Date: Wed, 20 Jan 1999 06:45:59 -0800 (PST)
From: Paul Bryant <levi_bryant-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: RE: Dialectics


Beth--

I fail to see how page 191 of D&R makes a case for the claim that
Deleuze is engaged in a non-ontological project.  As far as I can
tell, you're referring to one sentence on the page.  "The events and
singularities of the Idea do not allow any positing of an essence as
'what the thing is'".  Does the "what is x" question cover your entire
concept of what ontology is?  If singularities and events aren't
concepts that belong to ontology where do they belong?  What do you
make of the passages in Chapt 1 (Difference In Itself), where Deleuze
claims that being is difference, and praises Duns Scotus as the only
pure ontologist?  What do you make of the structure of the book
overall between the "in itself" of difference and the "for itself" of
repetition, thus rewriting, in a sense, the first two halfs of Hegel's
Greater Logic and reconceptualizing it in a playful manner?  Also, how
do you make sense of the claim that "ontology is an ontology of sense,
which is to say that the world is sufficient unto itself" and that
Deleuze happens to write a book called _The Logic of Sense_ that makes
good on this claim?

Paul



---"B. Metcalf" <bmetcalf-AT-ultranet.com> wrote:
>
> Nathan,
> 
> >	The molar level as a whole is not constituted by the becoming
> >reactive of forces.  The molar is a macro-fold, as such it relates
events
> >through their difference.  The becoming active of forces therefore
> >constitutes the molar just as the becoming reactive of forces does.  
> 
> I agree that the active and reactive forces both take part in the
process
> of the actualization (the becoming molar) of the virtual.  However,
I do
> not agree that active forces are molar.  Only the forces which have
become
> reactive are molar.  I see the molecular/virtual event in process of
> actualization which underlies the molar.  But the intensive-active
forces
> are always molecular.  The becoming active would be the eternal
return to
> the molecular virtual.  
> 
> It sounds to me as though you are thinking of this "macro-fold" as
> something like a dialectical oppositional movement, synthesizing
molecular
> forces into the molar.  That is not my understanding of D.  That is
not
> similar to D's differential difference of excess and default on the
> molecular level. 
> 
> 
> >	Don't try to save yourself by giving me some complex articulation of
> >the  simple "we just have different perspectives on things." 
> 
> From your description of your intierpretation of D, it seems that
you are
> thinking of his perspectivism as just different perspectives on a
prior
> synthesis.  This would introduce a normativity which cancels
differential
> difference.  I do not see this normativity as similar to what D is
talking
> about.    
> 
>  
> >	For what is now probably the TENTH time, Hegel has a level which has
> >similarities to the virtual.  I have never said it IS the virtual. 
But it
> >is certainly not the molar as Deleuze has described it.  Your
inability to
> >think outside of Deleuzean terms has left you to make incorrect
statements:
> >If Hegel's realm of forces isn't Deleuze's virtual, then it must be
the
> >possible (I have shown you why that is wrong) or the actual (and I
have
> >explained to you why that is wrong).  You have yet to say it has to
be the
> >real, but that would be wrong too.  Why can't you accept that
Deleuze's
> >divisons are not exhaustive?
> 
> H's relationality still is repetition in the form of the identity of
the
> concept and is therefore harnessed to the possibility of the molar
concept.
>  If you think it is not, then don't just tell me ten times.  Say why.
> 
> 
> >> Therefore, Hegel's representational forces cannot be intensive
difference
> >> (active forces).  For D, intensive difference (molecular) can
only be
> >> repetition WITHOUT A CONCEPT.       
> >> 
> >	Fine, there are differences -- and the ones you have just stated
> >correspond to the very differences I admitted long before you got
involved
> >in this discussion, that the difference is in the form of
synthesis.  That
> >does not mean there are not similarities, so tell me why the
similarities I
> >have drawn are incorrect.
> 
> Here, again, it sounds like you are thinking of D's difference in
the form
> of a synthesis.  That is not what I think D's difference is. 
Deleuze's
> different relates to different by means of difference.  How is that
similar
> to Hegel's relationality?  Don't just keep saying it is similar. 
Say why.
> 
> Also, since Paul thinks I am reticent about calling Deleuze's project
> ontological, I will refer you to D&R p191.  I thought I had made
myself
> clear that I was speaking against ontology as the 'what the thing is'
> question, which I take to be H's question.   
> 
> Beth 
> 
> 

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