Date: Fri, 22 Jan 1999 20:00:13 -0800 (PST)
From: Paul Bryant <levi_bryant-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: Dialectics


TMB--

It sounds like our difference of opinion here is merely semantic,
which is to say, uninteresting.  If I claim that the projects of
Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and much Anglo-American philosophy
"Critique" this is because they describe themselves in this way as
well.  Foucault devotes an entire book to critique, and Derrida (who
rarely used the term "deconstruction" himself by the way)describes his
own project in this way in numerous places.  Similarly, Deleuze claims
that "philosophy is at its best as critique", and devotes attention to
what this concept means throughout his career.  Now, the most
difficult question of critique is how critique itself is possible... 
That is, how is it possible to give a form of critique that assumes
nothing?  I would be more than interested in exploring that question,
or the question of the variety of forms of critique open to us.  But I
really don't like semantic debates.

Paul


---TMB <tblan-AT-telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 22 Jan 1999, Paul Bryant wrote:
> 
> > TMB--
> > 
> > TMB--
> > 
> > This strikes me as a very narrow view of critique
> 
> Maybe it is. I don't know.
> 
> .  How are you
> > conceptualizing the notion of critique such that you are led to this
> > conclusion?  What would it mean for a critique to have purely
negative
> > consequences?
> 
> I'm not suggesting that critique has purely negative consequences.
> 
>   Which is to say, what would it mean for a critique to
> > have no positive outcome?
> 
> I don't know. I'm not indicating that this is the case for "critique".
> 
>   The distinction I'm making is between
> > argument and critique, though it would be incorrect to say that
> > critique involves no argument.  As I see it, argument plays an all
or
> > nothing game whereby one attempts to show that a position reduces to
> > some sort of logical absurdity or contradiction, thereby allowing
them
> > to dismiss the position altogether.  On the other hand, critique
> > attempts to determine the conditions and limits embodied in a
certain
> > position, thereby making room for an entirely different realm of
> > thought.
> 
> That's precisely what I meant. By playing on the etymological
relationship
> between "critique" and "crisis", I simply meant to emphasise hos
things
> are pushed to limits, conditions are determiined in their qualities
and
> roles, etc, and yes, at that point there can, indeed, be a making
room,
> but often (thought not always), this "making room" is through an
excession
> of the thing critiqued. Sometimes it isn't. What that other thing is
is
> another matter, of course. Critique is, aparently, a kind of
> "revolutionary" relationship to the thing critiqued. As such it can
bring
> about many things. It can lead to breakdown, to a suring up, openings,
> extraparadigmatic advent/openings, etc. You name it. But critique as
such
> does appear to entail a kind of embodiment of the thing critiqued in
the
> manner of pushing crisis, but *not* in the manner, for example, of
> deconstruction. A critique can just as well bring about the greater
> fruition and security within the thing critiqued, like stirring up the
> embers in a fire may spark a log, lying in the back of the fire are,
to
> flame. Or, it may put the fire out, etc. Blah...
> 
>   This has been the standard definition of critique since
> > Kant, and has continued on in one form or another through both
> > analytic philosophy and continental thought.  For instance, Foucault
> > can be seen as engaged in a form of critique insofar as he
attempts to
> > determine the conditions under which a certain form of discourse
> > arose. 
> 
> In its Nietzschean sweep, historical emphasis, nihilistic slant, etc.,
> what you are talking about is better called genaeology, I think.
Critique
> is perhaps a bit more focused and bound to a specific thing in its
already
> being what it is. THe description, for example, of the emergence of a
> given episteme, or a socio-cultural institution, free even of the
motive
> of positive history in the usual senses, isn't really critique, nor
is it
> even simply critique of an age or power/knowledge situation as a
whole.
> There are elements of critique, of argument, of history, thought,
> synthesis, analysis, etc. but this all just refers us then to
Foucault's
> particular *artistry*. The genaeologist, like Nietzsche's
*philologist* is
> either working a bland category or else, if really brilliant,
working a
> vast range and pallete, that, again, *includes* critique simply as
one of
> its brushes, or even as a *prerequisite* for obtaining the freedom
for the
> kind of "impartial" or broad view Foucault develops.
> 
> 
> > Similarly, Quine is engaged in a form of critique when he
> > attempts to dissolve the analytic/synthetic distinction, thus
bringing
> > about the so-called "web of belief".  In the absence of that
> > definition, I'm at a loss in trying to describe this sort of
practice.
> >  But if you prefer to define terms arbritrarily in terms of what you
> > hear in your ear, then by all means do so; but please, tell me
what it
> > is that you're hearing.
> 
> Well, actally I dont' quite see how the "web of belief", thought in
> contradistintion to the analytic/synthetic distinction, constitute
> critique, but that doens't appear to be what you are pointing to
anyhow.
> You simly want to say that critique of Kant's categories enables a
kind of
> "wriggling out of them" that can make room for another view. Tat seems
> fine to me. I don't know if there can be a determinate name for such a
> thing. Critique is certainly part of the process, perahps some
moments of
> deconstruction, too, and some *positive* moments that would have to
have
> some nomination (phusis as emergence, what I call "enconstruction",
> construction in the usual sense, etc.)
> 
> TMB
> 
> 

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