Date: Wed, 23 Jun 1999 13:43:30 +0800
From: Paul Bains <P.Bains-AT-murdoch.edu.au>
Subject: Re: Art and expression


Thought for the day:

Far from being a dubious assumption or miraculous property, the fact that
the primary icon (formal sign [i.e. 'external relation' pb]) functions as a
sign (making present another in awareness), without itself being as such
objectified, is a direct and necessary consequence of the type of
relativity proper and constitutive of the sign. "So in contemplating a
painting", Peirce reminds us (CP 3.362), "there is a moment when we lose
the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and
the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream - not any
particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are
contemplating an _icon_". Deely, Idolum, Archeology and Ontology of the
Iconic sign, In: Iconicity: Essays on the nature of culture, ed. Bouissacs,
1986.
Representations (e.g 'a picture') found relations to something other than
themselves - at infinite speed.

At 03:42 AM 6/23/99 +0100, you wrote:
>From: Daniel Haines <daniel-AT-tw2.com> wrote;
>>John Appleby wrote:
>>>
>> I think that expression may be the only way to think
>>> about art as non-representational, but am not certain of this.
>>
>>could you expand on this point?
>
>I'll have a quick go, but it might be a bit muddy:
>
>I take it as non-controversial that a representational view of art is tied
>to interpretation of the artwork, i.e. one apprehends the work and thinks
>about what it might mean. The standard notion of expression would also be
>representational because it is intentional, in that the artist communicates
>something (e.g. an emotion) to the perceiver. I very much doubt that you can
>have non-representational intentionality.
>
>In contradistinction, D&G appear to argue that this expression takes place
>purely on the level of the work. In other words what is expressed is a
>pre-represenational set of affects which may then become overcoded by
>representation when interpretation is added to the initial reaction:
>
>'By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from
>perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the
>affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to
>extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations' (_What is
>Philosophy?_, p. 167).
>
>This is obviously a movement of becoming rather than one of communication.
>
>The best example of this that I can think of comes from Bataille when
>describing his reaction to the photographs of the Chinese man being tortured
>given to him by Borel:
>
>'I discerned, in the violence of this image, an infinite capacity for
>reversal. Through this violence - even today I cannot imagine a more insane,
>more shocking form - I was so stunned that I reached the point of ecstasy'
>(_The Tears of Eros_, p. 206).
>
>There are two points to notice here. Firstly Bataille's reaction to this
>image is, at least initially, more visceral than intellectual thereby
>circumventing his powers of representation. Secondly, it is very hard to
>believe that this reaction was the result of the photographer intentionally
>trying to communicate ecstasy to the spectator.
>
>It might be objected that this example does not deal with a work of art
>(whatever that is), however I think that the same affects take place with
>more 'normal' artworks, particularly music.
>
>Regards
>
>John
>
>Thought for the day:
>=8CNietzsche thus situates the philosopher and the =8Cabyss=B9 on the same plane:
>knowledge is an unacknowledged power of monstrosity. The philosopher would
>be a mere histrionic if he did not have this power, if he refused
>monstrosity=B9 (Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 205).
>
>
>