Date: Fri, 28 Aug 1998 15:29:23 -0800
Subject: Re: PKF: When Harry Met Sandra


May I suggest that the meaning of the term "objectivity" is rather slippery.

In the hard sciences it seems to mean that if A is objectively true then it
is a "time/space invariant truth."  Wigner gives the simple example of
Galileo's supposed experiment at the leaning Tower of Piza.  To say that
the conclusions of the experiment are t/s invariant is to say that the
experiment worked then and it would work now in Piza (space or location
invariance) and that it would work in Portland, Oregon or Brisbane,
Australia.

The notion that scientific truths are linked to t/s invariance is closely
tied to the deep commitment of the sciences to symmetry (a big word for
sameness).  See Wigner's "Symmetry and Reflections".  Another simple way to
see the commitment is in terms of repeatability.  If an experiment is
demonstrating (confirming?) a scientific truth then it must be repeatable.

I think it is unlikely that one can produce a self-consistent model of the
universe (that to which objective knowledge is supposed to correspond)
based on these assumptions (viz. t/s/ invariance, symmetry and
repeatability).  This is a subtle way of saying that no one has produced a
convincing model of the scientific view of the universe.  Science has no
foundations.

Another, closely related way of unpacking the notion of objectivity is in
terms of "perspective" or "frame of reference".  The latter expression is
most commonly used in 20th Century science, particularly with respect to
Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics.

If the universe is completely and consistently describable in terms of
objective truths then there is only one frame of reference.  This is like
saying that all real and meaningful (viz scientific) truth are objective.
Another equivalent way to say this is that all frames of reference are
qualitatively homogenous; this means that everything can be translated
(transformed) into everything else according to some (one)
logically/mathematically consistent set of rules (algorithms).

These are just different ways of trying to articulate the reductionist's
commitments.

What happened in quantum theory that mucked it all up is that physicists
were forced to the conclusion that there wasn't just one set of rules,
there wasn't just one (type of) frame of reference.  As a first step this
is like saying that there are two objectivities: one represented by wave
phenomena and the other by particles phenomena.  --  This first step
however forces a reflection on the deeper assumptions of the entire
enterprise.  It violates the core symmetry assumption of the scientific
model of the universe.

>From now on we must say that there are no frame-of
-reference-independent-experiences, and so no frame-of
-reference-independent knowledge, and so no frame-of -reference-independent
universe corresponding.

The frame of reference of the observer must be considered an essential
component of every observation, every knowledge claims, and so forth.  And
it is crucial to understand here that what is meant by "frame of reference"
has developed.  In the original working hypothesis frames were homogeneous
and logically/mathematically consistent.  But now we must conclude that
frames are at least partially inconsistent - or to jump right to the
jargon, they are at least partially incommensurable.  At the extreme we
seem to be forced towards the conclusion that every experience in the
universe is at least partially incommensurable.  One can just drop the
"partially" here and conclude that all experiences must be incommensurable.
PKF did this occasionally, adding grist to the extreme post-modernist
discussion of this line of thinking.

Notice that there is a very different sort of "problem of communication" in
this post-quantum theory model. If we are all talking from different frames
of reference (indeed, different each time we talk as well) and our
experiences are therefore at least partially incommensurable then how do we
communicate at all.  --  It was so must easier to explain communication
when we all lived in the objectively same, logically commensurable world of
experiences and things.

To close out to ramble . . . . .

To say that two frames of reference are incommensurable is -- I suggest --
to say that they are qualitatively different.  What we mean in practice -
at least when we start with a scientific reductionist agenda - by saying
that the world (ala Descartes Mechanical Philosophy) is reducible to
quantitative differences, is that there are no (real) qualitative
differences.  The classical, modern scientific hypothesis is that:  All
qualitative differences are reducible to quantitative differences.  In
which case all frames of reference must be qualitatively homogeneous and
all truths objective (true independent of the frame of reference (viz.
since there is really only one frame of reference in qualitative terms).

One problem is to conclude simply that all frames are incommensurable or
qualitatively different.  There is then no logically rational system, and
it appears that there is no possible account of the entire world of
scientific, rational thought -- including this discussion itself.

And it is correct to say that all frames and all experiences are
irreducibly incommensurable - in some sense.  In other words you can always
point of some qualitative difference between two frames, two experiences,
etc.  If we were to remain in the scientific conceptual framework we would
be inclined to say that if A and B are at least different in some sense, in
some way, then they are simply different.  Either/or logic.  But since the
whole point is that we just undermined the notion that there was an
universal homogeneous frame in terms of which we could make such inferences
in a complete and consistent way, then the basis this conclusion is not
binding.  We are now in a situation where there is more than one,
qualitatively different frame of reference.

What this last move allows is an uncomfortable alliance between objectivism
and relativism (pluralism).  For any two experiences, observations, truths,
or knowledge claims it is always possible to point out some sameness
between them and some (qualitative) difference.

So for instance, when a scientist claims that an experiment is repeatable,
he/she should not be understood a claiming that the two experiments are
identical in all aspects, in all senses.  Likewise in science when we make
an inductive inference, or assume that all the people on whom we tested a
new therapy, are the same - we do not mean objectively the same - the same
in all possible senses, but only for the purposes of the practical
knowledge being sought.

Much of this just points out what seems - after the fact - to be common sense.

The more interesting developments arise when we see that there is no
meaning in the classical objective world, and that by opening the
discussion to qualitatively different frames of references and experiences,
etc. the questions of meaning can now be addressed.

>From this point on the search for meaning and search for truth are one
research program.



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