File spoon-archives/feyerabend.archive/feyerabend_1997/feyerabend.9704, message 91


Date: Sat, 12 Apr 1997 07:48:11 +0800
From: David Geelan <bravus-AT-innocent.com>
Subject: Re: PKF: Scientific Method?


Günter Trendler wrote:

>Sorry but I must object to your [Michelle's] comparison Feyerabend vs. 
>E. v. Glasersfeld and Berger/Luckmann. The distinctions between them are 
>so deep, that I would affirm without much hesitation, that they are 
>incomparable. Above all E. v. Glasersfeld is deeply confusing. His ideas 
>may sound exciting, but they are bad philosophy and bad science. 

I'm working at the moment with my colleague Peter Taylor on a paper
looking at critiques by various academic philosophers of constructivism,
both Glasersfeld's 'radical constructivism' and the many other varieties
that have appeared in our field (science education) over the past ten or
fifteen years. 

(For a critical overview, informed by Feyerabend, of constructivist
perspectives in science education, see my recent paper "Epistemological
Anarchy and the Many Forms of Constructivism", Science & Education
6(1-2), Kluwer.)

As we read the numerous existing critiques of constructivism, two things
stand out:

1. Exactly as Guenter has done, these philosophers describe
constructivism as 'bad philosophy and bad science'. What they mean
though, is that when they try to understand it and subsume it into their
existing epistemological and ontological categories and philosophic
practices, there is no neat fit. A good (bad?) example is Wallace
Suchting's 'Constructivism Deconstructed' in the journal "Science &
Education", with a response by Glasersfeld. 

2. Constructivism is, although fundamentally epistemological in its
'terms of reference', essentially an 'applied science', while philosophy
is not. So if it fails to meet the exacting categories of the
philosophers, is this really important if it meets the needs and
positively changes the practices of science educators (ie classroom
teachers)?

So although I wouldn't consider myself a 'convert' to Glasersfeld's
views, I do believe the epistemological challenges he and the other
constructivists throw out are useful in maintaining a rich diversity of
perspectives, and challenging the monolithic claims of science. 

And in my opinion, that was always PKF's aim.

>Nothing but tricky metaphors!

I guess you don't have much time for Lakoff and Johnson then, either!
They argue that all of our thinking is done in 'tricky metaphors', and
there's no way out of that. If Glasersfeld's metaphors are trickier than
most, good for him!

> Berger/Luckmann aren't much better.(Hope you don't get angry. This are only my opinions!)

I guess they are just your opinions Guenter, and while I honour your
right to your opinions, it'd also be nice to hear on what you base these
opinions. That would give us more to go on in deciding whether to accept
your opinions for ourselves, reject them, or consider them.

For my own part, I again consider Berger and Luckmann's work very
valuable. I don't want to claim that they are 'big T' True, but that
they challenge our existing conceptions and ideas in interesting ways,
and enrich our set of mental tools for making sense of the world.

Regards,

David
-- 
David R. Geelan, Science & Maths Education Centre, Curtin University
GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA, 6107. Ph: +61 9 351 3594 Fax: +61 9 351 2503
Home Page: http://alpha7.curtin.edu.au/~pgeelandr/bravus.htm
'the boundaries of reality are in fact moveable' - Jurgen Habermas

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