Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 21:45:42 -0800
Subject: Re: PKF: Can Philosophy Save Science?


Dear PKF Group,

I would like to briefly suggest that the reductio is valid.

>'If what we perceive is determined by the paradigm we accept, then it
>should be impossible to perceive anything that doesn't fit our paradigm.
>But if it's impossible to perceive anything that doesn't fit our
>paradigm, it's impossible for there to be any anomalies.

However, it is not obvious how we are to interpret the situation.  Consider
the following.  If we assume that the observer is uni-dimensional and can
only see through his paradigm-spectacles, he can only see things in the
world that are commensurable with the paradigm.  In other words he can only
see what makes sense in terms of that paradigm (and quantitative, linear,
homogeneous variations; i.e. commensurable variations).  Such an observer
cannot indeed observe anomalies in any coherent sense.  Anomalies are
incommensurable.  They are incoherent in terms of the paradigm.  He can see
them in so far as he can experience things that don't make sense, but he is
rather unlikely to allow them into the paradigm-established dialogue.

Is it not the case that one who argues for a new paradigm is frequently
perceived, experienced, as being irrational - incoherent?
(incommensurable). And I take this to be close to equivalent to saying that
new paradigm challenging observations are indeed experienced by those who
see the world though the established-paradigm-spectacles as literally
incoherent.

So the writer is correct in his reductio IF the expectation is that the
challenging observation is coherent with respect to the established
paradigm. If this were the case indeed there could be no paradigm shift (we
would always be in the same (commensurable) paradigm.  And as one of the
respondents mentioned, being stuck in this one paradigm would mean that we
could not learn (viz. at least in the qualitative aspect of learning).

A simple example is the notion that quantum theory undermines classical
science: the crucial argument is that we discovered phenomena that are by
their very nature "chance-like", i.e. not governed by time/space invariant
laws in the traditional sense.  In other words we discovered that there was
an "irreducible probablilistic aspect" to reality.  De Broglie points out
that the subsequent discovery that the new realm of "chance-like" phenomena
has its own order does not chnage the undermining of the classical
paradigm.  We just move into "terra incognita" where there are two
complementary objectivities.  The fact that after 75 years no one has
managed to make sense of the situation does not alter my argument here: THE
OBSERVATION THAT CHALLENGES THE ESTABLISHED PARADIGM MUST BE
INCOMMENSURABLE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PARADIGM AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE
EXPECTED TO APPEAR INCOHERENT (IRRATIONAL) IN TERMS OF THE ESTABLISHED
PARADIGM.

It is because our ability to observe and reason is not uni-dimensional that
we are able to learn and have paradigm shifts.  We are humans first
(whatever we may discover that to be in its fullness) and scientists second.

I might also point out that this interpretation allows us to make sense of
Popper's otherwise difficult proposition that we should be able to specify
the evidence were it to occur that would lead us to abandon our hypothesis,
theory, paradigm or research program.  In fact, scientists are quite unable
to make such a specification (except in the limited intra-paradigm sense of
a quantitative, linear, variation of the current articulation).  I hope you
have all been troubled by this.  If not try to make such specification.
The reason we can not specify what observations/evidence would lead us to
abandon our theory is that it must be incoherent with respect to the
current understanding.

This of course leaves us with the implausible suggestion that the entire
sequence is irrational.  I say implausible because I take it to be
intuitively obvious that "science" produces something quite substantial.
Lakatos once made this point by telling us how he needed to reassure a
woman at a cocktail party, after making these points, that we really have
good reason to believe that airplanes will fly as specified (at least most
of the time) and that magic carpet won't.

One way to take off from the reductio is simply to say that we have no
theory that accounts for what we do.  Another Lakatos:  scientists don't
need a theory of science to do science any more than fish need a theory of
hydrodynamics in order to swim.  And given that they (scientists) don't
need one, it is not too surprising that they are unable to explain what
they did after the fact.  Bristol's variation: children don't need a theory
of inquiry in order to ask questions any more than fish need a theory of
hydrodynamics in order to swim.  --- Our theories of science are nothing
more than hypotheses about successful inquiry.  AND GUESS WHAT:  they don't
work.  This doesn't mean that we, or science, are irrational, but it does
suggest that INQUIRY is broader and more sophisticated than what we
represent piecemal as science.

Consider how one blindman, having experienced one part (objectivity) of the
elephant communicates with another blindman who has experienced another
(incommensurable objectivity) part of the elephant.

>And if it's
>impossible for there to be any anomalies, it's impossible for there to
>be any paradigm shifts.
>So if we accept Kuhn and Feyerabend's theory of
>perception, we must reject their history of science.

Kuhn and Feyerabend have simply led us to the recognition of the inadequacy
of our theories of inquiry.


Terry Bristol, President
Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy
3941 SE Hawthorne Blvd
Portland OR 97214

www.isepp.org



Terry Bristol, President and CEO
Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy
3941 SE Hawthorne Blvd
Portland OR  97214	(503) 232-2300
bristol-AT-isepp.org	www.isepp.org


**********************************************************************
Contributions: mailto:feyerabend-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Commands: mailto:majordomo-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Requests: mailto:feyerabend-approval-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu