Date: Wed, 23 Jun 1999 10:04:19 -0400 (EDT)
From: Inna Runova Semetsky <irs5-AT-columbia.edu>
Subject: Re: Art and expression


Absolutely - and deleuze was very specific writing about annoncing rather
thn representing. That's what gives any sign its particular character
despite the general rule embedded in it according to peirce: if it is an
annonce - it carries the particular content (expressed in the 4th person
singular???-- that's how pictures speak!) for someone, sign is smth that
stands for smth else to someone, the last addition is what makes a
difference. Intentionality is another story and a subject of great debate
e.g. Dennett's intentional stance. I guess it should be looked upon
from Deleuze notion of reciprocal presupposition. In the more radical vein
(or more traditional - depends where you stand) Deely was writing about
relation between what is posited and what is presupposed.
inna


On Wed, 23 Jun 1999, Paul Bains wrote:

> Thought for the day:
>
> Far from being a dubious assumption or miraculous property, the fact that
> the primary icon (formal sign [i.e. 'external relation' pb]) functions as a
> sign (making present another in awareness), without itself being as such
> objectified, is a direct and necessary consequence of the type of
> relativity proper and constitutive of the sign. "So in contemplating a
> painting", Peirce reminds us (CP 3.362), "there is a moment when we lose
> the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and
> the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream - not any
> particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are
> contemplating an _icon_". Deely, Idolum, Archeology and Ontology of the
> Iconic sign, In: Iconicity: Essays on the nature of culture, ed. Bouissacs,
> 1986.
> Representations (e.g 'a picture') found relations to something other than
> themselves - at infinite speed.
>
> At 03:42 AM 6/23/99 +0100, you wrote:
> >From: Daniel Haines <daniel-AT-tw2.com> wrote;
> >>John Appleby wrote:
> >>>
> >> I think that expression may be the only way to think
> >>> about art as non-representational, but am not certain of this.
> >>
> >>could you expand on this point?
> >
> >I'll have a quick go, but it might be a bit muddy:
> >
> >I take it as non-controversial that a representational view of art is tied
> >to interpretation of the artwork, i.e. one apprehends the work and thinks
> >about what it might mean. The standard notion of expression would also be
> >representational because it is intentional, in that the artist communicates
> >something (e.g. an emotion) to the perceiver. I very much doubt that you can
> >have non-representational intentionality.
> >
> >In contradistinction, D&G appear to argue that this expression takes place
> >purely on the level of the work. In other words what is expressed is a
> >pre-represenational set of affects which may then become overcoded by
> >representation when interpretation is added to the initial reaction:
> >
> >'By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from
> >perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the
> >affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to
> >extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations' (_What is
> >Philosophy?_, p. 167).
> >
> >This is obviously a movement of becoming rather than one of communication.
> >
> >The best example of this that I can think of comes from Bataille when
> >describing his reaction to the photographs of the Chinese man being tortured
> >given to him by Borel:
> >
> >'I discerned, in the violence of this image, an infinite capacity for
> >reversal. Through this violence - even today I cannot imagine a more insane,
> >more shocking form - I was so stunned that I reached the point of ecstasy'
> >(_The Tears of Eros_, p. 206).
> >
> >There are two points to notice here. Firstly Bataille's reaction to this
> >image is, at least initially, more visceral than intellectual thereby
> >circumventing his powers of representation. Secondly, it is very hard to
> >believe that this reaction was the result of the photographer intentionally
> >trying to communicate ecstasy to the spectator.
> >
> >It might be objected that this example does not deal with a work of art
> >(whatever that is), however I think that the same affects take place with
> >more 'normal' artworks, particularly music.
> >
> >Regards
> >
> >John
> >
> >Thought for the day:
> >=8CNietzsche thus situates the philosopher and the =8Cabyss=B9 on the same plane:
> >knowledge is an unacknowledged power of monstrosity. The philosopher would
> >be a mere histrionic if he did not have this power, if he refused
> >monstrosity=B9 (Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 205).
> >
> >
> >
>