From: "Widder,NE" <N.E.Widder-AT-lse.ac.uk>
Subject: RE: Dialectics
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1999 16:31:31 -0000




>  
> >	Because, to put the matter simply, the fact that Hegel's movement of
> >forces is one of return to identity does not define it as possible.
> >Deleuze's point about the possible in terms of identity is that
> realization
> >is understood in terms of identity with the possibility it realizes.  But
> >that is the relation between the possible and the real, not the
> definition
> >of the possible itself.  To put it in plain English, what is possible is
> >what may or may not be realized.  Hegel's realm of forces is not a mere
> >possibility in this sense, just as Deleuze's virtual is not a mere
> >possibility in this sense.
> >
> >	Nathan
> 
> YES! I agree.  THAT IS Hegel's perspective.
> 
	What is Hegel's perspective?  I didn't give you Hegel's perspective
in the above quote.  I gave you the definition of possibility that Deleuze
himself draws upon.  From that definition of possible, Hegel's realm of
forces does not fit in as "the possible".

> But Deleuze's perspective is NOT similar.  H presupposes a relationality
> ontologically prior to the concept.
> 
	Again, concept or Concept.  Deleuze and Guattari in WiP? make clear
that Hegel's Concept is no ordinary concept, in the way you are treating it.
Hegel's Concept is the realm of forces.  There is no "relationality
ontologically prior to the concept" because this ontologically prior
relationality IS the Concept.

> From H's perspective this appears similar to D's virtuality.  But for D,
> H's ontologically prior relationality still presupposes the 'what the
> thing is' question of representation (I never said H would necessarily
> agree with that).
> 
	Nor would I agree with it.  This gets us back to a different aspect
of our exchange, which specifically has focussed on Deleuze's reading of
Hegel.  You have staked your claims the D and H are not similar solely on
D's reading, because you admit not knowing H.  I have pointed out that this
is not what H is up to and that D on this point is wrong about him.  If this
caricature of H is removed, you will find there are similarities.  You have
refused to think outside this caricature, because for you ignorance is
bliss.

> For D, H's is NOT that multiplicity which tolerates no dependence on the
> identical in the subject or in the object.
> 
	Like duh.  I have said that all through this exchange, in fact I was
saying this from before this exchange began.  You are again trying to say
that D and H are not similar because of other ways in which they are
different, and you are in no way addressing the specific similarities I have
outlined.

	Let's go back and remind ourselves of your shifty position, shall
we?  I pointed out similarities in D's virtual and H's realm of forces.  I
was quite specific in how they both oppose atomism, underlie meaning and
sense, give primacy to relationality, and so forth.  I have also said from
long ago that H's synthesis is conjunctive (and, therefore, we can say that
it is not a realm of multiplicity in the same way as Deleuze's virtual
forces).  You have said that the similarities I have identified are not
similarities by pointing to the difference I have already stated.  You whole
argument is fallacious.

> Therefore, D would say that H's is really a representational repetition in
> the form of the *possibility* of the concept.
> 
	I don't give a shit what Deleuze would say.  That is irrelevant.
You have been drawing on Deleuze's reading of Hegel, and staked your claim
to it being a correct reading.  Since I have objected to parts of it which I
feel are incorrect, it does no good to respond to my objections by repeating
them to what Deleuze would say.

	That said, this is also NOT even what Deleuze would say.  Show me
one place where Deleuze defines "possibility" as "representational
repetition".  He speaks of the realization of the possible in that sense,
but not the possible itself.  Hence, here again, the way you draw on Deleuze
is flawed.

> I have never said H thought of his own position in those terms.
> 
	No, but you have stated that Deleuze understands Hegel, with nothing
more than Deleuze's comments as your basis, no knowledge of Hegel.  Have I,
for that matter, put my reading of Hegel in terms of what he thought of his
position?  Obviously not, or I wouldn't have launched into some of the
criticisms I have regarding his understandings of difference and spatiality.

	Now, again, you are trying to defend it by saying that it is just
Deleuze's perspective, and Hegel's self-perspective would obviously be
different.  You are here just trying once again to justify your own
ignorance and put it on par with someone who has actually read some Hegel.

> H & D have very different planes of immanence.  The presuppositions of one
> plane cannot be used to prove the other wrong.
> 
	Typical relativist comment, of the very sort Deleuze rejects.  You
have the Leibniz book, see for yourself.

	I notice you skipped the long part where I explained why I called
you thoughtless and ignorant.  Care to justify your curt dismissal of
similarities between Hegel and Deleuze as being too unimportant to mention?

> Beth  
> 
	Nathan
	n.e.widder-AT-lse.ac.uk