Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1999 09:18:13 -0500
From: "B. Metcalf" <bmetcalf-AT-ultranet.com>
Subject: RE: Dialectics


 
>	Because, to put the matter simply, the fact that Hegel's movement of
>forces is one of return to identity does not define it as possible.
>Deleuze's point about the possible in terms of identity is that realization
>is understood in terms of identity with the possibility it realizes.  But
>that is the relation between the possible and the real, not the definition
>of the possible itself.  To put it in plain English, what is possible is
>what may or may not be realized.  Hegel's realm of forces is not a mere
>possibility in this sense, just as Deleuze's virtual is not a mere
>possibility in this sense.
>
>	Nathan

YES! I agree.  THAT IS Hegel's perspective.  But Deleuze's perspective is
NOT similar.  H presupposes a relationality ontologically prior to the
concept.  From H's perspective this appears similar to D's virtuality.  But
for D, H's ontologically prior relationality still presupposes the 'what
the thing is' question of representation (I never said H would necessarily
agree with that).  For D, H's is NOT that multiplicity which tolerates no
dependence on the identical in the subject or in the object.  Therefore, D
would say that H's is really a representational repetition in the form of
the *possibility* of the concept.  I have never said H thought of his own
position in those terms.

H & D have very different planes of immanence.  The presuppositions of one
plane cannot be used to prove the other wrong.

Beth