Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1999 02:57:20 -0500 (EST) From: Orpheus <cw_duff-AT-alcor.concordia.ca> Subject: Truce Subject: Guattari speaks: Orpheus got tired of all this loose talk about fascism and g&d called Mona who said call Jill who said send this interview of Charles Stivale and Felix. Orpheus thought some parts were really related to what was happening on the list. A sudden press of the button and it flew off into ether space. > > 4. Deleuze-Guattari and psychoanalysis > > 5. The Americanization of Europe > > 6. Left and right readings of Deleuze-Guattari > > > with no tomorrow. > Today [1985], everything seems to have > > returned to order, and it's now the era of the new conservatism, > > something that you know quite well in the United States. > > But, people like me who continue to think that, on the > > contrary, this movement continues, whatever the difficulties and > > uncertainties might be, we are taken either for visionaries or > > completely retro and unhinged. Well, I willingly accept this > > aspect, much more willingly than many other things, because > > basically . . . I think that, in '68, not much happened. It was > > a great awakening, a huge thunderclap, but not much happened. > > What has been important is what occurred afterward, and what > > hasn't ceased occurring ever since. Thus, the molecular > > revolutions on the order of the liberation of women have been > > very important in their scope and results, and they are > > continuing across the entire planet. I am thinking to some > > extent of what I encountered in Brazil, of the immense struggles > > of liberation of women that must be undertaken in the Third > > World. > > There is at present a very profound upheaval of subjectivity > > in France developing around the questions of immigrants and of > > the emergence of new cultures, of migrant cultures connected to > > the second generations of immigrants. This is something that is > > manifested in paradoxical ways, such as the most reactionary > > racism we see developing in France around the movement of > > Jean-Marie Le Pen,\8 but also, quite the contrary, manifested > > through styles, through young people opening up to another > > sensitivity, another relationship with the body, particularly in > > dance and music. These also belong to molecular revolutions. > > There is also a considerable development, which, in my opinion, > > has an important future, around the Green, alternative, > > ecological, pacifist movements. This is very evident in Germany, > > but these movements are developing now in France, Belgium, > > Spain, etc. > > So, you'll say to me: but really, what is this catch-all, this > > huge washtub in which you are putting these very different and > > often violent movements, for example the movements of > > nationalistic struggles (the Basques, the Irish, the Corsicans), > > and then women's, pacifist movements, non-violent movements? > > Isn't all that a bit incoherent? Well, I don't think so because, > > once again, the molecular revolution is not something that will > > constitute a program. It's something that develops precisely in > > the direction of diversity, of a multiplicity of perspectives, > > of creating the conditions for the maximum impetus of processes > > of singularization. It's not a question of creating agreement; > > on the contrary, the less we agree, the more we create an area, > > a field of vitality in different branches of this phylum of > > molecular revolution, and the more we reinforce this area. It's > > a completely different logic from the organizational, > > arborescent logic that we know in political or union movements. > > OK, I persist in thinking that there is indeed a development > > in the molecular revolution. But then if we don't want to make > > of it a vague global label, there are several questions that > > arise; there are two, I'm not going to develop them, I'll simply > > point them out. There is a theoretical question and a practical > > question: > > 1) The theoretical question is that, in order to account for > > these correspondences, the "elective affinities" (to use a title > > from Goethe) between diverse, sometimes contradictory, even > > antagonistic movements, we must forge new analytical > > instruments, new concepts, because it's not the shared trait > > that counts there, but rather the transversality, the crossing > > of abstract machines that constitute a subjectivity and that are > > incarnated, that live in very different regions and domains and, > > I repeat, that can be contradictory and antagonistic. That is > > therefore an entire problematic, an entire analytic, of > > subjectivity which must be developed in order to understand, to > > account for, to plot the map of (_cartographier_) what these > > molecular revolutions are. > > 2) That brings us to the second aspect which is that we cannot > > be content with these analogies and affinities; we must also try > > to construct a social practice, to construct new modes of > > intervention, this time no longer in molecular, but molar > > relationships, in political and social power relations, in order > > to avoid watching the systematic, recurring defeat that we knew > > during the '70s, particularly in Italy with the enormous rise of > > repression linked to an event, in itself repressive, which was > > the rise of terrorism. Through its methods, its violence, and > > its dogmatism, terrorism gives aid to the State repression which > > it is fighting. There is a sort of complicity, there again > > transversal. So, in this case, we are no longer only on the > > theoretical plane, but on the plane of experimentation, of new > > forms of interactions, of movement construction that respects > > the diversity, the sensitivities, the particularities of > > interventions, and that is nonetheless capable of constituting > > antagonistic machines of struggle to intervene in power > > relations. > > I really can't develop much for you on that; this is simply to > > tell you that there is at least a beginning of such an > > experimentation showiing that this is not entirely a dream, not > > only mere formulae like I tossed them out ten, fifteen years > > ago; and this movement, I believe that it's the German Greens > > who are giving us not its model, but its direction, since the > > German model is of course not transposable. But it's true that > > the German Greens not only are people whose activity is quite in > > touch with daily life, who are concerned with problems relating > > to children, education, psychiatry, etc., who are concerned with > > the environment and with struggles for peace. They are also > > people who are now capable of establishing very important power > > relations at the heart of German politics, and who intervene on > > the Third World front, for example, having intervened in > > solidarity with the French Canaques,\9 or who intervene in > > Europe to develop similar movements. That interests me greatly, > > the multi-functionality of this movement, this departure from > > something that is a central apparatus with its program, its > > political bureau, with its secretariat. You see, I've returned > > again to the same terms I used when we were talking about the > > College de Philosophie. > > > > CS: That is, the Greens seem to work on all strata, on both molar > > and molecular strata, of the Third World . . . > > > > FG: Right, and on artistic strata and philosophical strata. > > > > 3. French Politics under Mitterand > > > > CS: I'd like to continue the discussion in this political direction. > > Yonu wrote an article last year entitled, "The Left as Processual > > Passion,"\10 and you spoke about several aspects of the current > > political scene. I'd like to know how you see this scene, not > > only from a political perspective, but from an intellectual one > > as well. For example, in this article, you spoke of Mitterand's > > government, and you said, "The socialist politicos settled into > > the sites of power without any re-examination of the existing > > institutions"; that Mitterand, "at first, let the different > > dogmatic tendencies in his government pull in opposing > > directions, then resigned himself to installing a tumultuous > > management team whose terminological differences from Reagan's > > 'Chicago Boys' must not mask the fact that this team is leading > > us toward the same kinds of aberrations." Could you develop > > these comments by explaining the resemblance that you see > > between Mitterand's and Reagan's politics? > > > > FG: It is not exactly a resemblance. There is, let's say, a > > methodological resemblance which is that these are people, > > whatever their origins, their education, who have come to think > > that there was only one possible political and economic > > approach, which they deduced from economic indices, etc., the > > idea that they could govern on the basis of the existing and > > functioning economic axiomatic. > > But, very schematically, here is how I see things: current > > world capitalism has taken control of the entirety of productive > > activities and activities of social life on the whole planet by > > succeeding in a double operation, an operation permeating > > world-wide (_de mondialisation_) that consisted in rendering > > homogeneous the Eastern State capitalistic countries and then a > > totally peripheral Third World capitalism in an identical system > > of economic markets, thus of economic semiotizations. This > > operation has completely reduced the possibilities; i.e. at the > > limit, we no longer have the dual relationship between > > imperialistic countries and colonized countries. All are at once > > colonized and imperialistic in a multi-centering of imperialism. > > This is quite an operation, that is, it's a new alliance between > > the deep-rooted capitalism of Western countries and the new > > capitalisms constituted by the "nomenclatura" of the Eastern > > countries and the kinds of aristocracies in Third World > > countries. One incident that I'll point out to you, which in > > fact would be entirely superficial, in my opinion, is lumping > > together Japanese capitalism with American and European > > capitalisms. For I have the impression that we have yet to > > understand that it's a completely different capitalism from the > > others, that Japanese capitalism does not function at all on the > > same bases. I don't want to develop this point, but it would be > > quite interesting to do so. > > The other operation of this capitalism is an operation of > > integration, i.e. its objective is not an immediate profit, a > > direct power, but rather to capture subjectivities from within, > > if I can use this term.\11 And to do so, what better technique > > is there to capture subjectivities than to produce them oneself? > > It's like those old science fiction films with invader themes, > > the body snatchers; integrated world capitalism takes the place > > of the subjectivity, it doesn't have to mess around with class > > struggles, with conflicts: it expropriates the subjectivity > > directly because it produces subjectivity itself. It's quite > > relaxed about it; let's say that this is an ideal which this > > capitalism partially attains. How does it do it? By producing > > subjectivity, i.e. it produces quite precisely the semiotic > > chains, the ways of representing the world to oneself, the forms > > of sensitivity, the forms of curriculum, of education, of > > evolution; it furnishes different age groups, different > > categories of the population, with a mode of functioning in the > > same way that it would put computer chips in cars, to guarantee > > their semiotic functioning. > > Yet, with this in mind, this subjectivity is not necessarily > > uniform, but rather very differentiated. It is differentiated as > > a function of the requirements of production, as a function of > > racial segregations, as a function of sexual segregations, as a > > function of _x_ differences, because the objective is not to > > create a universal subjectivity, but to continue to reproduce > > something that guarantees power with a certain number of > > capitalistic elites that are totally traditional, as we can > > witness quite well with Thatcherism and Reaganism. They aren't > > in the process of creating a renewed and universal humanity, not > > at all; they want to continue the traditions of American, > > Japanese, Russian, etc., aristocracies. > > Thus, there is a double movement, of deterritorialization of > > subjectivities in an informational and cybernetic direction of > > adjacencies of subjectivity in matters of production, but a > > movement of reterritorialization of subjectivities in order to > > assign them to a place, and especially to keep them in this > > place and to control them well, to place them under house > > arrest, to block their circulation, their flows. This is the > > meaning of all the measures leading to unemployment, to the > > segregation of entire economic spaces, to racism, etc.: to keep > > the population in place. One of the best ways of keeping them in > > place would have been to develop politics of guilt such as those > > in the great universalist religious communities. But that didn't > > work too well, these politics of interiorization and guilt, > > which explains the collapse of theories like psychoanalysis. Now > > it's much more a systemic thought that asserts itself: it's a > > matter of creating systemic poles that guarantee that the > > functions of desire, functions of rupture of balance will > > manifest themselves the least possible. What is the best > > procedure? Much better than guilt is systematic endangering: > > you're sitting in a place, you might have a tiny functionary's > > job, you might be a top-level manager; that's not important. > > It's absolutely necessary that you are convinced that, at any > > moment, you could be thrown out of this job. That concerns the > > non-guarantees of welfare as well as the super-guarantees of the > > salaried professions, with their contracts, perquisites, dachas, > > etc. From this point of view, it's the same in Russia as in the > > United States. You are not guaranteed; you are not guaranteed by > > a connection, by a territory, by a profession, by a corporation; > > you are essentially endangered because you depend on this system > > which, from one day to the next, as a function of some > > requirement of production or simply some requirement of power or > > social control, might say to you: now, it's over. You might have > > been the biggest TV star with tens of millions of fans crazy > > about you, but in the next instant, all that could end > > immediately if there were any dissension that suddenly resulted > > in your no longer functioning in the register of functions we > > agree to promote for the production of subjectivity. So it's > > that kind of instrument, I believe, that gives this power to > > integrated world capitalism. > > And so, in that case, what does a socialist government do when > > it comes to power in France? At the beginning, it thinks that it > > will be able to change all of that, it thinks that it will be > > able to change television, hierarchical relationships, > > relationships with immigrants, etc. And there is astonishment > > for six months during the grace period. And then, since it has > > no antagonistic instrument, no different social practice, no > > specific production of subjectivity, since the government is > > itself moulded by bureaucratization, by hierarchical spirit, by > > the segregation formed by the integrated model of capitalism, > > necessarily it discovers with astonishment that it can do > > nothing, that it is completely the prisoner of inflation, of > > mechanisms that render impossible the development of a > > production and a social life in such a country subjugated by the > > overall machinery of world capitalism. A guy I know well, sort > > of a friend, Jack Lang (the Minister of Culture), discovered > > this immediately: he made a few harmless statements, that might > > have passed totally without notice, at the UNESCO convention > > that I attended. Then he found that he had set off an explosion > > because he had dared to touch a tiny wire, a tiny wheel of this > > mechanism of subjectivation. He dared to say: after all, this > > American cinema is something that has taken much too great an > > importance vis-?-vis the potential Third World productions. > > There was a frightening scandal! He had to beat a retreat > > because he questioned, like during the Inquisition, he > > questioned fundamental dogma relating to this production of > > subjectivity. > > > > CS: You have said about the socialist government that by committing > > itself to "an absurd one-upsmanship with the right in the area > > of security, of austerity and of conservatism," the left has not > > contributed "to the assemblage of new collective modes of > > enunciation." What collective modes of enunciation did you > > foresee? > > > > FG: Listen, from 1977 to 1981, a group of friends and I organized a > > movement, that wasn't very powerful, but wasn't entirely > > negligible either, whose images I have here [FG indicates the > > different posters on his living room walls], that was called > > the Free Radio Movement.\12 We developed about a hundred free > > radio stations, an experimentation, a new mode of expression > > somewhat similar to what happened in Italy. Before 1981, the > > Socialists supported us; Francois Mitterand even came to some of > > our stations, and there was a lawsuit (I lost it, by the way, I > > lost quite a few). When they came to power, they created a > > committee on free radios; they undertook the most incredible > > machinations with their socialist militants, people who aren't > > directly venal in terms of money, but who are part of the > > venality of power, an administrative venality. To speak bluntly, > > they appointed their buddies, people who knew absolutely nothing > > about free radios. The result: at the end of two years, all the > > stations were dead, and all had been invaded, just like the > > invaders we were talking about, by municipal interests, by > > private capitalists, by the large newspapers who already had all > > the power, by other stations, that resulted in their quite > > simply killing the Free Radio Movement. I think that if a > > rightist government had remained in place, we would have > > continued to struggle and to achieve things. It sufficed that > > the socialists came to power in order to liquidate all that. > > I've given you the example of free radios, but I can give you > > the example of attempts at pedagogical and educational > > renovations. They liquidated it all; no, not everything, since > > there are nonetheless some experimental high schools like > > Gabriel Cohn-Bendit's, one of my friends.\13 But after all, one > > sees clearly today, and I said this directly to Laurent Fabius > > [then Mitterand's Prime Minister], that Chevenement is the most > > conservative Minister of National Education that we have seen > > during the Fifth Republic. I could go on and on: in the domain > > of alternatives to psychiatry, there was an _incredible_ > > offensive of calumny, of destruction of the alternative network > > through the lawsuit undertaken against Claude Cigala, claiming > > that he had raped little boys, I don't know what else. > > I could make a complete enumeration for all the > > potentialities; they weren't enormous, it wasn't May '68, but > > some beginnings, some new kinds of practices, compositions of > > new attitudes, of new assemblages, of all that have been > > systematically crushed. Not that the socialists did this > > voluntarily; they didn't realize what they were doing, that's > > the worst part! They didn't realize what they were doing! > > > > CS: So, this failure of the left from a political perspective could > > be extended undoubtedly to the intellectual domain. > > > > FG: Well, there, the failure has been total. > > > > CS: You also said in this article, "A whole soup of supposed 'new > > philosophy,' of 'post-modernism,' of 'social implosion,' and I > > could go on, finally ended up by poisoning the atmosphere and by > > contributing to the discouragement of attempts at political > > commitment at the heart of the intellectual milieu." > > > > FG: Well, the socialists weren't responsible for that; it had begun > > well before. But it's true that despite the sometimes > > considerable efforts by the Ministry of Culture, the result is > > quite nil in all domains. For example, in the domain of cinema, > > French cinema is alive from an economic point of view, but it > > doesn't at all have the richness of German cinema or other kinds > > because in this domain as well, the assemblages of enunciations > > remained entirely traditional, in the publishing houses, in the > > classical systems of production, etc. > > > > CS: And your work in _change International_?\14 > > > > FG: They helped us a bit, at the beginning, and then they dropped > > us. This was, in my opinion, a very interesting and very > > promising undertaking, but we didn't have the resources, and as > > you know, for a journal with that kind of ambition, one has to > > have resources. > > > > CS: So it no longer exists? > > > > FG: No. Well, there is an issue coming out, we're still going to put > > out one or two issues, but what we wanted to create was a > > powerful monthly, international journal. Instead, the socialists > > spent billions to support stupidities like the _Nouvelles > > litt?raires_ journal. And I mean billions! It's shameful. > > > > 4. Deleuze-Guattari and Psychoanalysis > > > > CS: Regarding the current intellectual scene, in a recent issue of > > _Magazine litte'raire_ (June 1983), D.A. Grisoni claimed that > > _Mille plateaux_ proves that "the desiring vein" has disappeared > > . . . > > > > FG: Yeh, I saw that! (Laughter) > > > > CS: . . . and he called Deleuze "dried up".\15 What do you think of > > this? What is your conception of the schizoanalytic enterprise > > right now, and what aspects of the two volumes of _Capitalism > > and Schizophrenia_ appear to you as the most valid? > > > > FG: They're not valid at all! Me, I don't know, I don't care! It's > > not my problem! It's however you want it, whatever use you want > > to make of it. Right now, I'm working, Deleuze is working a lot. > > I'm working with a group of friends on the possible directions > > of schizoanalysis; yes, I'm theorizing in my own way. If people > > don't care about it, that's their business; but I don't care > > either, so that works out well. > > > > CS: That's precisely what Deleuze said yesterday evening: I > > understand quite well that people don't care about my work > > because I don't care about theirs either. > > > > FG: Right, so there's no problem. You see, we didn't even discuss > > it, but we had the same answer! (Laughter) > > > > CS: Deleuze and I spoke briefly about the book by Jean-Paul Aron, > > _Les Modernes_.\16 What astounded me was that despite his way of > > presenting things, he really liked _Anti-Oedipus_. What > > particularly struck me in his statement about _Anti-Oedipus_ was > > that "despite a few bites, the doctor (Lacan) is the sacred > > precursor of schizoanalysis and of the hyper-sophisticated > > industry of desiring machines" (285). A question that one asks > > in reading _Anti-Oedipus_ is what is the place of Lacanian > > psychoanalysis in the schizoanalytic project. One gets the > > impression that you distance yourselves from most of the > > thinkers presented, but that Lacan has a rather privileged place > > to the extent that there is no rupture. > > > > FG: In my opinion, what you are saying is not completely accurate > > because it's true in the beginning of _Anti-Oedipus_, and then > > if you look, en route, it's less and less true because, > > obviously, we didn't write at the end the same way as we did in > > the beginning, and then it's not true at all throughout _A > > Thousand Plateaus_, there, it's all over. This means the > > following: Deleuze never took Lacan seriously at all, but for > > me, that was very important. It's true that I've gone through a > > whole process of clarification, which didn't occur quickly, and > > I haven't finally measured, dare I say it, the superficial > > character of Lacan. That will seem funny, but in the end, I > > think that's how Deleuze and Foucault ... I remember certain > > conversations of that period, and I realize that they considered > > all that as rather simplistic, superficial. That seems funny > > because it's such a sophisticated, complicated language.? > > So, I'm nearly forced to make personal confidences about this > > because, if I don't, this won't be clear. What was important for > > me with Lacan is that it was an event in my life, an event to > > meet this totally bizarre, extraordinary guy with extraordinary, > > crazy even, acting talent, with an astounding cultural > > background. I was a student at the Sorbonne, I was bored > > shitless in courses with Lagache, Szazo, I don't remember who, > > and then I went to Lacan's seminar. I have to say that it > > represented an entirely unforeseen richness and inventiveness in > > the university. That's what Lacan was; he was above all a guy > > with guts; you can say all you want about Lacan, but you can't > > say the contrary, he had no lack of guts. He possessed a depth > > of freedom that he inherited from a rather blessed period, I > > have to say, the period before the war, the period of > > surrealism, a period with a kind of gratuitous violence. One > > thinks of Gide's Lafcadio. He had a dadaist humor, a violence at > > the same time, a cruelty; he was a very cruel guy, Lacan, very > > harsh. > > As for Deleuze, it wasn't the same because he acquired this > > freedom vis-a-vis concepts, this kind of sovereign distance in > > his work. Deleuze was never a follower of anyone, it seems to > > me, or of nearly anyone. I wasn't in the same kind of work, and > > it was important for me to have a model of rupture, if I can > > call it that, all the more so since I was involved in extreme > > leftist organizations, but still traditionalist from many > > perspectives. There was all the weight of Sartre's thought, of > > Marxist thought, creating a whole environment that it wasn't > > easy to eliminate. So, I think that's what Lacan was. Moreover, > > it's certain that his reading of Freud opened possibilities for > > me to cross through and into different ways of thinking. It's > > only recently that I have discovered to what extent he read > > Freud entirely in bad faith. In other words, he really just made > > anything he wanted out of Freud because, if one really reads > > Freud, one realizes that it has very little to do with Lacanism. > > (Laughter) > > > > CS: Could you specify in which writings or essays Lacan seems to > > read this way? > > > > FG: The whole Lacanian extrapolation about the signifier, in my > > opinion, is absolutely un-Freudian, because Freud's way of > > constructing categories relating to the primary processes was > > also a way of making their cartography that, in my opinion, was > > much closer to schizoanalysis, i.e. much closer to a sometimes > > nearly delirious development -- why not? -- in order to account > > for how the dream and how phobia function, etc. There is a > > Freudian creativity that is much closer to theater, to myth, to > > the dream, and which has little to do with this structuralist, > > systemic, mathematizing, I don't know how to say it, this > > mathemic thought of Lacan. First of all, the greatest > > difference, there as well, is at the level of the enunciation > > considered in its globality. Freud and his Freudian > > contemporaries wrote something, wrote monographies. Then, in the > > history of psychoanalysis, and notably in this kind of > > structuralist vacillation, there are no monographies. It's a > > meta-meta-meta-theorization; they speak about textual exegesis > > in the _n_th degree, and one always returns to the original > > monography, little Hans, Schreber, the Wolf Man, the Rat Man.\17 > > So all that is ridiculous. It's as if we had the Bible, the > > Bible according to Schreber, the Bible according to Dora. This > > is interesting, this comparison could be pushed quite far. I > > think that there is the invention of the modelization of > > subjectivity, an order of this invention of subjectivity that > > was that of the apostles: it comes, it goes, but I mean that > > it's moving much more quickly now than at that time, i.e. we > > won't have to wait two thousand years to put that religion in > > question, it seems to me. > > > > CS: It also seems to me that there are many more apostles who have > > betrayed their master than apostles who betrayed Jesus. > > > > FG: I was thinking more of the apostles, I see them more as Freud's > > first psychoanalyses; then, it's the Church fathers who are the > > traitors. Understand, with the apostles, there is something > > magnificent in Freud, he's like a guy who has fallen hopelessly > > in love with his patients, without realizing it, more or less; a > > guy who introduced some very heterodoxical practices, nearly > > incestuous when you think of what was the spirit of medicine at > > that period. So, he had an emotion, there was a Freudian event > > of creation, an entirely original Freudian scene, and all that > > has been completely buried by exegesis, by the Freudian > > religions. > > > > CS: A few minutes ago, you mentioned Foucault. I asked Deleuze this > > question about Foucault yesterday evening: what are your > > thoughts on Foucault nearly a year after his death? How do you > > react to this absence, and can we yet judge the importance of > > Foucault's work? > > > > FG: It's difficult for me to respond because, quite the contrary to > > Deleuze, I was never influenced by Foucault's work. It > > interested me, of course, but it was never of great importance. > > I can't judge it. Quite possibly, it will have a great impact in > > different fields.\18 > > > > CS: Deleuze told me something very interesting: he said that > > Foucault's presence kept imbeciles from speaking too loudly, and > > that if Foucault didn't exactly block all aberrations, he > > nonetheless blocked imbeciles, and now the imbeciles will be > > unleashed. And, in terms of Aron's book, _Les Modernes_, he said > > that this book wouldn't have been possible while Foucault was > > alive, that no one would have dared publish it. > > > > FG: Oh, you think so? > > > > CS: I really don't know, but in any case, when it's a matter of > > machinations on the right . . . > > > > FG: It's certain that Foucault had a very important authority and > > impact. > > > > 5. The Americanization of Europe > > > > CS: There's another question I want to return to. In terms of > > capitalism in the world, I'd like to consider the question of > > the Americanization that penetrates everywhere, for example, > > the "Dallas" effect. There is even a French "Dallas", > > "Chateauvallon" . . . > > > > FG: It's not bad either. It's better than "Dallas," I find. > > > > CS: Of course, for the French. But when you like J.R. . . . > > > > FG: That's true. J.R. is a great character, quite formidable. > > > > CS: But what strikes me in your writing, especially in _Rhizome_,\19 > > is the impression of a kind of romanticism about America, > > references to the American nomadism, the country of continuous > > displacement, deterritorialization . . . > > > > FG: Burroughs, Ginsberg . . . > > > > CS: Right, and one gets the impression of a special America, and we > > Americans who read your texts, we know our America, and here in > > France, as a tourist this time, I see the changes, the > > penetration of our culture that has occurred over the last few > > years, the plastification, the fast food restaurants everywhere > > . . . > > > > FG: Ah, it's incredible. And in the popular social strata, among the > > youth, they babble this kind of slang, they've completely > > identified with it, it's incredible. It's all over Europe, > > everywhere, the linguistic phenomenon of the incorporation of > > American rock. It's really surprising. > > > > CS: So there are two conceptions of America: this nomadic conception > > which you present in your works, but that is finally a romantic > > conception in light of the practice of Americanization, the > > penetration of America and, of course, of capitalism. It seems > > that one does not go with the other, so how do you explain this > > difference? It's not really a contradiction, but simply a > > distance between two conceptions of America. > > > > FG: Well, that's complicated. I'm not very clear about that because > > . . . I went to America occasionally, especially during the > > '70s, and then afterwards, during the '80s, I've gone to Japan, > > to Brazil, and to Mexico a lot, and I've no longer wanted to go > > to the United States. I haven't considered it well, I haven't > > understood why. > > You know, it's not certain that this is a romantic vision. > > Americans are often jerks; they have a pragmatic relationship > > with things; they are dumb, and sometimes, this is great because > > they don't have any background as compared to Europeans, > > Italians, but there is an American functionalism that makes us > > pass into this a-signifying register, that transports a > > fabulous creationism, fabulous anyhow in the > > technical-scientific domain, because they are really a > > scientific people; they don't look for complications, it works > > or it doesn't, they move on to something else. > > I met an American last summer, I was in California, at > > Stanford, I don't know where. I was on a tour to study the > > problems of mental health, a mission for the Ministry of > > Exterior Affairs. Americans are people who receive you very > > well, who take time to talk, which isn't the case here, not the > > same kind of welcome. So, each person that I met gave me an hour > > for discussion, and there, this young psychiatrist explained > > what had happened after the Kennedy Act, the liquidation of the > > big psychiatric hospitals and the establishment in his sector of > > half-way houses, a kind of day hospital to replace the big > > hospitals. He made a diagram chart, I remember, there was a > > graph with double entries, there were all the dimensions of > > these establishments, a remarkable organization of what had been > > developed. So, he finished presenting all that to me, and then > > the conversation finally ended, but there still remained ten > > minutes because we had an hour for our discussion, so there was > > no reason to leave. And I asked him a final question: "And so, > > how did all that work? What was the result?" He broke out > > laughing: "Nil. Zero. It didn't work at all!" I said: "Oh, > > really?" He said: "Yes, it's just a program we made, but it > > didn't work at all!" That was like a thunderbolt for me that > > this guy had made this entire development, and then it didn't > > work, so let's do something else. We see this well in Bateson's > > work: he makes a program on something, it works, but that > > doesn't matter, they move on to something else because they were > > on contract.\20 That's what I find to be the marvelous > > a-signifying freedom, going on to something else, going on to > > something else. They massacre Vietnamese for years, then > > afterwards, oh, well, no, that was stupid, let's go on to > > something else. > > So I wonder if that isn't the rather invading, yankee side of > > Americans that makes us ask what they're up to, what they're > > looking for. But one shouldn't try too hard to discover what > > they're looking for or what they're up to. It's the same for the > > Japanese, but with an entire background of mysticism, of > > religiosity, that also exists in the United States, but without > > being structured the same way. > > > > CS: But where could we insert this question of nomadism? We have > > this "go on to something else" nomadism, so perhaps that's it, > > Kerouac, going on to something else . . . > > > > FG: And next, and next, and next, constantly, constantly, and now, > > and now.
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