File spoon-archives/feyerabend.archive/feyerabend_1998/feyerabend.9807, message 18


Date: Tue, 7 Jul 1998 14:51:48 +0200 (MET DST)
Subject: Re: PKF: Slide time


>On the question I posed about nihilism and relativism, I plucked these
>responses from the various emails everyone sent in my apologies for
>misrepresenting anyones views. If I got it wrong then hit me over the
>head with another email.
>
>Responses:
>
>David Geelan
>No need to in real rather than philosophical terms we base our
>decisions on our own values, what's freeing about relativism is that
>it makes these choices explicit.
>
>Drieu Godefridi
>There is no third way we must accept all truth claims. But perhaps we
>are in a position to make value judgements about our own society.

I assume the first sentence, not the second. What I tried to say is that if
we consider the results of our social organization as globaly good,
desirable or whatever, we can choice to defend the main institutions of
this society. To judge that the result is globaly desirable, you have to
begin with a value scale. But not necessarily a very oriented and developed
value scale. I can defend the capitalist system if I only think the merit
of the capitalist system is to permit to billions of humans to live. If the
life of humans is a fundamental value for me, I have to choice to defend
the system which permit to these humans to live. If I meet the social
organization of the Nuer, I accept all their social institutions, but I am
free to prefer the western organization. There is not a iota of objectivism
in this. My choice is perfectly subjective, i.e. based on personal values,
but I assume that, and as said David Geelan, what's freeing with relativism
is that it makes the pure subjectivity of the choice explicit. Not only the
choice between social systems and the value scales are subjective, but also
the proposition that the capitalist system has some merits. Maybe I'm
wrong. But so far the most "desirable" arguments I heard are in favor of
this proposition.

>Chris Holt
>No one view is privileged but there is a partial ordering among views
>while we can't say a view is wrong we can look at it and find out if
>it is arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent. We don't therefore have
>to accept all claims as desirable.

I didn't say that. Objectively, we have to accept all thruth claims, i.e.
we can reject all of them. The time of the choice is a subjective one. As
relativists, we do not have to fight on the objective plan, but what we can
do, and PKF wrote that, is to argument against a philosopher with objectice
pretensions with "objective" sentences, I mean : reasoning one the basis of
the so-called objective values of the objectivist. Example : to show him he
refuse to consider a proposition for reasons which are not correct knowing
his objective pretensions.

 You can accept that someone has
>different values without accepting their value system. "Better" is a
>value laden term and while we can't say in truth terms which value
>system is better that doesn't necessitate giving up my own or
>uncritical acceptance of others. It is misleading to say as Godefridi
>does that we can somehow be more objective to our own societies values
>
>Jeffery  Nich
>There is some reality though we have no apriori knowledge of it. Some
>survival strategies are better than others purely in terms of
>survival. Again Godefridi's suggestion is not helpful
>
>Terry Bristol
>The question is formally undecidable. In The Paramenides Plato
>concludes there is no way that does not lead into contradictions but
>perhaps we need these contradictions. Cf Goedals incompleteness
>theorum
>
>
>I like Terry's response, indeed it might just be the case as in
>mathematics and language that there are some propositions that are in
>principle unanswerable in society such as questions of morality and
>value. I also agree with Jeffery that we cannot have apriori knowledge
>of reality. However I suspect that in terms of values such as
>"good/bad" there is no apriori truth about them it is just as David
>says, values, and perhaps all we can do is try to make these explicit
>so as to gain a better understanding of them.

I agree. But we have to choice. Objectively, subjectively, or whatever, we
have to choice. We have to choice and try to convince other people that our
choice is right, even for a limited period of time and in a limited part of
the world. Life commands to choice.

Drieu Godefridi

 I would like to believe
>as do Chris and Drieu that there is a partial ordering among views and
>indeed do in relation to the physical world. But in human terms all we
>have are values and what is arbitrary, capricious and inconsistent to
>me is more than likely to be logical and consistent to many other
>people even from my own society. There just does not seem to me to be
>that same reality on which to base questions of value upon when we
>turn to things like morality. To me that suggests that perhaps we are
>dealing with different things when we talk of morality and physical
>reality. Also from Chris yes I agree with you accepting that there are
>different values is different from accepting that value system this
>comes back to what David said about making difference explicit. I
>don't know, what does everyone else think am I on the completely wrong
>track?
>
>
>Mike Eathorne-Gould
>(michael-AT-sol.otago.ac.nz)
>**********************************************************************
>Contributions: mailto:feyerabend-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>Commands: mailto:majordomo-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>Requests: mailto:feyerabend-approval-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu


**********************************************************************
Contributions: mailto:feyerabend-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Commands: mailto:majordomo-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Requests: mailto:feyerabend-approval-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005