an intro chapter (in
which they define their goals and attempt to respond in advance to
objections to their project), they mix two sorts of chapters: 1) several
somewhat cursory chapters in which they provide their take on "cognitive
relativism in the philosophy of sciences" (ch. 3), bemoan the fate of
"chaos theory" at the hands of "postmodern science" (ch.6), a skewed survey
of Bergson and his "successors"=92 treatment in the relationship between
science and philosophy (ch. 11), and a final, polemical "epilogue" in which
they pretend to be above the fray while belittling current critical
approaches. The focal chapters are devoted to dissecting how specific
authors introduce science and/or mathematics into their works: Lacan
(ch.1), Kristeva (ch.2), Irigaray (ch.4), Bruno Latour (ch.4), Baudrillard
(ch.7), Deleuze & Guattari (ch.8), and Virilio (ch.9) In each case, they
pull out (arbitrarily in certain cases) of selected works by these authors
excerpts as exemplars of how the authors employ scientific and/or
mathematical terms in ways that S/B judge to be unsatisfactory. In certain
chapters, the bulk of the text consists of... long block quotes from the
targeted authors, sometimes with lengthy, but usually with brief commentaries.

To focus only on the D&G chapter, it runs from p.141 to p.152, and there is
not a page without significant block quotes =96 indeed, all but 5 lines on p144, and all of pp.147, 148, 151. But this quantitative review could well
be irrelevant provided that the qualitative commentary were insightful and
exposed crucial lapses provided in an evidentiary manner in the citations.
This, alas, is not the case.

The chapter starts an epigraph from Foucault, the famous "Mais un jour,
peut-etre, le siecle sera deleuzien" statement. S/B indicate that they will
analyze the parts of the collaborative work with Guattari in which they
introduce physics and mathematics. Immediately, however, S/B indicate the
basis of their objections: "The principal characteristc of the following
texts is their lack of clarity", i.e. to Sokal and Bricmont. Why? "Upon
examining <the texts>, one finds a high density of scientific terms, used
outside their context and without evident logical connection, at least if
one attributes to these terms their usual scientific sense/meaning" (141).
This last phrase, "at least if=85" gives the game away, since S/B make no
effort whatsoever to understand the broader project of D&G and how these
terms, duly transposed and translated, function therein. While S/B pay lip
service to authors=92 freedom to use terms as they see fit, S/B still
maintain that D&G=92s texts "are peppered with very technical terms that are
not usually used outside a very precise scientific discourse, and Deleuze
and Guattari give no alternative definition of these terms" (142).
Moreover, S/B reproach D&G for their "allusions" to a great number of
subjects (Godel=92s theorem, theory of transfinite cardinal numbers, Riemann
geometry, quantum mechanics, to name a few; S/B provide selected references
in footnote 171) because, say S/B, these references are "too quick and
superficial for the reader to learn anything unless he/she already masters
the subjects. But the expert readers will find these affirmations the most
often to be meaningless, or sometimes acceptable, but banal and confused"
(142). So even acknowledging that D&G are engaged in philosophy and not in
"scientific vulgarization," S/B ask: what legitimate philosophical role can
be reached by this poorly digested scholarly terminology?" Their answer:
D&G "are displaying in their writings a vast but highly superficial
erudition." Let us not forget that this explanation comes from two authors
who admit not having achieved any clarity in their understanding of D&G=92s
works; thus, in a policing action based on their own confusion, S/B seek to
expose D&G=92s supposed superficiality and thereby protect "amateur" reader
as well as the expert.

While we would expect to receive "the full monty" in what follows, the bulk
(ahem!) of their expose=92 consists of slim commentaries on the following
citations (I provide the page references in both the French and the English
translations):
	Ia. Qu=92est-ce que la philosophie? <Q> p.111-112 <para. 2 up to "=85et
d=92evanouissement>; What Is Philosophy? <WIP> 117-118 <para. 2 up to "=85 and
disappearance.";
	Ib. Q 112 & WIP 118-119 <the rest of para 2>;
	Ic. Q 112-113 & WIP 119-120 (all of para 3>;
	IIa. Q 123 <"En regle generale =85 meme probabilite=92> WIP 129 <"As a general
rule .. same probability">;
	IIb. Q 123 & WIP 129-130 <next two sentences to "=85 par l=92oeil)"; "=85 by the
eye)";
	III. Q 115-116 ("L=92independence respective =85 qu=92il s=92approprie"), WIP 122
("The respective independence =85 it appropriates");
	IVa. Deleuze, Difference et repetition 66-67 ("Doit-on dire =85 limites
elles-memes"), Difference and Repetition 46-47 ("Must we say =85 limits
themselves");
	IVb. D et r 221-222 ("Nous opposons =85 et son etre"), D and R 170-171
("Just as we oppose =85 and its being");
	IVc. D et r 226-227 ("Le rapport differentiel =85 independant de _i_), D and
R 174-175 ("Finally, the differential relation =85 independent of _i_");
	IVd. D et r 270 ("Il y a donc =85 l=92integralite de l=92objet"), D and R
209("There is thus =85 different/ciation");
	V. Deleuze, Logique du sens 125-126 ("En premier lieu =85 et reformation"),
Logic of Sense 103-104 ("In the first place =85 and reformation");
	VI. Guattari, Chaosmose 76-79 ("On voit bien ici =85 a peine vivable!"),
Chaosmosis 50-52 ("We can clearly see =85 hardly livable!").

	Text Ia provide S/B with D&G=92s distinction between philosophy=92s "concepts"
and science=92s "functives". S/B pause to point out the use of the term
"chaos" in this paragraph since "not in its usual sense in today=92s
science". Here they provide a long footnote, showing D&G=92s reference to
Prigogine and Stengers; S/B conclude: "The definition of =91chaos=92 used by
D&G is thus a mix of a description of quantum field theory  with a
description of the nuclearizing of overmelted liquid <nucleation d=92un
liquide surfondu; translation approximate, I admit>. Let us emphasize that
these two branches of physics are not directly connected to chaos theory in
its usual sens (the theory dynamic non linear systems)". The implied
objection, again, is that D&G exceed the "usual", something S/B cannot abide.
	Text Ib continues the block citation from WIP?, and their commentary (144)
is that given the "at least 12 scientific terms <in this excerpted text>
used without apparent scientific logic," their "discourse oscillates
between non-sense and banalities," and what follows "is even more
impressive", text Ic. Here they comment only that these scraps of sentences
have "submerged meaning", but they provide an example in footnote 175,
stating that even though the quote "is not false, it can cause confusion.
To understand it properly, one has to already possess good knowledge of
relativity." However, the "submerged meaning" to which they refer
unfortunately, say S/B, occurs in a "discourse stripped of any meaning".

	S/B then seek to avoid "boring the reader" by providing other such
examples. However, the use of scientific terminology by D&G "is not all so
arbitrary", so text IIa. is such an example: the opening remark on quantum
mechanics "seems quite profound," the end is "meaningless"; IIb. also
"means nothing", and they refer to Eric Alliez=92s _La Signature du monde_,
ch. II, for an exegesis of D&G=92s statements, "in the same vein as the
original" (145).

	Turning to D&G=92s use of mathematics, text III is an example from WIP?, the
last one from D&G=92s collaborative works, and rather than commenting on it
directly, S/B use it to segue to _Difference and Repetition_ as the primary
vehicle for the criticism of Deleuze=92s use of mathematics. They introduce
the serial citations (texts IVa.-IVd) by stating that although the problems
raised by Newton and Leibniz in the seventeenth century were "resolved" by
d=92Alembert and Cauchy subsequently, "Deleuze pursues a long and confused
meditation on these problems", followed by the citations. A footnote
provides a list of places in D&R in which Deleuze "mixes banalities with
non-sense". The serial quotes take us to p. 149, but throughout the quotes,
footnotes appear that provide various critiques of Deleuze=92s "confusion".
The conclusion states only: "In these texts, we find some comprehensible
sentences =96 sometimes banal, sometimes erroneous--; we have commented on
several in footnotes. For the rest, we leave it to the reader to evaluate
them. The bottom line is that one has to wonder what good all these
mystifications are about mathematical objects that have been well
understood for more than 150 years" (149).

	To complete their review, S/B turn to _Logic of Sense_, and for the second
time (they made this rhetorical move in introducing D&R as well), they
refer sarcastically to Foucault=92s judgment of these two works by Deleuze as
"great among greats." Text V produces this insight: "Once again, this text
=96 that announces the style of his subsequent written works in collaboration
with Guattari =96 is peppered with technical terms". A footnote here supplies
a list, with a commentary on Deleuze=92s use of the term "singularities". The
commentary continues: "But, except for the banal comment that a cell
communicates with the outside through its membrane, <the text> possesses
neither logic nor meaning" (150).

	Finally, for S/B, text VI "contains the most perfect example of an random
mix of scientific, pseudo-scientific and philosophical terms that we could
find; only a genius could have written it" (150). The chapter=92s final
paragraph, following text VI, helps the reader who might wonder "if these
abuses are isolated" with references to 10 sources in WIP?, 7 in _A
Thousand Plateaus_. A footnote linked to the WIP? References states: "This
book is, in fact, scattered with mathematical, scientific and
pseudo-scientific terminology, used the most often in an entirely arbitrary
way". They comment that the lists are not exhaustive, and provide another
footnote, indicating two critical works that provide "examples of research
that elaborated D&G=92s pseudo-scientific ideas": Peter Canning=92s "The Crack
of Time and the Ideal Game", in the Boundas/Olkowski _Deleuze and the
Theater of Philosophy_, and Martin Rosenberg=92s _Postmodern Culture_ 4.1
(1993) essay, "Dynamic and Thermodynamic Tropes of the Subject in Freud and
in Deleuze and Guattari." S/B complete this "concluding" commentary with
two final points: "Guattari=92s article <"Les energetiques semiotiques", in
Brans, Stengers, and Vincke=92s _Temps et devenirs_, 1988> on tensors applied
to psychology is a real pearl. Deleuze=92s ideas on the theory of relativity
will be considered in chapter 11 below."

	This "consideration" occurs on pp. 181-182, Deleuze=92s treatment of
Bergson, _Le Bergsonisme_ (1968). They reproach Dleuze for referring to
"the relativity of even accelerated movement", which S/B argues does not
exist. Deleuze=92s text merely repeats Bergson=92s own errors regarding time,
providing two block excerpts. Their final comment is: One also finds
similar ideas, although expressed in even more confused fashion, in _Mille
Plateaux_ (603-604; ATP 483-484) and in _Qu=92est-ce que la philosophie?_
(125-126; WIP? 131-132).

	In other parts of the book, and especially in the polemical epilogue, S/B
lump D&G collectively into their collective dismissal of postmodern
critique from the French tradition, based on this pseudo-demonstration of
Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattari=92s "confused" and "nonsensical" use of scientific
and mathematical discourse. The fact that S/B have made no attempt
whatsoever to situation the citations they use within the broader context
of the projects they dismiss somehow does not register for them as a
possible problem. So much so that they provide the following poignant
anecdote in the polemical epilogue as evidence for one of the "lessons"
they wish to draw from their review of these texts:
"In Paris, we met a student who, having brilliantly completed a maitrise in
physics, turned to philosophy and to Deleuze, in particular. He tried to
understand _Difference and Repetition_. Having read the mathematical
passages that we critique, he admitted not to be able to see what Deleuze
was getting at. Nonetheless, the reputation of depth that the philosopher
enjoyed was such that the student hesitated to conclude from this that if
he, as one having seriously studied differential and integral calculus,
could not understand these texts, it=92s probably because they mean nothing.
On the contrary, it seems to us that this example should have caused him to
be more critical toward the rest of Deleuze=92s work" (191).

	The above overview and this final anecdote provide a summary of the basis
on which S/B gather D&G=92s discourse into the broadly dismissive net that
constitutes the political purpose of their book. They employ the same
citation/commentary strategy for all the other authors, to greater or
lesser analytical and polemical force, depending on one=92s familiarity with
and/or sympathy for the targeted author. Admittedly, I have a certain bias,
professional and personal, toward D&G (could you have guessed?), but I hope
I have been able to provide enough indication that S/B=92s "analysis" of
their work and failing is based entirely on poorly situated, out-of-context
quotes, assertive (and barely demonstrative) commentary, and mere
accumulation of page references supplied supposedly as further "evidence".

Charles J. Stivale