Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1999 13:00:04 -0500 (EST)
From: David F Maier <dfm8-AT-columbia.edu>
Subject: Internal/external relations


Thanks for this post - but I need to go over it again!

On Fri, 25 Dec 1998, Patrick Hayden wrote:

>  Basically the fundamental question he is addressing is that of how to
conceive of relations, and his concern about conceiving them as "internal"
is that they are then understood as mere properties of the "essences" of
the terms in relation.  If that is the case, a relation is little more
than an intrinsic part of its terms.

Okay, got it.

> Several problems (in Deleuze's view) arise from this:  how is it
possible to change relationships if relations are tied to the necessity of
essentialism?  

Hmm.  Not sure what you mean here by "changing relationships."  I can 
see the worry about the "internal" relations, making it look like they
were relational *properties* of the object(s), but I don't see how this
leads to "essentialism" or "necessity" by itself.  Wouldn't the
traditional distinction between "intrinsic" and "accidental" properties
help here? After all, accidental properties change all the time.  Or is
that the point - that the property *itself* doesn't change, only the set
of things it applies to?  If so, why exactly is this a problem?

> do relations have any real existence if they are intrinsic/internal?
(this problem is what motivates W. James, for instance, to insist that
relations have as much reality as terms, according to radical empiricism);

I also need to know why this is a problem.  It sounds strange for a
pragmatist like James to worry about the degree of "reality" that some
apparently useful concept (here, that of "relation") has.  The distinction
between the "real" and the "merely apparent" sounds more like something
the pragmatist's Cartesian opponent would worry about.  What would it mean
(for James, for Deleuze) for relations to be "real" in this way, given
that they (should) reject this distinction?

> and, if relations are dependent upon essence, does this not imply some
kind of ultimate "Absolute" or totality that ties everything together
neatly, so to speak?  

That sounds like it would indeed be an unacceptable result.  But how
exactly does the implication go?

> By emphasizing the "externality" of relations (at least in his most
explicitly empiricist stances) Deleuze simply wants to avoid some of
unsavory consequences of essentialism, absolutism, etc. etc.

I agree with this of course, and also with your defense of Deleuze from
the charge of using "external relations" as a "mantra."

> This does not mean that there are no relations, but it does presume that
difference is what we're starting from--a difference that cannot be
subsumed or recuperated.  Much more can be said on this, of course, but
I'll leave it at that for now.

No, please continue - this sounds promising.  What is it for difference to
be "subsumed," and why is would that be bad?

> [quoting someone else]: 'Both Deleuze and Guattari emphasized that the
impt thing was whether others could use bits and pieces of their work, not
simply becoming a connoisseur of them. Taking what you need in a creative
way. (see Chaosmosis, chpter 1).  "I invite those who me to take or reject
my concepts freely." '

(I agree - good advice for the new year.)

D.