Date: Mon, 7 Jun 1999 08:45:01 -0700 (PDT)
From: Mark Crosby <crosby_m-AT-rocketmail.com>
Subject: Re: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism 3b?


AMD, you wrote: "In many respects, this correlates
with current work of Habermas and others. (Well..
Otto Apel is included). What we are ending up here
with is that there is a sort of integration of the
position of the transcendental subject of thought or
cognition into that of the 'transcendental
communication community'".

Browsing through Paul Ricoeur's _Oneself as Another_,
I notice he mentions: "the reconstruction of
formalism by Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas on
the basis of a morality of communication... [which]
becomes fully authorized if it is kept along the
regressive path of *justification*, thereby leaving
uncovered the conflictual zone situated along the
progressive path of *actualization*" (280).

Using "the self-legislative character of freedom" as
"an ultimate foundation", Apel, says Ricoeur, "calls
upon the idea, inaccessible to Kant, of *performative
contradiction*, which enables us to save the
self-referentiality proper to transcendental
argumentation from the well-known accusation of
infinite regress ... *Transcendental pragmatics*
repeats, in the practical field, the Kantian
transcendental deduction by showing how the principle
of universalization, acting as a rule of
argumentation, is implicit in the presuppositions of
argumentation in general" (282). For his part,
Ricoeur says, "I shall confine myself to stating that
it is precisely by renouncing the idea of an ultimate
foundation ... that we are invited to follow the
inverse path from that of justification" (283).

AMD, perhaps this excerpt might be useful in your
research. Can you clarify whether what you call "the
fourth distinction, transcendental empiricism" is
distinct from this "transcendental pragmatics"
mentioned above (remember, I am a complete novice
with this stuff)? 

Also, might it be that your original concern was not
that Patrick Hayden's statement that "transcendental
empiricism receives its name precisely because it
seeks to understand the *actual conditions* under
which new things (from ideas to political
organizations) are created and produced" was
inconsistent with Deleuze, but that it was not in
tune with the "transcendental pragmatics" described
by these other authors mentioned above? Thanks, Mark

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