Date: Wed, 06 Jan 1999 16:27:30 -0500
From: Patrick Hayden <phkm-AT-totalnetnh.net>
Subject: Re: Internal/external relations




David F Maier wrote:

> Thanks for this post - but I need to go over it again!
>
> On Fri, 25 Dec 1998, Patrick Hayden wrote:
>
> >  Basically the fundamental question he is addressing is that of how to
> conceive of relations, and his concern about conceiving them as "internal"
> is that they are then understood as mere properties of the "essences" of
> the terms in relation.  If that is the case, a relation is little more
> than an intrinsic part of its terms.
>
> Okay, got it.
>
> > Several problems (in Deleuze's view) arise from this:  how is it
> possible to change relationships if relations are tied to the necessity of
> essentialism?
>
> Hmm.  Not sure what you mean here by "changing relationships."  I can
> see the worry about the "internal" relations, making it look like they
> were relational *properties* of the object(s), but I don't see how this
> leads to "essentialism" or "necessity" by itself.  Wouldn't the
> traditional distinction between "intrinsic" and "accidental" properties
> help here? After all, accidental properties change all the time.  Or is
> that the point - that the property *itself* doesn't change, only the set
> of things it applies to?  If so, why exactly is this a problem?

I think the "intrinsic property" designation is indeed the point that concerns
Deleuze--the very basis for his comments on "internal" (or "intrinsic")
relations--and in this respect is what *can* lead to the charge of
essentialism.  Recall, in Empiricism and Subjectivity for instance, that he
argues against "nonempiricist" theories which hold that "relations are derived
from the nature of things" (p.109).  If relations are "derived from the nature
of things" then, as you note, only the set of things the relation/property
applies to change, and moreover *must* change.  To Deleuze, this *must* is one
problem.  Another is accounting for the change referred to here:  just what is
being changed, and how?

> > do relations have any real existence if they are intrinsic/internal?
> (this problem is what motivates W. James, for instance, to insist that
> relations have as much reality as terms, according to radical empiricism);
>
> I also need to know why this is a problem.  It sounds strange for a
> pragmatist like James to worry about the degree of "reality" that some
> apparently useful concept (here, that of "relation") has.  The distinction
> between the "real" and the "merely apparent" sounds more like something
> the pragmatist's Cartesian opponent would worry about.  What would it mean
> (for James, for Deleuze) for relations to be "real" in this way, given
> that they (should) reject this distinction?

Strategically, I'm not sure that it is strange.  Certainly James (and Deleuze
on this point) was seeking to counter positions that favored essence and
*degraded* the "reality" of relations by positing them as mere intrinsic
properties ("derivatives").  But neither of them assert the reality of
relations while at the same time maintaining a dualistic ontology; they do so
in order to jettison such an ontology.

> > and, if relations are dependent upon essence, does this not imply some
> kind of ultimate "Absolute" or totality that ties everything together
> neatly, so to speak?
>
> That sounds like it would indeed be an unacceptable result.  But how
> exactly does the implication go?

 For a start, consider Nathan's 6 January post on dialectic and Hegel.

> > By emphasizing the "externality" of relations (at least in his most
> explicitly empiricist stances) Deleuze simply wants to avoid some of
> unsavory consequences of essentialism, absolutism, etc. etc.
>
> I agree with this of course, and also with your defense of Deleuze from
> the charge of using "external relations" as a "mantra."
>
> > This does not mean that there are no relations, but it does presume that
> difference is what we're starting from--a difference that cannot be
> subsumed or recuperated.  Much more can be said on this, of course, but
> I'll leave it at that for now.
>
> No, please continue - this sounds promising.  What is it for difference to
> be "subsumed," and why is would that be bad?

I believe an entire publishing industry has focused on that question for about
the past 30 years (not my intention to be rude with this).

> > [quoting someone else]: 'Both Deleuze and Guattari emphasized that the
> impt thing was whether others could use bits and pieces of their work, not
> simply becoming a connoisseur of them. Taking what you need in a creative
> way. (see Chaosmosis, chpter 1).  "I invite those who me to take or reject
> my concepts freely." '
>
> (I agree - good advice for the new year.)
>
> D.


Regards,

Patrick