Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1999 19:00:25 +0800
From: Paul Bains <P.Bains-AT-murdoch.edu.au>
Subject: RE: dialectic


Give me a few days M. As for Aristotle i don't think i dissed him, he's a
nice guy. As for Hegel whatever one says someone will say it's a
'misinterpretation' (qv. James). What i did say was that H. appears (given
my limited acquaintance) to challenge the then prevailing nominalist
assumption that relations are the products of the mind's own workings (ob.
ref. Kant). (ens rationis). Hegel says the concept _is_ an organism, Kant
says it _appears_ to be one.

Btw, do you teach somewhere (besides this list)? You ob. have an impressive
knowledge of the history of phil. I'm just a humble student with a small
grant, which soon finishes.

 


At 11:33 AM 1/7/99 -0800, you wrote:
>
>
>On Thu, 7 Jan 1999, Paul Bains wrote:
>
>> 'Things' (distinguished within the 'objects' of experience) are not 'nothing
>> but their relations' .
>> 
>> The things involved in relations are not relations, they are _relative_
>> beings. This distinction is easily occluded and seems to have been with
>> Nietzsche and pomo.
>> 
>> Hegel seems to get close to this but it gets lost in the complexities of his
>> own system. At least he recognized the mind indep. reality of relations (in
>> distinction to the essentially nominalist modern philosophies (with Kant as
>> their apotheosis). But he lacks a semiotic analysis of the common ground of
>> mind-indep and mind dependent relations, or their interrelation in
>> knowledge. The problem is to show how categorial schemes can be derived from
>> experience.
>
>Paul, 
>
>You've mentioned the distinction between mind-dependent
>and mind-independent entities several times in the past,
>but your particular usage continues to puzzle me.  It did
>so earlier when you somewhat blithely dissed Aristotle,
>and it does so now in reference to Nietzsche, Hegel and
>Kant.
>
>Here I would point out that Hegel's entire project can
>be reconstructed as "showing how categorial schemes are
>derived from experience" -- this is one way of describing
>the Begriff.  However, quite a bit hinges on what you
>mean by "mind".  Please explain further.
>
>
>Cordially,
>
>M.
>
>