Date: Fri, 18 Jun 1999 10:29:28 -0400 (EDT)
From: Robert Janiga <rjaniga-AT-yorku.ca>
Subject: Re: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricsm (fwd)




---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 1999 10:13:12 -0400 (EDT)
From: Robert Janiga <rjaniga-AT-yorku.ca>
To: deleuze-guattari-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Subject: Re: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricsm

Hello,

I am new to this list.  I have been reading D&G's Anti-Oedipus and A
Thousand Plateaus off and on for the last few months, so my contributions
to this list will bear the marks of my limited knowledge.  That said, I
would like to respond to the following post. 

On Fri, 18 Jun 1999, Daniel Haines wrote:

> Mark Crosby wrote:
> > 
> > "The transcendental is not a universal principle
> > which determines the forms of the empirical on the
> > basis of resemblance it imposes from without, but is
> > a composition of the differential conditions of real
> > empirical geneses that are themselves constituted in
> > that which is given".
> > 
I have never heard of Patrick Hayden, so it is not clear to me the context
from which this quote emanates.  The way I undestand this quote is
that a subject is dually constituted, in the sense of simultaneity.  In
any context a subject will be both shaped by it (thus constituted) but at
the same time shape the context (thus constitutive).  The latter,
constitutive aspect, is what is meant by the concept "transcendental".  A
subject is both shaped by a context but can also transcend that context,
thus a subject is never wholly determined.  In many ways, this connects to
D&G's theory of lines.  Molar and molecular lines determine the routes of
mobility but lines of flight escape this determination (albeit not in an
absolute sense).
  
> this is a very interesting definition which raises many questions for me
> which I hope I can express here...  I would understand this to mean
> replacing a closed system/structural(ist) model  of the
> "transcendental"  with an open/dynamic system or immanent "pattern"
> conception of it --  patterned matter producing singularities-events
> immanently.  

I would respond here, but I am not sure what is being suggested.  However,
I think you are correct to point out the "open/dynamic" nature.  Against
oedipal theories which attempt to situate phenomena in the past, in
museums or archives, D&G's thought seems very much to be oriented toward
the future, to possibilities, to cracks and openings.


> the question for me then becomes - does "trancendental" within this
> quote stand as an "sign" referring to the existence of such patterns, 
> on the level of language only (a term which groups phenomena and in
> doing so interprets/classifies them in a particular way), or is in fact
> the whole point that the transcendental is never "sign" but always
> "signified"?  
> 
> I realise this sfr/sfd not a linguistic model d&g use, but I think it
> illustrates the problem (for me) with this definition.  Is the
> transcendental a phenomena or a concept? or neither? Both? Using a word
> like "composition" suggests that "transcendental" is meant to be
> understood as an "index" (phenomena)  rather than a "sign" (concept) (-
> in the way ATP distinguishes these terms). 
> 
>  I know that the concept of the transcendental here isn't meant to be
> related to the mystical/religious use as such, but I think there is a
> slippage of the two senses here, created by this crucial ambiguity about
> whether "transcendental"  is treated  as a (philosophical)concept,  a
> lingistic construction, an explanatory principle, or something we can
> experience directly, (or something else again!).

Concepts are very important to D&G.  Their book What Is Philosophy?
presents a constructivist approach whereby "concepts" are the stuff of
philosophy.  Any endeavour to make sense of reality first requires the
creation of concepts (not necessarily new ones, but old ones will have to
be re-shaped and re-worked-- again, a subject is not determined by
concepts).  So my last sentence is a bit skewed since reality is 
not made sense of but actually produced.  Secondly, it is important to
note the distinction that D&G draw between the "virtual" and the "actual"
(which can be found in Deleuze's Difference and Repetition).  The
"virtual," although real, is not actual in the sense of materiality.  It
is a domain of problems, suggesting possible solutions.  The concept
"chair", for instance, is a composition of issues, problems, and possible
solutions.  Furthermore, it is not universal and is always contextual.  As
I walk into a room with an exhausted body I may look for a chair with
which to ease my exhaustion.  So the "chair" in this context, as concept,
suggests a certain set of problems that need to be dealt with on a
pragmatic level.  The "chair" that I end up sitting on is an attempt at
solving my problem in an "actual" sense.  

Now, this is not at all akin to Plato's notion of the Forms.  The form
"chair" and the material "chair" have a much different relationship than
the "virtual"/"actual" distinction.  In Plato, the Forms act as
metaphysical reference points, as ontologically grounding mechanisms that
bestow being and eternality on a flux-filled, always changing material
reality.  IN fact, for Plato, the material has no reality since it is
always in flux.  But with D&G, the virtual and actual are both in flux;
and the relationship between them is always shifting, depending on the
circumstances. 

So the term "transcendental" has both a conceptual nature that is virtual
and a material nature that is actual (but both are equally real).
Depending on its context, "transcendental" as a concept will suggest
certain problems and suggest certain solutions; as "actual" it will
attempt to solve the problems of a particular context and its pragmatic
qualities.  However, this does not mean that there is a necessary
relationship between the virtual and actual (otherwise this would simply
bring us into Aristotle's philosophy).  

Anyhow, I hope this makes some sense.  I would love to hear some feedback.

Cheers,

Robert