File spoon-archives/deleuze-guattari.archive/deleuze-guattari_1998/deleuze-guattari.9812, message 532


From: "MIGUELANGEL TISERA" <legnaleugim-AT-etheron.net>
Subject: Feliz a=?iso-8859-1?Q?=F1?=o !
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1998 11:00:05 -0400


This is a multi-part message in MIME format.




Feliz a=F1o !
Happy New Year!
Miguelangel
http://tisera.home.ml.org
http://www.geocities.com/soho/5055

 ----
From: Stephen Arnott <sarnott-AT-metz.une.edu.au>
To: deleuze-guattari-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Date: Miércoles 25 de Noviembre de 1998 08:33 PM
Subject: Re: incorporeal ontology?

It is paradoxical, and that's undoubtedly why Deleuze relishes to such a
degree this magic formula. Monism=Pluralism expresses the insight that only
a monist philosophy can account for pluralism. The arguments are all in DR
and concern the necessity of articulating Being univocally - one Being for
all beings. For Deleuze, pluralist ontologies fail because they are rooted
in analogy and representation (see DR chs. 1, 5 and conclusion). I won't go
into details here, but Deleuze's rejection of analogical conceptions of
Being rests on their inability to account for individuation, for diversity.
=93analogy falls into an unresolvable difficulty: it must essentially relate
being to particular existents, but at the same time it cannot say what
constitutes their individuality=94 (DR 38). So he works on how we can have a
monist, or univocal conception, and the formula for this is
"Being=difference".

As far as ATP is concerned, the word, or one of the words, that expresses
this univocity or monism is 'Mechanosphere' which is defined as the set of
all abstract machines and machinic assemblages outside the stata, on the
strata, or between the strata. But it is an abstract monism, in the sense
that the mechanosphere does not in any traditional sense unite the strata;
it is simply, as Deleuze puts it, the same that is said of the different.
And that same is difference in itself, disparity, inequality, intensity etc.

And what about 'thirdness' - well, I don't know about Peirce and his
reasons for postulating this, but Deleuze's ontology is always triadic.
This is Spinoza's fundamental insight, that a univocal ontology must be
triadic in conception. For him there are modes, there are attributes, and
the thirdness is substance. For Deleuze there is the actual, there is the
virtual, and the thirdness is difference in itself. In DR the
actual/virtual distinction is expressed in terms of two modes of
repetition, the clothed and the bare. Difference is their medium of
interaction. But it is still a monism because in the end the two
repetitions are nothing other than the two faces of difference itself. In
ATP this triadic ontology is expressed in terms of the ecumenon (the actual
and its stratified nature), the planomeneon (the virtual and its profound
consistency) and in between...

In the end only a monist philosophy which can accept difference in itself
as the fundamental ungroundedness of everything that is can hope to account
for the complexity of beings, or nature, of the Chaosmos.

Steve

At 11:51 PM 11/24/98 +0000, you wrote:
>Have missed some discussions - nevertheless re: relational being - this is
>a hot question in semiotics now leading to postulating a "semiotically
>real" entity that is a sign in Peircean definition which must exist
>(subsist?) in a triadic relationship. But triadic not merely in a sense of
>one two three - but rather as magnitudes of thirdness - deleuze's intensive
>multiplicities? Peirce's pragmatic maxim led to what he called "objective
>idealism" - a strange combination but perhaps with a certain affinity to
>deleuze's magic formula (monism=pluralism) that seems incomplete and hence
>enigmatic - as if a necessary "thirdness" is missing. What can be a
>"thirdness" to make this formula a true equality?
>In Foucault Deleuze hints on a third multiplicity calling it a multiplicity
>of relation between forces or a multiplicity of diffusion (p.84). Going
>back to the magic formula - what is the relation? What is between monism
>and pluralism to afford a symbolic equal sign? In the example used by
>Deleuze in Foucault he says "seeing is thinking and speaking is thinking"
>however it doesn't make seeing=speaking? Or does it?
>Inna
>

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Feliz año !

Happy New Year!

Miguelangel

http://tisera.home.ml.org
http://www.geocities.com/soho/5055

----
From: Stephen Arnott <sarnott-AT-metz.une.edu.au>
To: deleuze-guattari-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Date: Miércoles 25 de Noviembre de 1998 08:33 PM
Subject: Re: incorporeal ontology?

It is paradoxical, and that's undoubtedly why Deleuze relishes to such a
degree this magic formula. Monism=Pluralism expresses the insight that only
a monist philosophy can account for pluralism. The arguments are all in DR
and concern the necessity of articulating Being univocally - one Being for
all beings. For Deleuze, pluralist ontologies fail because they are rooted
in analogy and representation (see DR chs. 1, 5 and conclusion). I won't go
into details here, but Deleuze's rejection of analogical conceptions of
Being rests on their inability to account for individuation, for diversity.
=93analogy falls into an unresolvable difficulty: it must essentially relate
being to particular existents, but at the same time it cannot say what
constitutes their individuality=94 (DR 38). So he works on how we can have a
monist, or univocal conception, and the formula for this is
"Being=difference".

As far as ATP is concerned, the word, or one of the words, that expresses
this univocity or monism is 'Mechanosphere' which is defined as the set of
all abstract machines and machinic assemblages outside the stata, on the
strata, or between the strata. But it is an abstract monism, in the sense
that the mechanosphere does not in any traditional sense unite the strata;
it is simply, as Deleuze puts it, the same that is said of the different.
And that same is difference in itself, disparity, inequality, intensity etc.

And what about 'thirdness' - well, I don't know about Peirce and his
reasons for postulating this, but Deleuze's ontology is always triadic.
This is Spinoza's fundamental insight, that a univocal ontology must be
triadic in conception. For him there are modes, there are attributes, and
the thirdness is substance. For Deleuze there is the actual, there is the
virtual, and the thirdness is difference in itself. In DR the
actual/virtual distinction is expressed in terms of two modes of
repetition, the clothed and the bare. Difference is their medium of
interaction. But it is still a monism because in the end the two
repetitions are nothing other than the two faces of difference itself. In
ATP this triadic ontology is expressed in terms of the ecumenon (the actual
and its stratified nature), the planomeneon (the virtual and its profound
consistency) and in between...

In the end only a monist philosophy which can accept difference in itself
as the fundamental ungroundedness of everything that is can hope to account
for the complexity of beings, or nature, of the Chaosmos.

Steve

At 11:51 PM 11/24/98 +0000, you wrote:
>Have missed some discussions - nevertheless re: relational being - this is
>a hot question in semiotics now leading to postulating a "semiotically
>real" entity that is a sign in Peircean definition which must exist
>(subsist?) in a triadic relationship. But triadic not merely in a sense of
>one two three - but rather as magnitudes of thirdness - deleuze's intensive
>multiplicities? Peirce's pragmatic maxim led to what he called "objective
>idealism" - a strange combination but perhaps with a certain affinity to
>deleuze's magic formula (monism=pluralism) that seems incomplete and hence
>enigmatic - as if a necessary "thirdness" is missing. What can be a
>"thirdness" to make this formula a true equality?
>In Foucault Deleuze hints on a third multiplicity calling it a multiplicity
>of relation between forces or a multiplicity of diffusion (p.84). Going
>back to the magic formula - what is the relation? What is between monism
>and pluralism to afford a symbolic equal sign? In the example used by
>Deleuze in Foucault he says "seeing is thinking and speaking is thinking"
>however it doesn't make seeing=speaking? Or does it?
>Inna
>

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