Subject: Re: PKF: Walking On
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 1998 21:15:01 +0200


Micheal,
you wrote:

>
> I've spent some time agonizing over replying to you letter Alexander
> because I'm not sure if I understand you, particularly the stuff
> about my sister.....:)
>
> On the one hand in the quote from John McCarthy he seems to be saying
> that we can't change just one component of a theory (presumably) and
> expect to be able to predict the result anyway except approximately in
> real terms. But on the other hand he seems to do just that in the
> example quoted.
>
> Also there is this phrase *relevant aspects of reality* in the quote
> which is used as a qualifier. The problem with this the age old
> question of who decides which are the relevant and which the
> irrelevant aspects of any given reality. I'm sure we all reject the
> positivist notion of "science" as something seperate from society and
> agree that whatever "science" is, it is influenced by many factors
> which have nothing to do with theory or experiment. Further though if
> we expand his idea to take into account aspects of reality which would
> traditionally not be classed as "science" say politics for example,
> then we run into a quagmire of difficulty deciding relevancy and
> irrelevancy let alone in predicting results even in an approximate
> way. So you see I have a little bit of difficulty with use of this
> phrase if as it appears it is used in such a way as to construct a
> general model of reality.
>
> I agree with McCarthy though when he says "... no single definite
> state of the world as a whole corresponds to changing one component."
> And that we only construct "... certain APPROXIMATE models of the
> world." But it seems to me, at least from this quote, that he confuses
> the model with the world itself. Here's an joke someone sent me
> recently in the mail which perhaps makes it a bit clearer
>
> > People make one-way bargains with the Universe all the time. If I do
> > this-and-that, such-and-such will happen. The Universe, not having
> > made any deal, drops a meteorite on them.
>
> Anyway I look forward to your reply and hope I haven't misread your
> reply to badly.

First of all, I agree and have believed for some time that McCarthy
confuses or uses world and model as synonymous or even considers
them coindent -- see my asterisk below. You wrote<But on the other hand he
seems to do just that in the example quoted.> That is part of
the first confusion also.

As Bill mentioned, I should make my 'equations' clearer. I agree.
The kind of thing that I was trying to get at with those remarks
about your sister (nothing personal -- ) falls in the following:
To be doing something is in part to be locked out of what
you are not doing. This is a matter of containment and definition.
On a behavioural level, I am speaking of a kind of fluid referent
(much in the way we speak of kinetic energy) and seperately
of a certain level of 'sureness' or 'confidence' in the brain to which
the fluid referent pertains (much in the way we speak of potential
energy). There would not be a flux of increase and decrease as
the one decreases and the other increases however as in physics,
but there would be what we might call a Cartesian axis at which the
one goes off and the other goes on. Bla Bla.

In any case modal logic can be seen almost certainly as a reification
of our cognitive perceptions of the modifications occur in and on
the conditions of human life. (All I have to do to know this is to think
of some great works of literature, Dreiser or Tolstoy for example.)
This is a warning-light for any modal logicians out there.
An argument -AT- cannot really take a property-predicate or a modal
operator externally (cannot have a predicate or modality assigned to
it, or even posited of it based on the most scientifically accurate
observation! -- although we depend on and trust the scientists to make
as accurate approximations as possible, but this is still not ideal and is
not in accoradance with the facts of the world). An argument -AT- has
internal properties, and if we are speaking of a modal operator, the
internal constitution of the argument will decide the one and only
modalities (or modificational combinations of modalities) according
to which this argument BEHAVES.

Again with regard to let's say my ex-girlfriend's sister's marriage to
a Frenchman: Each of us is behaving as no other human has ever
behaved before or ever will, except for ourselves. I may have behaved
as I am behaving now, but no one else ever has or ever will. Thus
behavior takes on a color or mien which is entirely significant and
exclusionary, as perhaps a fluid referent. You can picture a quantity
structure consisting of material and time. (Rather than speaking of a
Cartesian product structure I much prefer to speak of a quantity
structure. It is much more permissive.) It is the same when I posit
three quantity structures in the universe, x, y, and z, for which there
is a single function f of the three q-structures, and then say that there
value u for which u=f(x,y,z) is our sole yardstick. We have every right
to change the values of our three q-structures *[on paper or on the
field or for some range of assumptions holding up a policy], but we
should discern the consequences first (this goes to BillR's lucid
comments). (Caveat: What exactly did happen when the British
divided up sub-Saharan Africa?)

So I can write: "Why my exgirlfriend's sister's marriage to a
Frenchman?" "Why that mole on my buttocks?" The first does not
permit of a heriditary explanation, except (if someone should wish
to do so -- crass endeavor) from a very wide sociological
perspective. The second permits of an hereditary explanation,
I should think. The first is behavior. The second is not, although
it could be seen as an aesthetic instrument when viewed by the
right person or persons.

Now on with this idea of changing values and consequences with
regard to the counterfactual: With proportional theories it is a simple
matter to turn them upside down, especially where the evidence is
sensitive to the state of technological development which the
theory is working in (e.g. Malthus on population and food supply).

Proportional theories are easy to turn upside down when one
considers the syncategorematic nature of the interpretation
of natural phenomena. What would the world look like without
the two (false, ie instituted) values of scarcity,
i.e. poverty and hunger? Malthusian thinking and
ratios assumed/posited between population and food supply
would be turned upside down or equalized, and hopefully we
as human beings would find it a node of contrition for such a
bastardized way of scientifically BRANDING the world in relation
to human beings and human beings in relation to the world. To
be fairer to Malthus however, if you read deeper into his paper
you will see that he did indeed accept just such syncategorematic
elements vis a vis the shifting tide of social conditions and the
class structures as the drivers of the shifts.

I am worried, however. Something I used to think about a couple
of years ago, which may hit some ears with a strange ring: The
words, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which are now institutions
(have a general and universal significance beyond their original
designations), justify a certain pessimism (belief only in
ego-sensations), appear to belie the justification of social
advantage, and displace any notion of bearing a name which
can be a titular affix or suffix (whether by common citizenship or
by credential) to a proper name (place or person). I don't know
if I can any longer believe this. If someone wishes to verbally
shoot me down for such a dark view, or to call it a liberal
attitude with intentionally built-in contradictions, I really don't
care.
Out here. A.P.
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